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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Civil Procedure--Contribution Among Joint-TortfeasorsRights of Insurers
At the close of its 1965 Spring Term the North Carolina Supreme Court took a significant step in relaxing its previously
adamant stand denying contribution to an insurance company that
has paid a judgment rendered against its insured as a joint tortfeasor. The decision in Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co.' arose out of a prior action by plaintiff Phillips to
recover for personal injuries he received when struck by a 1954
Ford.2 The Ford had been parked on the pavement without lights
and was struck from the rear by an automobile driven by defendant
Parnell. On motion of Parnell, Elliot, the owner, and Blue, the operator of the Ford, were made additional defendants as joint tortfeasors under section 1-240 of the North Carolina General Statutes.'
The court found Phillips had been injured by the concurring negligence of Parnell, Blue, and Elliot, and Phillips recovered from
Parnell a judgment of 3,500 dollars. Upon payment "by or on
behalf of" 4 Parnell of 3,500 dollars in satisfaction of this judgment,
Parnell was to recover from additional defendants Blue and Elliot
1,750 dollars and one-half the court costs. Parnell's insurance
company, Safeco Insurance Company of America, made full payment of the judgment.
Prior to the accident Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company
had issued an automobile liability insurance policy to Elliot. Elliot,
as owner, and Blue, as operator, were each an "insured" under the
terms of the policy, and Nationwide was obligated to pay on behalf
of an insured all sums which the insured became legally obligated
to pay as a result of any accident arising out of ownership, maintenance, or use of the car.5
'264 N.C.749, 142 S.E.2d 694 (1965).
Phillips v.Parnell, 261 N.C. 410, 134 S.E.2d 676 (1964).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-240 (1953).
'Safeco Ins. Co. of America v.Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 264 N.C. 749,
750, 142 S.E.2d 694, 695 (1965).
' The terms of the provision provided that the insurance company was
obligated:
To pay on behalf of the insured [Blue and Elliot] all sums which
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
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Parnell caused execution to be issued on the judgment against
Blue and Elliot. The execution was returned unsatisfied, and
Parnell then sued Nationwide for the amount of the contribution
judgment.' In the superior court, Nationwide pleaded as an affirmative defense allegations that Safeco rather than Parnell had made
full payment of the Phillips' judgment in discharge of its liability
under Parnell's insurance policy. On Parnell's motion the affirmative defense was stricken on the grounds that the facts alleged did
not constitute a defense. Nationwide appealed, and the North
Carolina Supreme Court reversed, stating that the allegations that
Safeco rather than Parnell had made payment meant Parnell was
not the real party in interest and could not maintain the suit.'
Safeco then sued Nationwide. The superior court sustained
defendant's demurrer to the complaint for failure to state a cause
of action. On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed,8
basing its decision on Nationwide's policy provision, reasoning that
since Safeco had discharged Parnell's liability it had become by
operation of law an equitable assignee of Parnell, succeeding to his
rights, and that as such it could compel Nationwide to perform its
policy obligation.' Since this provision is standard in North Carolina in all automobile liability insurance policies, the decision in practical effect amounts to a reversal of the court's prior rulings in this
field.
The rule against contribution among joint tort-feasors was first
of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death at any time resulting therefrom, sustained by any person, caused by accident and
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the automobile.
Id. at 751, 142 S.E.2d at 696.
,The provision further provided:
No action shall lie against the company, unless as a condition precedent
thereto, the amount of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been
finally determined either by judgment against the insured after actual
trial or by written agreement of the insured, the claimant, and the
company.
Any person or organization or legal representative thereof who has
secured such judgment or written agreement shall thereafter be entitled
to recover under this policy to the extent of the insurance afforded by
this policy.
Id. at 752, 142 S.E.2d 696.
7
Parnell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 263 N.C. 445, 139 S.E.2d 723
(1965).
s Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 264 N.C. 749,
142 S.E.2d 694 (1965).
' For the text of the policy see notes 5 and 6 supra.
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announced in England in 1799.1" The English rule, however, was
abolished by Parliament in 1935.11 The policies behind the theory
seem to have centered on the proposition that there should be no
recovery where one's wrongful conduct has contributed to the injury.
Since the original English case dealt with intentional rather than
negligent conduct, the policy of deterring such intentional action by
not allowing contribution is clearly evident. In this country, many
jurisdictions have modified the common law rule by judicial decisions' and statutes,' but a majority of jurisdictions in which the
" Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T.R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
Although the case involved wilful not negligent tort-feasors, it was generally
adopted by American courts as pertaining to both. See Reath, Contribution
Between Persons Jointly Charged For Negligence-Merryweatherv. Nixan,
12 HARv. L. REV. 176 (1899).

" Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935, 25 & 26
GEo. 5, c. 30, § 6(1) (e). This act provided that any tort-feasor may recover
contribution from any other tort-feasor who was, or would if sued have
been, liable in respect of the same damage, whether as a joint tort-feasor
or otherwise.
1 Only seven jurisdictions have allowed contribution between joint
tort-feasors without any form of legislation: District of Columbia, Knell v.
Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Iowa, Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa
800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956) ; Maine, Bedell v. Reagen, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d
24 (1963); Minnesota, Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258
Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960); Pennsylvania, Goldman v. MitchellFletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 Atl. 231 (1928); Tennessee, Huggins v.
Graves, 210 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Wisconsin, Bielski v. Schulze,
16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962). Pennsylvania later adopted this
position in statutory form. PA. STAT. AN. tit. 12, §§ 2082-89 (Supp. 1964).
' Four jurisdictions allow an action for contribution from a joint tortfeasor, whether joined by plaintiff or not, and apportion damages among
joint tort-feasors in accordance with their relative degrees of fault. Arkansas,
ARx. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1001 to -1009 (1962); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN.

tit. 10, §§ 6301-08 (1953); Hawaii, HAWAII REv. LAWS §§ 246-10 to -16
(1955); South Dalkota, S.D. CoDE §§ 33.04A01-33.04A10 (1960). Thirteen
jurisdictions allow an action for contribution from joint tort-feasors, whether
joined by the plaintiff or not, and require that such action result in equally
divided damages: Kentucky, Ky. REv. STAT. § 412.030 (1962) (if tort
involves no moral turpitude); Louisiana, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 2103-05

(Supp. 1964); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1964);
Massachusetts, MASS. Gm. LAws ANN. ch. 231B, §§ 1-4 (Supp. 1964);
Michigan, MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2925 (1962); Missouri, Mo. STAT.

ANN. § 537.060 (1953); New Jersey, N.J. Rnv. STAT. §§ 2A:53A-1 to -5
(1952); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-1-11 to -18 (1954); North
Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-38-01 to -04 (1960); Pennsylvania, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2082-89 (Supp. 1964); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws
ANN. §§ 10-6-1 to -11 (1957); Texas, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212
(1964); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 8-627 (1957) (if tort involves no

moral turpitude). Five jurisdictions allow contribution only from joint
tort-feasors joined by the plaintiff and equally divide damages. California,
CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE §§ 875-880; Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 105-2011
to -2012 (1956); Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN. § 335.5 (1957); New York,
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. § 1401; West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 5481-82
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contribution rights of negligent tort-feasors are not controlled by
statute still hold that the fact that the joint tort-feasor's injurycausing conduct was negligent rather than intentional furnishes no
basis for freeing them of the burden of the general rule that there
can be no contribution among tort-feasors.' 4
In 1929 North Carolina adopted a statute allowing contribution
between joint tort-feasors and joint judgment debtors. 5 In 1936,
however, the statute's effect was limited by Lumbermen's Mut. Ins.
Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.' In Lumbermen's the North
Carolina Supreme Court stated that "a most liberal construction of
the statute will not permit the writing into it of the liability insurance
(1961).

In a recent Kentucky decision the court chose not to award

damages equally under the Kentucky statute. See Elpers v. Kimbel, 366
S.W.2d
157 (Ky. 1963).
14
E.g., Kellenberger v. Widener, 159 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1963); Dobbins
v. Beachler, 47 Ill. App. 2d 30, 197 N.E.2d 518 (1964); Reid v. Royal Ins.
Co., 390 P.2d 45 (Nev. 1964); Wilson v. Herd, 1 Ohio App. 2d 195, 204
N.E.2d 389 (1965); Graves v. Shippey, 215 Ore. 616, 300 P.2d 442 (1956).
See generally annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1366 (1958). For arguments concerning,
the policy of allowing contribution between joint tort-feasors, see the opposing positions of Professors James and Gregory, Contribution Among Joint
Tort-feasors: A Pragmatic Criticism; A Defense, 54 H~Av. L. REv. 1156

(1941).
"5 N.C.

GEN. STAT. § 1-240 (1953):
In all cases in the courts of this state wherein judgment has been, or
may hereafter be, rendered against two or more persons or corporations,
who are jointly and severally liable for its payment either as joint obligors
or joint tort-feasors, and the same has not been paid by all the judgment
debtors by each paying his proportionate part thereof, if one of the
judgment debtors shall pay the judgment creditor, either before or after
execution has been issued, the amount due on said judgment, and shall,
at the time of paying the same, demand that said judgment be transferred
to a trustee for his benefit, it shall be the duty of the judgment creditor
or his attorney to transfer without recourse such judgment to a trustee
for the benefit of the judgment debtor paying the same; and a transfer
of such judgment as herein contemplated shall have the effect of preserving the lien of the judgment and of keeping the same in full force
as against any judgment debtor who does not pay his proportionate part
thereof to the extent of his liability thereunder in law and in equity,
and in the event the judgment was obtained in an action arising out of
a joint tort, and only one, or not all of the joint tort-feasors, were made
parties defendant, those tort-feasors made parties defendant may, upon
motion, have the other joint tort-feasors ... made parties defendant.

Any judgment creditor who refuses to transfer a judgment in his
favor to a trustee for the benefit of a judgment debtor who shall tender
payment and demand in writing a transfer thereof to a trustee to preserve his rights in the same action, as contemplated by this section,
shall not thereafter be entitled to an execution against the judgment
debtor so tendering payment.
16211 N.C. 13, 188 S.E. 634 (1936).
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carrier of tort-feasors when only tort-feasors and judgment debtors
are mentioned therein." 7 In contrast, other jurisdictions have taken
the position that, since the theory of contribution is equitable in
nature, a contribution statute should be liberally construed to include
the insurance companies of tort-feasors.18 This is the position taken
by the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.' 9
The Lumbermen's decision attained its real significance with the
advent of compulsory liability insurance in North Carolina."
Exclusion of the insurance company from the right to contribution
in a state where all motorists are required to have liability insurance
certainly made the statute less meaningful.
An attempt to distinguish the Lumbermen's decision came in
Squires v. Sorahan." Counsel for plaintiff in Squires argued that
17

Id. at 17, 188 S.E. at 636.
E.g., Silver Fleet Motor Express Inc. v. Zody, 43 F. Supp. 459 (E.D.
Ky. 1942); State v. McMillian, 349 S.W.2d 453 (Mo. 1961). This decision
interpreted the Missouri statute on contribution as also giving insurance
companies the right to enforce the judgment although only the word "defendant" appeared in the statute. American Employers' Ins. v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 218 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1954). Here the court applied a Virginia
statute on contribution and reasoned that liberality should be favored in the
application of the doctrine of contribution, since the doctrine had its basis
in the broad principles of equity, and since the Virginia statute did not
specifically exclude the right to contribution from insurance companies, the
right extended to them also. The court also disagreed with the interpretation of the North Carolina Supreme Court in the Lumbernten's decision and
specifically rejected the court's argument.
" UNIFORm CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFFASORS AcT § 1(e). The 1955
Revised Act was the first to contain this section. It provides that:
A liability insurer who by payment has discharged in full or in part the
liability of a tort-feasor and has thereby discharged in full its obligation
as insurer is subrogated to the tort-feasor's right of contribution to the
extent of the amount it has paid in excess of the tort-feasor's pro rata
share of the common liability; and this provision does not limit or impair
any right of subrogation arising from any other relationship.
The original Act was promulgated in 1939. It was adopted in Arkansas
(1941), Delaware (1949), Hawaii (1941), Maryland (1941), New Mexico
(1947), Pennsylvania (1951), Rhode Island (1940), and South Dakota
(1948). As indicated this original act did not contain the insurance provision. Most of the states that adopted the 1939 act had made important
changes in it which defeated the idea of uniformity. For that reason and
because of unfavorable reports as to the progress and operation of the act,
the commissioners withdrew it from further study and revision. Massachusetts and North Dakota have specifically adopted the 1955 revised act.
See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231B, §§ 1-4 (Supp. 1964); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 32-38-01 to -04 (1960). See also CAL. Cw. PROC. CODE §§ 875-880.
" MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY AND FINANCIAL REsPONSIBILITY AcT OF
1953, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.1 to -279.39 (Supp. 1963).
252 N.C. 589, 114 S.E.2d 277 (1960), 12 MmEcER L. REv. 276 (1960).
See also 41 N.C.L. Rnv. 882 (1963).
18
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the earlier decision merely held that a liability insurance company
upon paying more than a proportionate share of the judgment,
could not go directly against the insurance company of the other
joint tort-feasor and did not rule out an action against the joint
tort-feasor himself."2 The North Carolina Supreme Court, however,
took the position that an insurance company that pays a joint tortfeasor's obligations to the injured party cannot force contribution
from other tort-feasors. "G.S. § 1-240, as interpreted by the many
decisions of this Court cannot be stretched to include subrogation,
which arises by reason of contract, into contribution, which arises
by reason of participation in the tort."2"
Another attempt to circumvent the Lumbermen's decision came
in Herring v. Jackson. 4 This case arose out of a prior action in
which the injured party had sued Herring for injuries received in
an automobile collision, but Herring made no attempt to bring in
Jackson as a joint tort-feasor. Being convinced that he could not
successfully defend the action against him, Herring settled with
the injured party, and a consent judgment was entered against him.
In an attempt to preserve Herring's contribution rights against Jackson, Herring's insurance company, Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company, executed a "loan receipt" to Herring and made full payment of the judgment against him.25 When Jackson subsequently
sued Herring for injuries received in the accident Herring counterclaimed for his own injuries. The court found for Herring on the
counterclaim. Herring then brought suit against Jackson in an
attempt to enforce contribution, under section "1-240, to the original
consent judgment. The North Carolina Supreme Court felt the
"loan receipt" was a subterfuge to subvert sections 1-57 (the realparty-in-interest statute) 26 and 1-240 and held the settlement repreBrief for Appellant, p. 17.
Squires v. Sorahan, 252 N.C. 589, 591, 114 S.E.2d 277, 279 (1960).
2
u255N.C. 537, 122 S.E.2d 366 (1961).
22
2

= The agreement stated that Herring, the insured, receive the sum re-

quired to pay the judgment against him from the insurance company as a
loan to be repayable only in the event and only to the extent any recovery
might be obtained by plaintiff from defendant as joint tort-feasor. Herring
agreed to cooperate with the insurance company and to allow suit to be
brought in his name if necessary to the extent that all rights of contribution
which he had or might thereafter acquire be enforced. The expense of
litigation was to be borne by the insurance company, and if action brought,
it would be under sole control of the insurance company. Id. at 542, 122
S.E.2d at 370-71.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-57 (1953).
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sented not a loan but payment under the policy. Thus the insurance
company, not the insured, was the real party in interest, 27 and since
the insurance company has no right to contribution under section
1-240, the judgment of dismissal was affirmed.2"
It can be deduced from these prior decisions that if the insured
brings an action for contribution under section 1-240 after his
insurance company has paid the judgment he may not recover,
since the insurance company, not the insured, is the real party in
interest.' On the other hand, if the insurance company brings the
action in its own name against the additional defendant after judgment has been rendered it cannot succeed, since the insurance company, as the statute is interpreted by the court, is neither a joint
tort-feasor nor a joint judgment debtor.30
All these prior decisions involved secondary suits brought to
obtain judgments under section 1-240 after payment of an original
judgment by the insurance company. This situation elicited one
writer to comment that
as the law apparently now stands, an insurer must bear the
entire burden if it satisfies a judgment before judgment is entered in favor of its insured for contribution against the joint
tort-feasor; that is, the liability carrier can preserve its insured's
right to contribution only by impleading the joint tort-feasor as
an additional defendant. By this procedure, plaintiff's judgment
against the insured and the latter's judgment against the additional defendant for contribution are entered at the same time
thus preserving the right.31
" For the position that under a "loan receipt" an insurance company is

the real party in interest see Crocker v. New England Power Co., 347 Mass.

1313, 202 N.E.2d 793 (1964) ; Wold v. Grozalsky, 277 N.Y. 364, 14 N.E.2d
437" (1938); Cf. Cunningham v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 139 N.C. 427, 51

S.E. 1029 (1905).

Generally, an insurance company that pays a claim in full becomes
the real party in interest and must sue in its own name against a tort-feasor
under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-57. Where an insurance company pays only
part of the loss and the insured pays the balance over the policy limit, the
insurance company is subrogated to the insured's right only to the extent
of payment by the company. In such a case the insured remains the real
party in interest, and the insurance company is a proper party but not a
necessary party to the suit. See, e.g., Jewell v. Price, 259 N.C. 345, 130
S.E.2d 668 (1963); Smith v. Pate, 246 N.C. 63, 97 S.E.2d 457 (1957).
.9 Squires v. Sorahan, 252 N.C. 589, 114 S.E.2d 277 (1960); Gaffney v.
Lumbermen's
Mut. Cas. Co., 209 N.C. 515, 184 S.E. 46 (1936).
"0 Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 211

N.C."'41
13, N.C.L.
188 S.E.Rav.
634 882,
(1936),
15 N.C.L.
887-88
(1963). Rv. 289 (1937).
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However, earlier in the 1965 Spring Term it appeared that the
court had also closed this avenue of escape for insurance companies
and indeed strengthened its noncontribution position. In Parnellv.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,32 Safeco's first attempt to secure contribution arising out of the Phillips action, as previously indicated
the court had reiterated the Herring rule. In the negligence action
by Phillips, the injured party, against Parnell, Blue and Elliot were
brought in as additional defendants by Parnell, and counsel for
Parnell argued that this distinguished the case from Lumbermen's,
Squires, and Herring.3 The North Carolina Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that Parnell had made no payment nor otherwise
defendant and
suffered any loss for which he had a claim against
34
interest.
in
party
real
the
be
therefore could not
This ruling came as no surprise and in fact followed the reasoning of the court's prior decisions. But two months later in Pittman
v. Snedeker35 the court reached a totally anomalous result, which
proved to be a harbinger of its decision in Safeco. In Pittman the
plaintiff, a minor, was injured when an automobile operated by
his mother and an automobile operated by Snedeker collided. Plaintiff brought suit against Snedeker to recover for injuries received
in the accident. Snedeker denied liability and filed a cross-action
against the mother as an alleged joint tort-feasor. The mother
was made an additional defendant. The jury found plaintiff was
injured by the concurring negligence of Snedeker and the mother.
A judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff which provided that
upon satisfaction of the judgment by Snedeker, he could recover
one-half the amount from the mother. Snedeker's insurance company, United Services Automobile Association, made full payment
of the judgment. Snedeker then caused execution to issue against
the joint tort-feasor, plaintiff's mother. The mother then brought
suit to enjoin this execution and, when an injunction was refused,
appealed. To follow the reasoning of its prior decisions the North
Carolina Supreme Court had only to state that Snedeker was not
the real party in interest. Counsel for plaintiff pointed this out in
his brief and relied upon Lumbermen's, Squires, and Herring to
263 N.C. 445, 139 S.E.2d 723 (1965).
for Appellee, pp. 3-4.
"Brief
4
' Parnell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 263 N.C. 445, 449, 139 S.E.2d
723, 726 (1965).
- 264 N.C. 55, 140 S.E.2d 740 (1965).
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support his position." This was the same argument advanced by
counsel for the defendant in Parnell17 and adopted by the court
as the basis for its decision in that case."8 But the court refused to
accept the reasoning that it had arrived at two months earlier and
affirmed the lower court's refusal to enjoin the execution. The
court distinguished Herring in a perfunctory manner, saying "appellant ignores the factual differences .... The difference is vital."39

This apparently meant that in Herring execution was returned
unsatisfied and the original defendant was trying to enforce his
contribution judgment by affirmative action, whereas in Pittnan
execution was issued on the contribution judgment and the additional defendant was trying to enjoin the execution. If this is the
factual difference the court was alluding to, then one must conclude
that the original defendant is not the real party in interest for
affirmative action to enforce contribution but he is the real party
in interest in an execution where the additional defendant is seeking
an injunction. Since in both instances the insurance company made
the settlement, the type of action should have no bearing on which
party is the real party in interest. Since this reasoning is so inconsistent, it seems clear that the court was actually reevaluating its
prior rulings when it stated "no sound reason appears why the
insurance carriershould be penalized for performing its contractual
obligation."40 This statement is indeed an anomaly in light of the
prior decisions, but it is a welcome one.
It is important to note that in all the decisions discussed above
the injured party sued one defendant who then brought into the
"3Brief for Appellant, pp. 5-6, Pittman v. Snedeker, 264 N.C. 55, 140

S.E.2d 740 (1965).

"7Brief for Appellant, pp. 5-9, Parnell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 263

N.C. 445, 139 S.E.2d 723 (1965).

See note 34 supra.
Pittman v. Snedeker, 264 N.C. 55, 57, 140 S.E.2d 740, 743 (1965).
40 The court stated:
There has been no cancellation of the judgment for which appellant is
liable. She makes no claim that she has paid the debt which a court of
competent jurisdiction has solemnly declared she owes. She seeks to
escape her obligation because an insurance company made the payment
as required by its contract with the original defendant. The insurance
company was not a volunteer. If Snedeker had borrowed the money
from someone under no obligation to make a loan, and, as security for
the loan, assigned his judgment in favor of the additional defendant, no
one would question the right of the assignee to enforce the judgment
against the additional defendant.
Id. at 58, 140 S.E.2d at 743-44. (Emphasis added.)
fl
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action an additional defendant as a joint tort-feasor. This situation should be distinguished from the situation in Greene v. Charlotte
Chem. Labs., Inc.4 In Greene the court reached the "unfortunate"'
decision that when the injured party chooses to sue all the tortfeasors jointly, a defendant in the action cannot cross-claim for
contribution against any codefendants before judgment has been
entered against all of them jointly. Therefore, if the plaintiff
takes a voluntary nonsuit or suffers an involuntary nonsuit as to one
defendant, his codefendants cannot act to retain him as a party in
the action, but must pursue a separate action for contribution after
their liability to plaintiff has been judicially determined. If in
such a situation an insurance company had paid a codefendant's
obligation to the plaintiff, whether it would be able to pursue this
separate action to enforce contribution under Safeco has not yet
been decided. However, to deny insurance companies this right
would be in effect basing the decision on whether the plaintiff
decides to sue all the tort-feasors instead of only one of them.
The Safeco decision, as previously indicated, was based on a
standard provision of an automobile liability insurance policy. This
provision was present even in the policy involved in the Lumbermens decision in 1936, and, certainly, the court could have relied on
it in a number of similar cases. Basically, the court in Safeco stated
that plaintiff, having discharged Parnell's liability to Phillips, became
by operation of law an equitable assignee and as such acquired
Parnell's rights to enforce payment from Blue and Elliot. 3 The
court then, in an apparent reference to its rule in Pittman, said that
Safeco could by execution or action enforce the judgment against
Blue and Elliot.4 This in effect means that Safeco, an insurance
company which had paid a judgment rendered against its insured
as a joint tort-feasor, could by affirmative action enforce a contribution judgment against a joint tort-feasor who had been made an
'-254 N.C. 680, 120 S.E.2d 82 (1961). For a criticism of the decision see
40 N.C.L. Rav. 633 (1962).
' See Brandis, Civil Procedure (Pleading and Parties), Survey of North
Carolina Case Law, 43 N.C.L. REv. 873, 884-85 n. 44 (1965).
" The theory that the insurance company becomes by operation of law
an equitable assignee to the insured's rights is not a new one. See, e.g.,
Milwaukee Ins. Co. v. McLean Trucking Co., 256 N.C. 721, 125 S.E.2d 25
(1962); Smith v. Pate, 246 N.C. 63, 97 S.E.2d 457 (1957); Cunningham
v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 139 N.C. 427, 51 S.E. 1029 (1905).
""Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 264 N.C. 749,
751, 142 S.E.2d 694, 696 (1965).
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idditional defendant. This nullifies the reasoning of the court in
Pittman that the case is distinguishable from Herring on the basis
of the types of action involved. The cases are in complete disagreement.
The court then reasoned that all this imposes no obligation
on Nationwide, but that an obligation does exist as a result of the
insurance contract which was intended to protect Blue and Elliot
from judgments imposing liability on them for the negligent operation of the automobile. Since Safeco acquired its insured's rights by
making payment of his judgment liability, it could compel Nationwide to perform its contract.
Though the result in the decision is rather indirect, it is certainly in the right direction. It now appears that, although contribution per se does not exist between insurance companies, the
insurance company which pays its insured's judgment can enforce
by execution or action contribution from either the additional defendant under Pittman, or from his insurance company under
Safeco. Whether insured can bring suit in his own name, however,
seems doubtful without express reversal of the Herring decision.
Since the common-law rule of not permitting contribution between joint tort-feasors was abrogated by statute in North Carolina,
it seems apparent that the legislature must have realized the obvious
injustice of allowing one defendant to pay an entire loss when two
defendants were responsible. Since automobile liability insurance
is compulsory in North Carolina, if the efficacy of the statute is
to be realized to any extent, there is no valid reason for denying
insurance companies a right to participate. Most of our tort litigation today involves automobile collision situations and in a very
real sense insurance companies are the only "real parties in interest."4 5 Safeco, in effect, reflects this realistic approach to the

problem.
JAMES A. MANNINO

"Brief for Appellee, p. 4, Parnell v. Nationwide Mut Ins. Co., 263
N.C. 445, 139 S.E.2d 723 (1965).
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Constitutional Law-Habeas Corpus-New Post-Conviction
Hearing Act
Experience in criminal law administration has shown that defendants are sometimes convicted of crimes through procedures
which do not comply with the due process requirement, or which
are legally ineffective for some other reason.' To guard against
these miscarriages of justice arising in the usual channels of criminal procedure, various post-conviction remedies have been instituted. These post-conviction remedies are extraordinary remedies
and are used only when no direct procedures are available. With
these post-conviction remedies the legality of incarceration and
not the question of guilt or innocence is put in issue.2 One such
remedy in North Carolina is the Post-Conviction Hearing Act."
In 1965 this act was rewritten and substantially changed. Important
changes were made in the procedure for the filing and review of
petitions for post-conviction relief. Also, the grounds for review
under the act were broadened considerably. However, the most
significant consequence of the new act is its effect upon other
remedies which had previously been available for collaterally attacking imprisonment. It is the purpose of this note to point out some
of these changes and to discuss briefly some constitutional questions
raised by certain provisions of the new act.
Unlike the earlier Post-Conviction Act,4 the new act is not
limited to the review of alleged substantial denials of constitutional
rights. Instead, the act provides a means of review where any of
the following grounds for relief are asserted: (1) that in the
proceedings which resulted in conviction there was a substantial
denial of constitutional rights; (2) that the court was without
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) that the sentence exceeds
the maximum authorized by law; or (4) that the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error
heretofore available under a writ of habeas corpus, writ of coram
nobis, or other common law or statutory remedy.5 Under the new
'For example, where the court was without jurisdiction.

' See generally UNIFORM PosT-CoNvIcTION PROCEDURE AcT, 9B UNIF.
LAWS ANN. 344-45.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222 (1965 Advance Leg. Serv., No. 3).

"N.C. Sess. Laws 1951, ch. 1083, § 1.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-217 (1965 Advance Leg. Serv., No. 3).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

act, as under both the earlier act0 and prior habeas corpus procedure, 7 there must have been no previous adjudication of the
assertion by any court of competent jurisdiction.8
The new act simplifies the procedure for filing petitions for
relief' and clearly sets forth what is to be contained in such petitions.' 0 Post-conviction proceedings are now commenced by the
petitioner's filing three copies of his petition with the clerk of the
superior court in the county in which the petitioner's conviction
occurred." The act requires the clerk to deliver one copy of the
petition to the solicitor.'" It then directs the clerk to enter receipt
of the petition upon the criminal docket and to bring promptly the
petition to the attention of the "resident judge or any judge holding
the courts of the district or any judge holding court in the county."' 3
This procedure seems an improvement over the earlier act, which
required the petitioner himself to serve a copy on the solicitor and
made no provision for directing the clerk to call the attention of
the judge to the petition. Further, under the new provisions if it
appears to the judge that substantial injustice may be done by any
delay in hearing upon matters alleged in the petition, he may issue
an order appropriate to bring the petitioner before the court without
delay and may direct the solicitor to answer the petition at a time
specified in the order.' 4 In addition, if it appears to the judge that
records of the proceedings which resulted in the petitioner's conviction are necessary for a proper determination of the allegations,
upon a finding that the petitioner is indigent the judge is directed
to order the county to pay the cost of furnishing such records to
the petitioner.' 5 This added simplicity and clarity in the provisions
dealing with the preparation, filing, and processing of the petition
o N.C. Sess. Lavs 1951, ch. 1083, § 1 at 1085.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 17-7 (1953). See In re Adams, 218 N.C. 379, 11
S.E.2d 163 (1940); In re Brittain, 93 N.C. 587 (1885).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-217 (1965 Advance Leg. Serv., No. 3).
o N.C. GEN . STAT. § 15-217.1 (1965 Advance Leg. Serv., No. 3).
10 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-218 (1965 Advance Leg. Serv., No. 3).
a'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-217.1 (1965 Advance Leg. Serv., No. 3).
12
Ibid.
"'Ibid. Although this section does not expressly state that the judge
must be a superior court judge, the implication is that a superior court
judge is required, since the petition is filed with the clerk of the superior
court and is entered on the criminal docket of the superior court.
14 Ibid.
2 5N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-220 (1965 Advance Leg.
Serv., No. 3). Under
both the earlier act and the present act, the judge is directed to appoint
counsel for the petitioner if he is indigent and requests counsel.
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for relief seem a definite improvement in post-conviction relief in
North Carolina, especially when it is realized that most petitions
are drafted and filed by the petitioner himself or with the aid of
another inmate.1 6
Many of the difficulties which have arisen involving post-conviction remedies may be traced to the multiplicity and indefiniteness
of existing post-conviction remedies
In recognition of this fact
section 15-217 of the act states that the remedy therein provided
is the exclusive remedy for challenging the validity of incarceration under any sentence of imprisonment or death.' The effect of
this section in situations where it is applicable is to replace the writ
of habeas corpus and all other common-law or statutory remedies
with the new remedy."9 However, article I, section 9 of the United
States Constitution and article I, section 21 of the North Carolina
Constitution provide that the "privilege of habeas corpus shall not
be suspended." In light of this explicit prohibition it is possible
that section 15-217, in an effort to eliminate the problems that
have resulted from the multifariousness of post-conviction remedies,
violates these constitutional provisions by "suspending" the writ
of habeas corpus.2"
The primary purpose of article I, section 21 and similar provisions is to guarantee the citizen who is restrained of his liberty
18 See generally 2 HARV. J. LFmis. 189 (1965).
1"

See UNIFORm POsT-CoNvICTION PROcEnuIE AcT, 9B UNIF. LAWS ANN.

344, 348.

8 Parts of § 15-217 are taken verbatim from § 1 of the Uniform PostConviction Procedure Act.
18 Section 15-217 only purports to replace remedies which, prior to its
enactment, had been available for attacking incarceration under sentence
of imprisonment or death. Therefore, presumably the provision will have
no effect on the continued use of habeas corpus where the petitioner is
incarcerated in an insane asylum or in the child custody cases or where
a prisoner is held illegally prior to trial. See, e.g., it re Harris, 241 N.C.
179, 84 S.E.2d 808 (1954); In re Habeas Corpus of Jones, 153 N.C. 312,
69 S.E. 217 (1910). It would seem that the new act would not apply in
cases where the petitioner is incarcerated for civil contempt, since the act is
made available to persons "incarcerated under sentence of . . . imprisonment." Presumably, it would be available to one who was held for criminal
contempt if he were incarcerated in the penitentiary, Central Prison, or
common jail of any county.
"The Supreme Court of the United States has held that article I,
section 9, of the federal constitution restricts only federal action and has
no effect on action by a state. Gasquet v. Lapeyre, 242 U.S. 367 (1917).
See LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, LIRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CoNsriTUITION OF THE UNITED STATES

OF AmERICA

363 (1964).

no further mention of article I, section 9, will be made.

Accordingly,
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a speedy investigation into the cause of his detention, and to secure
his release unless he is legally detained. 21 Therefore it would seem
that the "suspension" of the writ which is prohibited by this provision means denial to the citizen of the right to demand a speedy
investigation into the cause of his detention and to secure his release if such detention is illegal, whether or not that remedy is

designatedhabeas corpus.' Clearly, legislation which, without more,
completely abolished the writ of habeas corpus would violate this
purpose,2 3 as would legislation which seriously curtailed the efficiency of the remedy guaranteed the citizen.24 However, it is well
established that the legislature may reasonably regulate habeas
corpus so long as the legislation does not abrogate or detract from
the protective force of the writ of habeas corpus as protected by
the constitution.2 5 Hence, it is submitted that section 15-217,
merely because it replaces habeas corpus with the new remedy, does
not necessarily violate article I, section 21, provided that the new
remedy offers to every person who could have used habeas corpus
" See, e.g., Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908); Ex parte

Craig, 282 Fed. 138 (2d Cir. 1922); State v. Towery, 143 Ala. 48, 39 So.

309 (1905); Ex parte Johnson, 1 Okla. Crim. 414, 98 Pac. 461 (1908);
FERRIs, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES § 4 (1926); HuRD, HABEAS

CoRpus 143-46 (1858).
" See, e.g., State v. Towery, 143 Ala. 48, 50, 39 So. 309 (1905), where
the court said:
The 'suspension' of the writ which is prohibited means the denial to
the citizen of the right to demand an investigation into the cause of his
detention. When this right is accorded to him, all that he has a right
to demand is that his case be investigated according to the usual mode
of procedure in courts of justice, and that 'justice' shall be administered
without sale, denial or delay.'
Id. at 309-10.
" See State v. Hawkins, 37 Del. 396, 183 Atl. 626 (1936); Mahaffey v.
State, 87 Idaho 228, 392 P.2d 279 (1964); Madsen v. Obermann, 237 Iowa
461, 22 N.W.2d 350 (1946); Hoff v. State, 279 N.Y. 490, 18 N.E.2d 671
(1939); Ex parte Davis, 66 Okla. Crim. 271, 91 P.2d 799 (1939); Ex
parte Wilkins, 7 Okla. Crim. 422, 115 Pac. 1118 (1911); Commonwealth

v. Reifsteck, 271 Pa. 441, 115 Atl. 130 (1921).

But see United States

v. Anselmi, 207 F.2d 312, 314 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 902

(1954).

ee Cannon v. Stuart, 3 Houst. 223 (Del. 1860) ; People ex rel. Tweed

v. Liscomb, 60 N.Y. 559 (1875); In re Knight, 74 Okla. Crim. 321, 131
P.2d 506 (1942); In re Patzwald, 5 Okla. Crim. 789, 50 Pac. 139 (1897);
Miskimins v. Shaver, 8 Wyo. 392, 58 Pac. 411 (1899).
"E.g., Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 392 P.2d 279 (1964); Johnson
v. Burke, 238 Ind. 1, 148 N.E.2d 413 (1958); Olewiler v. Brady, 185
Md. 341, 44 A.2d 807 (1945); Ex parte Webers, 275 Mo. 677, 205 S.W.
620 (1918) ; Miskimins v. Shaver, 8 Wyo. 392, 58 Pac. 411 (1899).
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a remedy which is as broad and effective as habeas corpus would
be under the same circumstances.2
But does the new Post-Conviction Hearing Act provide for
every person who because of the act cannot utilize the writ of
habeas corpus a remedy which is as broad and effective as habeas
corpus? It is helpful to consider this question in three separate
parts. First, does the new act make the new remedy available to
every person who no longer may use habeas corpus because of the
act? Because of the manner in which section 15-217 is drafted,
it cannot be said conclusively that the new remedy is available to
every person who, according to section 15-217, may no longer
rely on habeas corpus. The first paragraph of section 15-217
enumerates the persons who may utilize the new remedy.2 7 The
second paragraph of this section states that the new remedy shall
be the exclusive means of challenging the validity of incarceration
under sentence of imprisonment or death.2" Construing the section
" Support for this conclusion may be found in the somewhat analogous
situation which has arisen with respect to article I, section 9, of the United
States Constitution as a result of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958). Section 2255
provides that an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts
shall not be entertained if the applicant could apply for relief by motion to
vacate or if he has filed a motion and was denied relief, unless the remedy
by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
It is well established that, notwithstanding article I, section 9, where a
motion to vacate offers an effective remedy, it is not unconstitutional to
refuse to entertain an application for habeas corpus where the applicant
has failed to file a motion or such a motion was refused. See United States
v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1951); Madigan v. Wells, 224 F.2d 577 (9th
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 911 (1956); United States v. Anselmi,
207 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 902 (1954); Close v.
United States, 198 F.2d 144 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 879 (1952);
Jones v. Squier, 195 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1952); Barrett v. Hunter, 180
F.2d 510 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 897 (1950). See generally 20
A.L.R.2d 965 (1951). But see 59 YALE L.J. 1183 (1950).
Perhaps the most distinguishing aspect of § 2255 is that it specifically
provides that habeas corpus shall remain available in situations where the
motion to vacate is "inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of . . .
detention." The North Carolina act has no such provision.
"' "Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary, Central prison, common
jail of any county or imprisoned in the common jail of any county and
assigned to work under the supervision of the State Prison Department...
may institute a proceeding under this article."
28 "The remedy herein provided is not a substitute for nor does it affect
any remedies which are incident to the proceedings in the trial court, or
any remedy of direct review of the sentence or conviction, but, except as
otherwise provided in this article it comprehends and takes the place of all
other common-law and statutory remedies which have heretofore been
available for challenging the validity of incarceration under sentence of
death or imprisonment, and shall be used exclusively in lieu thereof."
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whole,2"

it is possible to conclude that the new remedy is the
as a
exclusive remedy only as to persons who are enumerated in the first
paragraph of the section. Under this construction the act is not
exposed to the possibility of violating article I, section 21, since
the persons who may use the act are the only ones who may no
longer use habeas corpus.30 By this same construction, however,
the only persons who may utilize the new remedy are those persons
enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 15-217. But, as the
comments to the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act point
out,"' the primary purpose of the language in section 15-217 is to
avoid the multiplicity of existing post-conviction remedies by consolidating all such remedies into a single procedure for obtaining
post-conviction relief. By limiting the availability of the new remedy
in North Carolina to persons enumerated in section 15-217, the
statute has departed from this objective, since habeas corpus and
other post-conviction remedies remain available to all persons not
enumerated in section 15-217, i.e., to all persons who cannot utilize
the new remedy. Fortunately, this flaw in the statute could easily
be corrected by replacing the unnecessary enumeration of persons
" See 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4703
(3d ed. 1943).
" The second paragraph could also be construed to mean that the new
remedy is the exclusive means of challenging "incarceration under sentence
of death or imprisonment." Indeed, since the purpose of § 15-217 is to avoid
the multiplicity of post-conviction remedies by consolidating all such procedures into a single remedy, this would seem a reasonable interpretation of
the provision. Under this construction it is likely that § 15-217 would
violate article I, section 21, unless the list of persons in the first paragraph
of § 15-217 includes every one who might be considered as imprisoned

under sentence of death or imprisonment. For example, persons confined in

a city jail are not enumerated as being eligible for relief. Although persons
are usually confined in a city jail pending trial or transportation to another
place of confinement, it is conceivable that some persons in a city jail might
be treated as incarcerated under sentence of imprisonment. If so, then
such a person could not be denied both habeas corpus and relief under the
new act without violating article I, section 21. In such a situation the
court could do one of two things: it could (1) read into the statute words
which are not there and permit the petitioner to utilize the new act, or (2)
rule that the petitioner could seek relief through a writ of habeas corpus.
However, this latter construction does to some extent depart from the
general rule that a statute should be construed as a whole. See note 29,
supra. Further, the North Carolina court has held that where a statute is
fairly susceptible of two interpretations, one constitutional and the other
not, the court will adopt the former and reject the latter. E.g., State v.
Casey, 201 N.C. 620, 161 S.E. 81 (1931); Jenkins v. State Bd. of Elections,
180 N.C. 169, 104 S.E. 346 (1920).
"See

UNIFORM PosT-CoNvIcTIoN

ANN. 344, 351.

PROCEDURE

ACT, 9B UNIF. LAws
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eligible for relief with a clause making the new remedy available
to any person incarcerated under sentence of imprisonment or
death.
It would seem that any ground of relief which could have been
asserted by a writ of habeas corpus may now be raised under the
new act, since section 15-217 expressly states that the petitioner
may assert that the sentence is subject to collateral attack "upon
any ground of alleged error heretofore available under a writ of
habeas corpus ......

Finally, does the new act subject the petitioner to any procedural or jurisdictional restrictions or handicaps which make the
new remedy less effective than habeas corpus would have been
under the same circumstances? The procedure for filing a petition
relief and instituting the proceedings under the new act seem no
more restrictive or less effective than has been the case under habeas
corpus procedure.32 Nor does there appear to be any reason why
the hearing under the new act would be less adequate than the
hearing which has heretofore been available upon a writ of habeas
corpus.33 Also, the means of review of a final judgment is the
same as has been available under prior habeas corpus procedure. s4
" Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -217.1 (1965 Advance Leg.
Serv., No. 3), with N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 17-4 to -8 (1953). But see N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 17-5 (1953), which permits an application for a writ of habeas

corpus to be made by any person on behalf of a party who is illegally restrained, and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 17-8 (1953) which authorizes any justice
of the supreme court or judge of the superior court to issue a writ of
habeas corpus where any person is illegally detained even though no application for relief has been made. Section 15-217.1, the section which sets
out the procedure for filing petitions for relief under the new act, does not
necessarily exclude the possibility of some one other than the prisoner
filing a petition since it provides: "The proceeding shall be commenced by
filing. . . ." But quaere whether § 15-217 of the new act which provides
that "any person imprisoned . . . may institute a proceeding under this

article" means that only the petitioner himself may file a petition for relief
under the new act.
"Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-221 (1965 Advance Leg. Serv., No.
3) with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 17-32 (1953). Whether the petitioner is to

be present at the hearing is committed to the discretion of the judge. N.C.

§ 15-221 (1965 Advance Leg. Serv., No. 3). This appears to
have been the rule for habeas corpus procedure. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 17-15
(1953) ("If the writ requires it, the officer . . . shall produce the body
of the party ..
").
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-222 (1965 Advance Leg. Serv., No. 3), of the
new act provides that review of final judgment under the act shall be by
writ of certiorari. Likewise review of a refusal to order the discharge of the
habeas corpus applicant is by writ of certiorari. See In re Croom, 175 N.C.
455, 95 S.E. 903 (1918); State v. Burnette, 173 N.C. 734, 91 S.E. 364
GEN. STAT.

(1917).
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However, to the extent that the new act limits the petitioner to
applying for relief only in the superior court in which his conviction occurred,3 5 the new act is clearly more restrictive than habeas
corpus. Since the year that article I, section 21, was adopted as a
part of the constitution, North Carolina has by statute permitted a
petitioner seeking habeas corpus to apply to any justice of the
supreme court or any judge of the superior court.36 In addition,
the supreme court has said that under article I, section 18, of the
constitution it has the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus.3
Further, courts in a number of states having constitutional provisions similar to article I, section 21, have held that the effect of
such a provision is to insure the writ of habeas corpus as it existed
at common law ;38 and at common law the habeas corpus applicant
was clearly not limited to seeking relief in any single court.39
Therefore, it is likely that in any situation where the petitioner
could not obtain as effective relief in the superior court in which he
was originally convicted, the court would hold that the new act,
by limiting him to such court, had unconstitutionally detracted from
the protective force of habeas corpus. However, as stated previously,
courts recognize that in spite of constitutional provisions such as
article I, section 21, the legislature has the power to regulate reasonably habeas corpus by statute.40 This factor is especially significant since there are legitimate purposes to be served by requiring
a petitioner to seek post-conviction relief in the court where he was
convicted. It is here that the records of the proceedings resulting in his conviction may be found, as well as witnesses and
officers of the court who are familiar with the proceedings. 1
In addition, by requiring post-conviction proceedings to be conN.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-217.1 (1965 Advance Leg. Serv., No. 3).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 17-6 (1953).
'See

lit re Schenck, 74 N.C. 607 (1876).

UNIFORM POsT-CONvICTION

PROCEDURE ACT,

9B

Notice how § 2 of the
UNIF. LAWS ANN.

354,

deals with the situation where the state constitution vests courts with
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus.
" See People v. Morhous, 183 Misc. 51, 49 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct,
1944); Ex parte Davis, 66 Okla. Crim. 271, 91 P.2d 799 (1939); Ex parte

Wilkins, 7 Okla. Crim. 422, 115 Pac. 1118 (1911); lit re Patzwald, 5
Okla. Crim. 789, 50 Pac. 139 (1897); Servonitz v. State, 133 Wis. 231,
113 N.W.277 (1907).
See HURD, HABEAS CORPUS 147-48 (1858).
40 See note 25, supra.
lt Cf. Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 175
(1949).

(1965).

See generally SOKOL, A

HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL HABEAS CoRPus
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ducted where the original proceedings were held, the burden of the
numerous petitions for such relief is more evenly spread among the
superior courts throughout the state, since the courts located near
prisons may no longer be overburdened with habeas corpus petitions.
WILLIAM L.

STOCKS

Constitutional Law-Right of Counsel-State and Lower Federal
Court Interpretations of Escobedo
The historic Supreme Court decision of Escobedo v. Illinois,1
which extended the right to counsel to some point prior in time to
the actual trial of an accused,' has engendered a wealth of theoretical
discussion of the problems it encompassed.3 The state and lower
federal courts have had to face many of these problems on a practical rather than theoretical plane. The following categories constitute some of the most critical areas that have required interpretation.
I.

FAILURE TO INFORM THE ACCUSED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AND THE ABSENCE OF A REQUEST FOR COUNSEL

In situations where an accused was not advised of his right to
counsel or to remain silent in the accusatory stage of an investigaU.S. 478 (1964).
'378
2 The defendant Escobedo was arrested, handcuffed, and taken to police
headquarters for interrogation concerning the murder of his brother-in-law.
A lawyer, previously retained, made two futile attempts to see Escobedo
at headquarters. During the interrogation the defendant was confronted
with a statement solicited from another suspect accusing him of the crime.
Without the benefit of his attorney's advice, the defendant made incriminating statements in response to this accusation that lead to his subsequent
conviction. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded stating:
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no longer
a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on
a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody,
the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to
eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and
been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police
have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right
to remain silent, the accused has been denied "the Assistance of
Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as
"made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,"
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S., at 342, and that no statement elicited
by the police during the interrogation may be used against him at a
criminal trial.
Id. at 490-91.
' See, e.g., Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United
States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REV. 47 (1964); Note, 43
N.C.L. Rav. 187 (1964).
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tion,4

a prevalent method of avoiding direct confrontation with the
Escobedo dilemma has been to distinguish Escobedo on the basis
of a particular aspect of the Supreme Court decision that was absent
from the situation facing the lower court.5 The fact situation of
Escobedo had many facets, and courts taking this approach have
not found the task of containing its ruling particularly troublesome.
In State v. Howard6 the Missouri court upheld the conviction
of a defendant who had not been advised of his right to counsel
prior to making incriminating statements that were used against
him. The court held that since the defendant had not been prevented from seeing a lawyer previously retained (as had defendant
Escobedo) Escobedo was not applicable.
The Illinois court in upholding the conviction of a defendant
who had not been advised of his rights before making incriminating
statements, confronted the issue on the basis of the voluntariness
of the confession rendered. 7 The court stated that "we do not,
however, read the Escobedo case as requiring the rejection of a
voluntary confession because the State did not affirmatively caution the accused of his right to have an attorney and his right to
remain silent before his admissions of guilt."'8 This rationale was
also employed by the North Carolina court 9 in upholding the conviction of a defendant who had made incriminating statements to
an officer after being advised of his right to remain silent but not of
his right to counsel. The court concluded that Escobedo had no
effect on "free and voluntary conversation."'"
A contrary view is exemplified in People v. Stewart" where the
California Supreme Court, showing a tendency to apply Escobedo
liberally, held that once the investigatory process had reached the
stage where the right of counsel would attach, "the record must
'The accusatory stage is descriptive of the time when the investigation
has ,begun to "focus" on the suspect as described in note 2 supra.
See, e.g., State v. Worley, 178 Neb. 232, 132 N.W.2d 764 (1965);
Bean v. State, 398 P.2d 251 (Nev. 1965); State v. Darst, 399 P.2d 618
(Wash. 1965).
'383 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. 1964).
People v. Hartgraves, 31 I11.
2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964).
'Ild.
at v.
-, 202 N.E.2d at 36.
State
Fletcher, 264 N.C. 482, 141 S.E.2d 873 (1965).
10 Id. at 485, 141 S.E.2d at 875.
1143 Cal. Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97 (1965).
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indicate that the defendant was advised of his right to counsel and
to remain silent or that he knew of these rights and intelligently
and knowingly waived them."'
The California court again showed its liberal inclination in
3 It was held that once the stage is set for the
People v. Dorado."
right of counsel to attach, the accused does not specifically have to
request legal assistance in order to make incriminating statements
elicited by the police during an accusatory investigation inadmissible.14 The court did not concern itself with the voluntariness of
a confession obtained under such circumstances, but felt that the
right of counsel overrides such a consideration, even in the absence
of any evidence of coercion.
Courts opposing this interpretation have concerned themselves
with the absence of a specific request for counsel as well as the
voluntariness of the confessions obtained.15 In Sturgis v. State6
a defendant had confessed after being confined for four days without
a hearing or the services of an attorney. The Maryland court, refusing to apply Escobedo, found no evidence of mistreatment of
the accused or that his confession was in any way the product of
coercion. In addition the court found neither a request for counsel
by the accused nor a denial of such on the part of the police. In the
absence of these elements, the court was convinced that the defendant's confession was voluntary and therefore admissible.
The Pennsylvania court interjected the theory of unreasonable
curtailment of police investigatory methods into its approach to
the problem. In Commonwealth v. Maroney17 the police found the
defendant Maroney wounded at the feet of a murder victim. He
was immediately taken to the hospital for an emergency operation
and interrogated later the same morning. At this time the accused
12
Id. at 207, 400 P.2d at 103.
Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1965).
For courts following this interpretation, see, e.g., United States v.

1842
1,

Myers, 240 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Galarza Cruz v. Delgado, 233

F. Supp. 944 (D.P.R. 1964); State v. Mendes, 210 A.2d 50 (R.I. 1965).
" See, e.g., United States v. Ogilivie, 334 F.2d 837 (7th Cir. 1964);
Woodard v. State, 171 So. 2d 462 (Ala. Ct. App. 1965); State v. Worley,
178 Neb. 232, 132 N.W.2d 764 (1965) ; State v. Darst, 399 P.2d 618 (Wash.
1965); State v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965).
'5 235 Md. 343, 201 A.2d 681 (1964).

'"416 Pa. 331, 206 A.2d 288 (1965).
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was informed that anything he said could be used against him. He
was not offered, nor did he request, the services of counsel. He
proceeded to describe the murder and four days later signed a typewritten statement of the same. In holding the confession admissible
the court said:
To hold now that his description of the event at that time is
inadmissible, because he did not have counsel or waive his right
thereto beforehand, is tantamount to precluding the police from
ever interrogating individuals suspected of crime, and could
result in barring from evidence all admissions obtained in the
course thereof."
Though not discussing law enforcement expediency, the Fourth
Circuit took a dim view of the defendant's failure to request counsel
0
The defendant, an escapee from a state
in Davis v. North Carolina."
prison, was taken into custody by the police and kept in jail a total
of sixteen days until he confessed to the crime of murder.20 In
upholding the admission of the confession, the court refused to
apply Escobedo on the basis that the defendant had, according to
police testimony, been informed of his rights and had not requested
the assistance of counsel. The police arrest sheet, however, clearly
indicated that Davis was to be held without the privileges of using
a telephone or seeing anyone. It was established that the police had
aided Davis in contacting his sister, the only person he had requested
to see. The dissenting opinion, agreeing with the Dorado interpretation of Escobedo,2" pointed out that it would have been useless for
the defendant to request an attorney when the arrest sheet indicated
that such a request would have been rejected.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals22 coupled the lack of a
request for counsel with the fact that the accused had been advised
of her constitutional right of silence in declaring an incriminating
statement admissible. The court evidently felt that an affirmative request and denial of counsel was necessary to bring Escobedo into
play once the warning against self-incrimination was given.
8 1d. at

-, 206 A.2d at 290-91.
F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1964).
'0 The prison warden had granted the officers permission to detain the
accused instead of returning him to the state prison.
*See text accompanying note 13 supra.
"Miller v. State, 387 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).
18339
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II.

THE NECESSITY OF THE PHYSICAL PRESENCE OF AN

ATTORNEY AT THE INTERROGATION OF THE ACCUSED

Courts have been reluctant to hold that the mere physical absence of an attorney, at the time the accused was interrogated, is
sufficient to render a confession inadmissible under Escobedo 3
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Long v. United
States2 4 declared that no court or legislative body has held that
statements made voluntarily to the police are inadmissible regardless
of the circumstances. The Washington Supreme Court used the
same reasoning2 5 in holding that a confession obtained in the absence of counsel was not "per se inadmissible."2 In that case defendant had confessed after being warned by his attorney (who
was not present at the time of the confession) against making any
statements to the police.
The same District of Columbia court that rendered the Long 7
decision, was faced with a somewhat different situation in Queen
v. United States. 28 There they considered the absence of counsel at
the time of confession to be critical. The defendant had been advised
of her right of silence and was granted a continuance for the purpose of obtaining counsel. She was interrogated during this continuance, at which time she made incriminating statements that
were subsequently used against her. The court refused to uphold the
admission of the statements recognizing that the untimely interrogation had frustrated the defendant's right of counsel.
III.

THE NECESSITY FOR THE PRESENCE OF ALL OF THE ELEMENTS
IN

Escobedo To

BRING A CASE WITHIN THE

SCOPE OF ITS RULING

The cases previously discussed would seem to indicate that

Escobedo is often distinguished on the basis of a particular element
"E.g, Watson v. Gaughan, 338 F.2d 659 (1st Cir. 1964); Jackson v.
United States, 337 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Hayes v. United States, 236
F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Mo. 1964); Davidson v. United States, 236 F. Supp.
264 (W.D. Okla. 1964); Mitchell v. Stephens, 232 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Ark.
1964); Hayden v. State, 201 N.E.2d 329 (Ind. 1964); State v. Fox, 131
N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 1964); People v. Sanchez, 15 N.Y.2d 387, 207 N.E.2d
356, 259 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1965); Sturgis v. State, 235 Md. 343, 201 A.2d
681 (1964); Marion v. State, 387 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).
24338 F.2d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
" State v. Young, 400 P.2d 374 (Wash. 1965).
0 Id.
at 375.
"Note 24 supra.
Cir. 1964).
28335

F.2d 297 (D.C.
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of the decision that is somewhat different from the case under consideration. However, some courts have ventured further and professed an intention to apply Escobedo only in situations where the
various conditions that prompted the Supreme Court opinion itself
were present.20 For example, the Delaware court30 stated that
several factors seem to be necessary for the Escobedo rule to apply
and a case must be considered in the light of the facts that were
before the Supreme Court."' The Wisconsin court, in State v.
Burke,3 2 expressed the feeling that the most Escobedo did was
to say that failure to inform a criminal suspect under arrest of
his constitutional right against self-incrimination, coupled with other
circumstances, may be enough to exclude any confession made by
him.
Without being overly concerned with the boundaries of Escobedo,
courts not wishing to limit the decision to its facts have applied the
principle of pre-trial right of counsel to a variety of case situations.'a
A notable example is the District of Columbia case in which the
committing magistrate had appointed counsel for the defendant, 3'
but the attorney was not informed when his client was called before
the grand jury and repeated former confessions. The court held
that such failure to inform the attorney was ground for reversal
since the defendant would have refrained from the additional incrimination with his counselor's advice.
IV.

THE INGREDIENTS OF AN "INTELLIGENT

WAIVER"

OF THE RIGHT OF COUNSEL

In situations where a court is convinced that the circumstances
necessary for the right of counsel to attach were present, the de"0E.g., Edwards v. Holman, 342 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1964); Cephus v.
United States, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2674 (D.C. Cir. June 21, 1965). United
States v. Pate, 240 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. III. 1965); Davidson v. United
States, 236 F. Supp. 264 (W.D. Okla. 1964); State v. Fox, 131 N.W.2d 684
(Iowa 1964); Commonwealth v. Tracy, 207 N.E.2d 16 (Mass. 1965); State
v. Howard, 383 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. 1964); Bean v. State, 398 P.2d 251 (Nev.
206 A.2d 288 (1965).
416 (Del.
Pa. 331,
Maroney,
1965);
Commonwealth
A.2d 722
1965).
':King
v. Delaware,v.212
', The Delaware court placed a further limitation on Escobedo by saying
that it was not applicable to pre-arrest situations.
27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965).
"See cases discussed in previous categories.
"Jones v. United States, 342 F.2d 679 (D.C. Cir. 1964).

1965]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

cisions have presented a broad spectrum of interpretation as to what
constitutes a waiver of this right.3 5
Criminal technique was evidently a major consideration in the
Kentucky case of Scamahorne v. Commonwealth"6 where the court
concluded that since the defendants were intelligent enough to park
a car a mile from the scene of the crime; carry tools to get into the
back of the building; crawl across a field to avoid detection; hide
when the police approached; and come out with their hands up
asking not to be shot, they must surely have the intelligence to be
aware of their right to counsel. The defendants did not request an
attorney; therefore the court concluded that they had waived their
rights to do so.
The Third Circuit in Russo v. New Jersey,3 without delving
into the mechanics of the crime as a criterion for intelligence,
held that the failure to request counsel at the interrogation level
did not in itself constitute a waiver of the right. The Oregon
court in State v. Neely3 s held that to be sure that an accused
knew of his right to counsel, steps must be taken to insure that he
is effectively informed. The court held that there could be no
waiver of the right if there was any doubt that the accused was
aware of it. The burden of defendant enlightenment, under this
rationale, falls squarely on the shoulders of the law enforcement
officers.
Age and experience have received consideration by some courts.
The Indiana courte9 allowed the admission of the signed incriminating statement of an accused of "tender years"4 0 who had been twice
advised of his right to counsel prior to the taking of the statement
and had failed to request legal aid. The court held that he had
"5E.g., Otney v. United States, 340 F.2d 696 (10th Cir. 1965); Miller v.
Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 338 F.2d 201 (4th Cir. 1964); United States v.
Pate, 240 F. Supp. 696 (N.D. Ill. 1965); Richards v. Holman, 239 F. Supp.
137 (M.D. Ala. 1965); Ledbetter v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 239 F.
Supp. 369 (D. Md. 1965); People v. Stewart, 43 Cal. Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d
97 (1965); People v. Dorado, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1965);
Commonwealth v. Maroney, 416 Pa. 331, 206 A.2d 288 (1965); Marion v.
State, 387 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965); State v. Darst, 399 P.2d
618 (Wash. 1965).
"394 S.W.2d 113 (Ky. 1965).
" 33 U.S.L. WEEI 2621 (3d Cir. May 20, 1965).

" 395 P.2d 557 (Ore. 1964).

" Hayden v. State, 201 N.E2d 329 (Ind. 1964).
"°
Id. at 329.
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effectively waived his right of counsel despite his age, as he was
"worldly wise far beyond his years. "41
The Fifth Circuit declined to comment on the issue of unequivocal
waiver (as exemplified in the Indiana case where the defendant was
both advised of his right to counsel and failed to request aid), but
allowed the age and experience of the defendant to weigh heavily
in his favor.' The accused was nineteen years old and had been
confined for two months at the time of his confession. Counsel
had been appointed, and the attorney had warned him against making
any statements to federal officers. The attorney was absent from
the interrogation in question, the defendant having neglected to
request his presence. The interrogating officers were unaware that
the defendant was even represented by counsel. In declaring the
confession inadmissible, the court suggested that the officers could
have easily determined from the record that the defendant had been
provided with an attorney, and because of the defendant's youth
and inexperience they had a duty to do so. The court extended
this duty by declaring that if officers discovered that the defendant
was represented by counsel, they must ascertain if the accused desired
his presence at the interview.'
V. THE PROBLEM OF RETROACTIVITY
Courts that have held that Escobedo is to be given retroactive
application have done so without a great deal of fanfare. 44 The
4 5 for example,
Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. Fogliani,
merely said that Escobedo should without a doubt be retroactive
along with Gideon v. Wainwright.4"
Courts opposing retroactive application 47 have concerned themselves with an analysis of the purpose of the Escobedo decision'1 Id. at 330.
"Clifton v. United States, 341 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1965).

,The Fifth Circuit made reference to the age and experience factor
in Edwards v. Holman, 342 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1965). The court distinguished Escobedo on several grounds, one being that the defendant had
previous convictions while Escobedo was twenty-two years old and of Mexican extraction.
"See, e.g., Fugate v. Ellenson, 237 F. Supp. 44 (D. Neb. 1964).
"343 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1965).
48372 U.S. 335 (1963). See also Wright v. Dickson, 336 F.2d 878
(9th Cir. 1964).
47 E.g., United States v. Pate, 240 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ill. 1965) ; Hayes
v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Mo. 1964); King v. Delaware,
212 A.2d 722 (Del. 1965); State v. Johnson, 43 N.J. 572, 206 A.2d 737
(1965).
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i.e., what was the true nature of the injustice it sought to correct, and would this correction be served by retroactivity.
In the case of In re Lopez,48 the California court declined retroactive application on the ground that the true purpose of Escobedo
was to curtail future police practices that might lead to involuntary
confessions. The court did not deny that such practices were unhealthy in the past, but felt that they had not necessarily resulted
in a "substantial risk"4 to the rights of an individual who had
voluntarily confessed. As to confessions that might have been
coerced from defendants in the past, the court expressed the hope
that such injustice had been uncovered at the trial."°
In addition to discounting retroactivity on the basis of its relationship to the truth or falsity of a confession, the California
court referred to placing of "impossible burdens upon the administration of criminal justice"5'1 that such a ruling would create.
The court felt that viewing long-forgotten cases would obviously
involve the rehashing of hazy fact situations and the time-dulled
memory of past witnesses.
The same rationale was evidenced in the Seventh Circuit's re2
fusal to apply Escobedo to the past. In Walden v. Pate1
the court
stated
Nothing expressed in either the Mapp 53 or Escobedo opinion
required retrospective application of the rule announced ....
a condition existed where ignorance of constitutional rights
and absence of counsel operated to the prejudice of persons in
custody. In order to put an end to a system so fraught with potential abuses, the Supreme Court in Escobedo decided to remove the incentive to deny an accused the right to counsel by
rendering inadmissible any confession obtained while such denial was in effect.54
Cal. Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380 (1965).
,Id. at 194, 398 P.2d at 386.
It is interesting to note that the Lopez decision was delivered the
same day as People v. Dorado, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1965). See
text accompanying note 13 supra.
In re Lopez, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 198, 398 P.2d at 390.
52350
F.2d 240 (7th Cir. 1965).
83
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Court held that any evidence
obtained during the course of an illegal search and seizure would be inadmissible against the accused.
"'Walden v. Pate, 350 F.2d 342-43 (7th Cir. 1965). If Escobedo is truly
analogous to Mapp, the Seventh Circuit's reasoning may well become the
4842

law of the land. The Supreme Court declared that Mapp will not be given
retroactive application in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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"TRIAL TACTICS" AND THE APPEAL OF A DEFENDANT WHOSE

ATTORNEY DID NOT RAISE THE ISSUE OF DEPRIVATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THE TRIAL COURT

When the question of the denial of the right of counsel during
the pre-trial stage arises for the first time on appeal, the possibility
of a waiver of such rights takes on a new aspect. In addition to a
consideration of the facts surrounding the alleged constitutional
violation, the court must determine whether or not the defendant's
attorney has closed the issue by failing to raise it in the trial court. 55
Hence the defendant is faced with two possible adversaries to his
fundamental rights, i.e. his own lawyer, as well as the individuals
who have allegedly violated his right to counsel.
In Timmons v. Peyton5 6 the Virginia district court was of the
opinion that mistakes in judgment or trial tactics of the defendant's
counsel do not deprive a defendant of his constitutional rights and
cannot be reviewed on a writ of habeas corpus. The Ninth Circuit
did not completely close the door to review, 57 but did hold that where
the question was not raised in the district court, it could not be heard
on appeal unless a failure to do so would constitute a "manifest
miscarriage"5' 8 of justice.
The Nevada Supreme Court discussed this problem in Bean v.
State.5" The court held that the defendant had not been deprived
of his rights at the pre-trial level, but indicated that if this had been
the case, the failure of his attorney to object to the confessions
obtained thereby would throw a different light on the subject. The
defendant had pleaded insanity in the original trial, and the court
" The issue was confronted by the Supreme Court in Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965). The attorney had failed to object to the introduction of illegally seized evidence at the trial, and the defendant was subsequently convicted. The question raised was whether the attorney had
thereby waived the defendant's right by knowingly bypassing his remedy
in the lower court. The Supreme Court, remanding for further State consideration of the significance of procedural defects, warned that a dismissal
of the case on the basis of adequate state grounds would not end the litigation:
IP]etitioner might still pursue vindication of his federal claim in a
federal habeas corpus proceeding in which the procedural default will
not alone preclude consideration of his claim, at least unless it is shown
that petitioner deliberately bypassed the orderly procedure of the state
courts.
Id. at 452.

"240 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Va. 1965).
'

Davis v. California, 341 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1965).

"OId. at 986.
"398 P.2d 251 (Nev. 1965).
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was aware that his attorney may have wanted the jury to consider
the confessions as evidence of a deranged mind.
Contrary to the rationale in the aforementioned cases, the defendants have not always found themselves stymied by the actions
of their attorneys in the trial courts. The Rhode Island Supreme
Court ruled that the defendants confession was inadmissible on the
basis of Escobedo, even though the issue was not raised at the trial.'
The court's ruling was based on the fact that there was no evidence
that the defendant had acquiesed in his attorney's decision not to
object to the introduction of the incriminating statements, and
therefore he had waived no rights.
The relationship of the time lapse between the defendant's original trial and the Escobedo decision was a major factor in the defendant's favor in Ledbetter v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary.,1 The
defendant had made both oral and written confessions that were
introduced at the trial level without objection. The court concluded
that the confessions, which were the only evidence of the defendant's
guilt, were obtained in violation of the principles laid down in
Escobedo. As the Escobedo case had not been decided at the time
of the trial in question, the failure of the attorney to object would
not constitute a waiver of the defendant's rights.
VII. CONCLUSION

The categories discussed above illustrate the extent to which the
web of implications surrounding Escobedo has developed. In all
likelihood no single Supreme Court decision will eliminate this
confusion. There seems to be no definite line of division between
the various lower court approaches to a given problem that will
allow opposing viewpoints to be neatly classified. For example, the
attitudes toward waiver are particularly inconsistent. Not only do
courts vary in their interpretation of the circumstantial prerequisites for a valid waiver, but the background of the individual accused may be a critical consideration. A defendant who has experienced previous criminal proceedings may find it hard to persuade
a court that he was unaware of his constitutional rights.
One reason for this diversity of interpretation is that fundamental methods of law enforcement procedure are at stake in the
"0State v. Mendes, 210 A.2d 50 (R.I. 1965).
1239

F. Supp. 369 (D. Md. 1965).
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application of Escobedo. A liberal approach requires an adjustment
by police and courts alike. A liberal interpretation of Escobedo requires the investigating officer to determine, at that time, if the
person questioned is an accused, or face the possibility of a voluntary confession's being excluded. This quasi-judicial determination
may well affect the outcome of subsequent litigation. Even though
the officer makes such a determination, there is no certainty that
the court will concur in his finding. If the accused's request for
counsel is required, the interrogator is able to proceed with some
degree of certainty, and the court is spared from confrontation with
Escobedo in such a situation where only hindsight can establish
its applicability.
The relationship of Escobedo to the guilt or innocence of an accused is another consideration that might persuade a court to limit
the Supreme Court ruling. It is conceivable that a guilty defendant
might find Escobedo a valuable tool with which to prolong litigation
of his case in a jurisdiction that gives it a broad application. In
such instances, invoking Escobedo might not affect the final outcome
of the trial but would hamper the ability of the court to administer
justice within a reasonable time.
A further consideration that has caused apprehension among
lower courts is that a liberal application of Escobedo would result
62
in an unreasonable burden on police ability to investigate crime.
The majority opinion in Escobedo suggested that a law enforcement system built on confessions would be less reliable in the long
run than one built on independently secured evidence through investigation.03 It has been suggested, however, that if it is necessary
for an attorney to be present at an interrogation, the result would
be a suppression rather than a disclosure of evidence. 4 It is submitted that the suppression of evidence is not the goal of any legitimate law enforcement system.
It has been suggested that a possible solution to these conflicts
would be to require that interrogations be conducted in the presence
of witnesses at places controlled by the police." Requiring recording
of the interviews would be a further deterrent to coercive police
methods 6 6
€' See text accompanying note 18 supra.
°' Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964).
e'
Enker & Elsen, op. cit. supra note 3.
00
Id. at 85.
T
Ibid.
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If a solution is achieved in addition to the problems that now frequent the courts, however, there are others that may become significant in the future. For example, does a collateral attack on a criminal judgment become merely a civil proceeding in which the sixth
amendment does not apply? This expanding involvement of Escobedo into other areas of criminal litigation points to the need for
a more definite enunciation of its limitations. it would seem desirable for courts to be required to consider such a fundamental
right with some degree of uniformity.
WILLIAm

H. FAULK, JR.

Criminal Procedure-Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation
Made Obligatory in State Prosecutions
[T]he privilege to confront one's accusers and cross-examine
them face to face is assured to a defendant by the Sixth Amendment in prosecutions in the federal courts, and in prosecutions in
the state courts is assured very often by the constitutions of the
states. For present purposes we assume that the privilege is
reinforced by the Fourteenth Amendment, though this has not
been squarely held.'
So wrote Mr. Justice Cardozo some thirty-one years ago. But it
was not until 1965, in the cases of Pointer v. Texas2 and Douglas v.
Alabama, that this assumption was squarely affirmed.
In Pointer defendant was accused of robbery, and at a preliminary hearing the victim testified, giving a detailed account of the
crime and identifying Pointer as its perpetrator. Neither Pointer
nor Dillard, an alleged accomplice, were represented by counsel at
the hearing, but Dillard tried to cross-examine the victim, and
Pointer was said to have attempted cross-examination of some of
the other witnesses.4 At Pointer's trial, because the robbery victim
had moved permanently out of the jurisdiction, the state offered
as evidence a transcript of this witness's prior testimony. Pointer's
counsel objected, arguing that the right to confrontation had been
denied at the hearing. The objection was overruled because Pointer
had been "accorded the opportunity of cross examining the witSnyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934). (Emphasis added.)
2380 U.S. 400 (1965).
-380 U.S. 415 (1965).
'

'380 U.S. at 401.
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Pointer was convicted and sentenced to life imprison-

ment.' The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. 7 The
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the fourteenth
amendment makes the sixth amendment's guarantee of confrontation8 obligatory upon the states9 and confrontation had in fact
been denied to Pointer.10
In Douglas, the Court reversed a decision by an Alabama circuit
court which had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Alabama."
Douglas had been convicted of assault with intent to murder. 2
Loyd, his alleged accomplice who had been found guilty in a previous trial, invoked the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination when called as a prosecution witness. Examining
Loyd as a hostile witness,' 3 the prosecutor read from a confession
signed by Loyd and implicating Douglas. This was to "refresh his
recollection" ;14 and after reading each sentence the prosecutor
asked Loyd if he had made such a statement. Loyd steadfastly
refused to answer these questions, even when ordered to answer by
1Id. at 402.
Pointer v. State, 375 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963). Since
defendant was convicted of robbery with firearms, he could have received the
death sentence. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 1408 (1953).
7375 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
' In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (Emphasis added.)

0380 U.S. at 403-06.
"Id. at 406-08. However, the Court rejected the argument that the
facts constituted a denial of the right to counsel. Id. at 402-03.
" Douglas v. State, 163 So. 2d 477 (Ala. Ct. App. 1963). The Supreme
Court of Alabama denied review. 276 Ala. 703, 163 So. 2d 496 (1964).
12 380 U.S. at 417.
"'After Loyd's refusal to testify in defiance of an order that he do so,
the trial judge granted the prosecutor's motion to "declare [Loyd] a hostile
witness and give me the privilege of cross-examination." Id. at 416.
" Ibid. The right to use a hostile witness's written memorandum to refresh his recollection has occasionally been recognized. See Comment, The
Forgetful Witness: Refreshing Memory and Past Recollection Recorded,
3 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 616, 618 (1956). But see Voyles v. Columbia Terminals
Co., 223 S.W.2d 870 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949). There the court states that it
should not be permitted "in the guise and on the pretext of refreshing
the witness' recollection, to make use of a favorable memorandum with an
actual view to contradicting the witness or inducing him to change his
testimony." Id. at 872. Use of the confession in Douglas seems clearly
guise and pretext.
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the trial judge and threatened with a contempt citation. 5 The
confession was never offered in evidence. The United States Supreme Court held that the lack of opportunity to cross-examine
Loyd as to the confession denied Douglas the right secured by the
confrontation clause.'
The right of confrontation set out in the sixth amendment is
essentially an evidentiary concept."1 Its basis is in the hearsay rule,
which rejects as untrustworthy testimony not subjected to the
scrutiny of cross-examination.'" Cross-examination is considered
indispensable because of its force as a truth-assuring device.'" There
are well-established exceptions 0 to the rule, and these have been
carried over generally as exceptions to the confrontation requirement. 2 '
But the admission of evidence that exceptions to the hearsay
rule permit does not always mean a complete denial of confrontation. When transcripts of testimony taken at a former trial or
preliminary hearing from a later unavailable witness are admitted,
frequently there has been an opportunity to cross-examine at the
prior proceeding. There has been confrontation, but has the con22
frontation been effective? This was the question in Pointer.
In Douglas, however, the objection resulted from a lack of
opportunity to test, by cross-examination, the confession at any
time. Since Loyd testified to his name and refused to testify further,
there was no opportunity to cross-examine him at the trial.23 This
" 380 U.S. at 416 & n.1. The judge did not proceed with the contempt
citation, but interrupted defendant's trial to sentence Loyd to twenty years
imprisonment.
Pr 380 U.S. at 418-20. The Court also held that Douglas' counsel had
not waived his constitutional right by failure to make timely objection. Id.
at 420-23.
"1The right of "confrontation" was synonymous at the common law with
the right to cross-examination at the time of adoption of the sixth amendment. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDErcE § 1397 at 128-29 (3d ed. 1940). But confrontation has developed to include the additional right to be "face to face" with
the witness before a judge and jury, although it is regarded as dispensable
when8 impracticable. Id. § 1365.
I' Id. § 1362 at 3.
19 Ibid.
20 E.g., dying declarations, statements of fact against interest, declarations
about family history, attestation of a subscribing witness, regular book
entries
21 in the course of business. Id. § 1426. See generally Id. § 1420-27.
1Id. § 1398 at 141.
"2There was a "confrontation," but the Court apparently considered

that Pointer could not make effective use of the opportunity to cross-examine.

" The scope of cross-examination is usually limited to matters dealt with

in direct examination or connected therewith. 5 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1885
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contention is scarcely weakened by Loyd's already having been
convicted and perhaps not having had the right to rely on the fifth
amendment in his refusal to testify.2 4 The prosecutor's reading
of the confession and Loyd's refusing to answer were not testimony,
hence neither were subject to cross-examination by the defendant.
Nevertheless, the confession was a crucial link in the case against
Douglas, and its reading by the prosecutor may easily have been
the equivalent of testimony in the minds of the jury.
In addition to the confrontation problem Pointer presented the
closely allied question of right to counsel. The Court rejected
Pointer's argument that he had been denied the right to counsel
at the preliminary hearing within the meaning of Gideon v. Wainwright, 5 as focused by White v. Maryland.6 The Court observed
that in Texas preliminary hearings whether the accused shall be
bound over to the grand jury and, if so, whether he shall be admitted
to bail are the only questions decided. In White, the Court said,
there was a hearing in which pleas were received, and this constituted
a "critical stage" in the prosecution, entitling the defendant to
counsel. The Court reserved the question whether there might be
other circumstances making the Texas preliminary hearing a "critical stage" to the defendant for which counsel would be required.2
Yet it is difficult to say that the taking of testimony later used
against Pointer did not make the hearing a "critical stage." That
testimony was crucial to his conviction. The Court's holding in
.Escobedov. Illinois has resulted in a considerable variation among
state courts as to when the right to counsel attaches before trial.29
Pointer clearly is not the final word on this issue.
Arguments based on denial of the right of confrontation by
at 532 (3d ed. 1940). This is the rule in a majority of the states. Id. §
1890 at 548. However, wide latitude is permitted on cross-examination in
Alabama. Murphy v. State, 42 Ala. App. 60, 151 So. 2d 800 (1963). Nevertheless, since the prosecutor's reading of Loyd's confession was not evidence,
there could have been no opportunity to cross-examine.
11380 U.S. at 416. The argument against the availability of the fifth
amendment's protection is of very doubtful validity. At the time, Loyd
had not been sentenced and planned to appeal. Although Douglas' counsel

was also Loyd's counsel the Court indicated that there had been no collusion
on this point. Id. at 420.
28372 U.S. 335 (1963).

"373 U.S. 59 (1963).
'7 380
28378

U.S. at 403.
U.S. 478 (1964).

"See 44 N.C.L. Rav. 161 (1965) for a discussion of state court applications of Escobedo v. Illinois.
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state courts have occurred infrequently, since most states guarantee
confrontation, either constitutionally or by statute." Nevertheless,
prior to Pointer and Douglas, the application of the sixth amendment's right of confrontation to the states was inconsistent.31 This
inconsistency was created by conflicting statements in three cases.
In West v. Louisiana3 2 the Court pronounced, in dictum, that
the sixth amendment did not apply to proceedings in state courts.3 s
The principle was not there applicable, however, since the defendant,
through counsel, had actually cross-examined the witness at the
preliminary hearing.
In In re Oliver3 4 a Michigan judge, partially relying on testimony
of a witness whom Oliver had not confronted, sentenced the defendant to jail for contempt of court. The Court held that such a
procedure was a denial of petitioner's right to due process of law
under the fourteenth amendment:
A person's right to a reasonable notice of a charge against him,
and an opportunity to be heard in his defense-a right to his day
in court-are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these
rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses
against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel.85
In Stein v. New York"0 petitioner was convicted on a felonymurder charge partially as a result of confessions of codefendants
who had not testified at the trial. The Court responded unfavorably
to petitioner's contention that he had been denied the opportunity
to cross-examine in violation of his sixth and fourteenth amendment
" E.g., N.C. CoxsT. art. I § 11 provides: "In all criminal prosecutions,
every person charged with crime has the right to be informed of the accusation and to confront the accusers and witnesses with other testimony, and
to have counsel for defense .

. . ."

No North Carolina cases were found

that would have been affected by the decisions in the principle cases. In
fact, the North Carolina Supreme Court ordered a new trial in a case
somewhat similar to Douglas. An accomplice testified against the defendant and then invoked the privilege against self-incrimination when
cross-examined by defendant's counsel. The court held that this deprived
the defendant of his right to cross-examine. State v. Perry, 210 N.C. 796,
188 S.E. 639 (1936). Forty-six states have constitutional provisions for
confrontation and two others grant the protection by statute. See 5 WIGMOiRE,
EVIDENCE § 1397, n.1 (3d ed. 1940).
" See McKay, The Right of Confrontation, [1959] WAsH. U.L.Q. 122,
124.
32194

U.S. 258 (1904).

Id. at 262.

,333 U.S. 257 (1948).

1 Id. at 273.
84346 U.S. 156 (1953).
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rights. Mr. Justice Jackson, for the majority, said: "[O]bjection
to the introduction of these confessions is that as to [petitioner]
they are hearsay. The hearsay-evidence rule, with all its subtleties,
anomalies and ramifications, will not be read into the Fourteenth
Amendment." 37 Stein has been much criticized, 38 principally because
te Court dispensed with the constitutional denial by saying apparently that the defendant's guilt had been established beyond a
reasonable doubt at the trial. The statements in these three cases
illustrate the difficulty resulting from the Court's application of the
doctrine that the fourteenth amendment protects only those rights
that are essential to a "scheme of ordered liberty."3 Rights
within the scope of this doctrine were subjected to the additional
test of whether their preservation in the specific case as applied to
the specific defendant were necessary to insure a fair trial. And
that determination in turn depended upon a concurrence among
the justices in their individual concepts of a "fair trial."
The full significance of Pointer'sguarantee of the sixth amendment's right of confrontation in state criminal trials is that the
right is a part.of the sixth amendment. It is an application to the
states of a specific portion of the Bill of Rights. Mr. Justice Harlan
termed the decision "another step in the onward march of the...
'incorporation' doctrine."40 The doctrine in its fullest force has
been championed primarily by Mr. Justice Black. 1 Simply put, it
would "incorporate" the entire Bill of Rights into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The view adopted by a majority of the Court in recent years has been called "selective"
incorporation,42 and the decisions applying it have brought selected
guarantees of the Bill of Rights within the fourteenth amendment.
The doctrine has been long and hotly debated. 41 It will not be discussed extensively here, but it should be noted that the Pointerand
87Id.

at 196.
"sE.g., Gorfinkel, The Fourteenth Amendment and state criminal proceedings--"orderedliberty" or "just deserts," 41 CALIF. L. REV. 672 (1953).
" Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
,o380 U.S. at 408 (opinion of Harlan, J., concurring).
"Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71 (1947) (opinion of Black, J.,
dissenting); Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 865 (1960). See

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. at 411 (opinion of Goldberg, J., concurring).
"380 U.S. at 408 (opinion of Harlan, J., concurring).

,nSee, e.g., Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the
Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. Rzv. 5 (1949).

Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?
The Judicial Interpretation.Id. at 140.
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Douglas decisions are indicative of the progress made by those on
the Court who favor incorporation.
The concurring opinions in both cases make it clear that this
is the principal issue on which the justices differ.44 Mr. Justice
Harlan thought that the Court's present policy of "selective" incorporation "increasingly subjects state legal processes to enveloping
federal judicial authority."4 But Mr. Justice Goldberg replied
to this, observing that Mr. Justice Harlan's approach of "concept
of ordered liberty" would require the Court "to intervene in the
state judicial process with considerable lack of predictability and
with a consequent likelihood of considerable friction." 4
The effect of Pointer and Douglas will be to bring about increased vigilance by the Court in insuring that state courts grant
the full confrontation privilege of the sixth amendment.47 In addition, the decisions portend a shift in emphasis in future confrontation cases to the issue of whether specific exceptions to the hearsay
rule are carried over into the sixth amendment's confrontation
standard.48 It was announced in Malloy v. Hogan4 9 that "the Court
"In both cases Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Stewart, while concurring in the Court's judgment on the grounds that petitioners had been
denied the right of "confrontation" implicit in the 'concept of ordered liberty'
embodied in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, dissented
from the Court's broad application of the sixth amendment's right of confrontation to the states. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Id. at
408-09 (opinion of Harlan, J., concurring). Id. at 409-10 (opinion of
Stewart, J., concurring), Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 423 (1965)
(opinions of Harlan, J. and Stewart, J., concurring). Mr. Justice Goldberg
concurred in both the judgment and the reasoning, but took the opportunity
to set out his views on the incorporation doctrine.
"'380 U.S. at 409 (opinion of Harlan, J., concurring).
"Id. at 413-14 (opinion of Goldberg, J., concurring).
" See Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911). In construing a
Philippine statute modeled after the sixth amendment, the Court set out
the standard required in federal courts.
This ...

intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as

facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as
meet him face to face at the trial, who give their testimony in his
presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination.
It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions
or ex parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the
accused to test the recollection of the witness in the exercise of the
right of cross-examination.
Id. at 330.
"'This issue has been resolved in a few fact situations in cases decided
prior to the principal decisions in federal courts. See generally, Pollitt,
The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PUB. L.
381, 400 (1959).
4°378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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has not hesitated to reexamine past decisions according the Fourteenth Amendment a less central role in the preservation of basic
liberties than that which was contemplated by its Framers when
they added the Amendment to our constitutional scheme." 50 Pointer
and Douglas represent continuance of this reexamination by a majority of the Court. As the Court moves away from the "concept of
ordered liberty," Mr. Justice Goldberg's comment is representative:
"[T~o deny to the States the power to impair a fundamental constitutional right is not to increase federal power, but, rather, to limit
the power of both federal and state governments in favor of safe51
guarding the fundamental rights and liberties of the individual."
Confrontation, under these decisions becomes a right, applicable
in every case, not solely in those cases where it seems "fair" to a
majority of the Court. The uniformity alone achieved by the application of the confrontation clause to the states seems to justify
the Court's shift in constitutional theory in this area.
PiILIP L. KELLOGG
Federal Jurisdiction-Erie Doctrine-Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure
Hanna v. Plumer' involved personal injury claims arising out
of an automobile accident which was allegedly caused by the negligence of a deceased Massachusetts citizen. The petitioner, a citizen
of Ohio, instituted the suit against the decedent's executor, also a
Massachusetts citizen, in the District Court for the District of
Massachusetts on the ground of diversity of citizenship. Process
was served by leaving copies of the summons and complaint with
the respondent's wife at his home. This form of service was sufficient to comply with rule 4(d) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ;2 however, a special Massachusetts statute required comI9Id. at 5.
"' 380 U.S. at 414.
'-380 U.S. 460 (1965).
'FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)

(1). This rule provides that service shall be
made in the following manner:
Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person,
by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place
of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein. .

..

NOTES AND COMMENTS

1965]

mencement of the action and service in hand within one year after
an executor or administrator posted bond.3 Petitioner's complaint
was filed, and service was made less than a month before the expiration of this period. Since the limitation period had lapsed when
the action came before the district court,4 litigation could continue
only if the federal rule prevailed; if the state rule was applied, the
respondent would succeed because of the insufficiency of service
within the time limited. The district court, in considering respondent's motion for summary judgment, applied the state rule
on the basis of Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.5
and Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.' The Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit found that the conflict between the federal and the
state rules involved a substantive matter and affirmed.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari' "because of the threat to the goal
of uniformity of federal procedure posed by the decisions below . .

.-

Mr. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, stated the
issue as follows:
The question to be decided is whether, in a civil action where
jurisdiction of the United States District Court is based upon
diversity of citizenship between the parties, service of process
shall be made in the manner prescribed by state law or that set
forth in Rule 4(d) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 10
ch. 197, § 9 (1958). This section provides that
Except as provided in this chapter, an executor or administrator shall
not be held to answer to an action by a creditor of the deceased which
is not commenced within one year from the time of his giving bond
for the performance of his trust, or to such an action which is commenced within said year unless before the expiration thereof the writ in
such action has been served by delivery in hand upon such executor or
administrator....
'Respondent posted bond on March 1, 1962. The complaint was filed
on February 6, 1963, and the service was made two days later. The answer
was filed on February 26, 1963. 331 F.2d 157, 159 (1st Cir. 1964). The
court of appeals stated that "at the time the answer was filed it was in fact
still possible to comply with the statute. However, plaintiff took no
further action." Ibid.
337 U.S. 530 (1949).
'326 U.S. 99 (1945).
v. Plumer, 331 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1964).
'Hanna
8
Hanna v. Plumer, 379 U.S. 813 (1964).
'Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463 (1965). See, e.g., Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Charneski, 286 F.2d 238 (7th Cir. 1960); Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph
Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960); Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281
F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960); Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959).
' MASS. ANN. LAWS

10380

U.S. 460, 461 (1965).
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In response to this issue the Court said:
We conclude that the adoption of Rule 4(d) (1), designed to
control service of process in diversity actions, neither exceeded
the congressional mandate embodied in the Rules Enabling Act
nor transgressed constitutional bounds, and that the Rule is
therefore the standard against which the District Court should
have measured the adequacy of service. Accordingly, we reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals.'1
The issue raised by this case had its genesis in section 34 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provides that "the laws of the
several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes
of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the Courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply."' 2 In the monumental
decision of Swift v. Tyson, 3 decided in 1842, the Supreme Court
held the term "laws" to mean state statutes and their construction,
local usages, and decisions as to real estate. The result was that in
diversity cases not involving one of these three categories, the federal courts could apply a federal "common law."' 4 The Conformity
Act of 1872's required the federal district courts to follow the procedure regulating similar actions in the forum state.'0 Thus, in
summary, "prior to 1938 the pattern in federal courts had been conformity to state law on matters of procedure, under the Conformity
Act, but substantial uniformity among the federal courts on substantive law under the aegis of Swift v. Tyson."' 7
In 1938, two events occurred which in effect reversed the situation described above. First, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
were promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to the Rules
"1Id. at 463-64. In a footnote to the opinion, the Court noted that

"there are a number of state service requirements which would not necessarily

be satisfied by compliance with Rule 4(d) (1)." North Carolina was listed
as falling in this category. Id. at 463 n.2. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-94

(1953).

28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958)).
(1842).
Pet.) 1(now
U.S. (16 (1789)
§ 54, at 188 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
CouRTs
FEDERAL
WRIGHT,

' 1 STAT. 92

1841

WRIGHT].
"5Act of

June 1, 1872, ch. 255, 17

STAT.

197.

" This state of affairs proved to be impracticable because some states

were far ahead of others in procedural reform. See Smith, Blue-Ridge and

Beyond: A Byrd's-Eye View of Federalisn in Diversity Litigation, 36
(1962).
TUL. L. REV. 443
§ 59, at 209.
17

WRIGHT
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Enabling Act. 8 The purpose of the federal rules was to establish
uniformity of procedure in the federal courts.1 9 Second, the Supreme Court, in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,2" overruled Swift v. Tyson.
In his opinion for the Court, Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or
by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law
of the state. And whether the law of the state shall be declared
by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision
is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general
common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules
of common law applicable in a state whether they be local in
their nature or "general," be they commercial law or a part of
the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution
purports to
confer such a power upon the federal courts. 2'
The policy underlying the Erie decision was the desire for
intrastate uniformity in result regardless of whether the action was
brought in state or federal court. 2 Since this uniformity pertained
to substantive law, the distinction between substance and procedure
became a central issue. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 23 demonstrated
that the traditional distinctions between substance and procedure
had been encroached upon by the policy of uniformity. 24 There, a
group of noteholders brought a class action against Guaranty Trust
Co., the trustee under the indenture. The issue was whether a state
statute of limitations that would have barred the action in a state
forum also functioned as a limitation in the federal court. The
Court held that the state statute of limitations significantly affected
the outcome of the litigation and therefore must be applied. An
"outcome-determinative" test was set forth, the essence of which
was that if the determination of an issue would have a decisive influence on the outcome of the case, then that issue was one of "substance.
18 28

'25

U.S.C. § 2072 (1958). This act provides that "the Supreme Court

shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules . . . the practice and

procedure of the district courts of the United States . ..in civil actions.
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right ...."
See, Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play on the Federal
VAND. L. REV. 711 (1950); Smith, supra note 16.
20304 U.S. 64 (1938). This decision was handed down five months
1"

Rides, 3

before
the federal rules were to become effective.
'111d. at 78.
22 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).

"Ibid.
24 See 26 N.C.L. REV. 60 (1947).
2" See I BARRON & HoLTzoFF § 138 (Wright ed. 1960); 28 U. CINc. L.
REv. 390 (1959).
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Although the outcome-determinative test was heavily criticized,
it was applied by the Court until 1958.26 The major criticism was
that there was no apparent stopping place.2 Professor Charles A.
Wright asserts that three of the cases28 in which the test was applied
"showed the deference to state law which was to be required in
matters which, for other purposes, are clearly procedural."2 9
In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., ° decided in f958,
the "outcome-determinative" test was modified. The case involved
a state rule providing that a court rather than a jury should determine whether a corporation was a statutory employer for purposes
of the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act. The federal
policy was that the jury should decide the issue."' The Court laid
down a twofold rule for determining whether a state rule should
be applied in a diversity case: If the rights and obligations of the
parties are defined by state law, then the state law is applicable, but
where the significance of the state law lies in "form and mode,"3'
an investigation of the policies supporting the state and federal
rules is appropriate. The stronger policy should control even though
there may be a question of variance in outcome.m Thus, the second
part of the rule involves a balancing process.
In applying the rule to the facts of the case, the Court first decided that the state rule involved only "form and mode." It then
applied the balancing process to the respective rules and concluded
that the federal policy of having a jury determine the question was
'

Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956);

Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Woods v.

Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer
& Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S.
183(1947).
Hart, The Relations between State and FederalLaw, 54 COLUm. L. R!v.
489 (1954); Clark, Federal Procedural Reform and States' Rights; to a
More Perfect Union, 40 TEXAs L. REv. 211 (1961).
"Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949);
Woods v.Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Ragan v.Merchants
& Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
Transfer
"WRIGHT, § 59, at 208.
80356 U.S. 525 (1958).

"1The Court used the term "policy" in stating the issue:

Thus the inquiry here iswhether the federal policy favoring jury decisions of disputed fact questions should yield to the state rule in the
interest of furthering the objective that the litigation should not come
out one way in the federal court and another way in the state court
at d.
538.at 536.
Id. "I
"Smith, supra note 16.
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the most cogent because of the seventh amendment. The result was
that a federal policy supported by the seventh amendment prevailed
over a simple "outcome-determinative" test. It would seem that the
Court, in applying the second aspect of the rule, does not preclude the
possibility that a state rule might prevail even in the area of procedure.

4

In Hanna85 the respondent contended that Erie and York made
it mandatory for the federal court to apply state law governing
service of process rather than rule 4(d) (1). However, the Court
held that where there is a federal rule and a state rule which are in
direct conflict, the federal rule will prevail if it is constitutionally
valid and if it meets the requirements of the Rules Enabling Act.8"
The Court concluded that rule 4(d) (1) was within the bounds of
the Constitution and that, on the basis of Sibbach v.Wilson & Co.,a
it did not violate the Rules Enabling Act.
What is the law under the Erie doctrine today? Erie was said
to have a constitutional basis; yet Mr. Justice Brandeis failed to
designate a specific section of the Constitution. This point alone has
excited a great deal of comment."8 The issue of whether Congress
and the federal courts can declare the substantive rules of common
law applicable in a state has not been specifically considered since
Erie; however, it was referred to in one case. 9 Though Hanna
does not answer the constitutional issue, it does tend to abolish any
doubts concerning the constitutional validity of rules governing
procedure in federal courts.
[T]he constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it
congressional power to make rules governing the practice and
pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either.40
*'56 Nw. U.L. REV. 560 (1961).
(1965).
U.S. 460
85380
§ 2072
(1958), supra note 18.
so28 U.S.C.
'312 U.S. 1 (1941). The Court in this case defined procedure as

"the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or
infraction of them." Id. at 14.
8 See WRIGHT § 56.
" Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956). Here,
that they were avoiding the issue.
specifically stated
the Court U.S.
460, 472 (1965). (Emphasis added.)
40380

186
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Hanna has seemingly clarified application of the Erie doctrine
in three situations. First, where there is a direct conflict between a
federal rule and a state rule, the federal rule will prevail if it is
constitutionally valid and does not exceed the limitations established
by the Rules Enabling Act.
Secondly, Hanna appears not to preclude future application of
the "outcome-determinative" test in a certain class of cases. In
Hanna, the difference between the Massachusetts rule and the federal rule would be "outcome-determinative" in the sense that either
respondent would win because of insufficient service within the oneyear limitation or the case would continue, but this is not the "outcome-determinative" sense in which the test is usually applied. The
Court stated that it would be "outcome-determinative" if the plaintiff, in choosing whether to bring suit in federal or state court,
faced a total bar to recovery due to the applicable rule in the state
court. The Court was not confronted with this situation in Hanna
because the special state statute of limitations had not run against
the petitioner when the action was commenced and thus there was
4
a choice of forum. '
The question remains as to when the test is still applicable. The
answer would seem to lie in the Court's reference to a series of
cases where a state rule was enforced though it was argued that a
federal rule governed. In the words of the Court, "the scope of
the Federal Rule was not as broad as the losing party urged, and
therefore, there being no Federal Rule which covered the point in
dispute, Erie commanded the enforcement of state law." ' Two
cases are illustrative of this situation. In Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co., 43 a state statute required the issue of
summons in addition to the filing of the complaint to toll the statute
of limitations. Federal rule 3 provided that the action was commenced
with the filing of the complaint. The statute of limitations had run
after the complaint was filed in the federal district court but prior
to the service of summons. The Court held that the state statute
was applicable and the claim barred. In Cohen v. Beneficial IndistrialLoan Corp.,44 a state rule which went one step further than
"Id. at 469.
"Id. at 470.
"337 U.S. 530 (1949).
"337 U.S. 541 (1949).
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federal rule 23(b) 4 5 by requiring the posting of bond by the plaintiff in a shareholder's derivative suit was applied rather than rule
23(b).
Ragan and Cohen would clearly seem to be "outcome-determinative" test cases in the very sense the Court spoke of such a test in
Hanna. In both cases there is a federal rule that is not as broad as
the state rule, but does not conflict with it. Thus, the conclusion
would seem to be that when there is a federal rule and a state rule
which do not conflict, but the plaintiff may be barred in the state
court because the state rule goes one step further, the "outcomedeterminative" test is still appropriate and the state law should
prevail.
Thirdly, the Court in Hanna made the following statement:
[i]t is doubtful that, even if there were no Federal Rule
making it clear that in hand service is not required in diversity
actions, the Erie rule would have obligated the District Court
to follow the Massachusetts procedure. 'Outcome-determination'
46
analysis was never intended to serve as a talisman.
Here, the Court, citing Byrd, seemingly indicated that the Byrd
balance test might still be applied where an established federal
practice not specifically required by the federal rules conflicts with
state procedure. Byrd involved a situation in which there was a
general federal policy favoring jury trials and a contrary state rule
specifically designed to meet the very fact situation before the
Court. It is important to remember that in Byrd, unlike in Hanna,
there was no federal rule that was specifically and directly contrary
to the state rule.48 Thus, it seems fair to conclude that when a
problem involves a federal practice that is not specifically contrary
to the state rule, but conflicts with it, the Court will apply the balance
test of Byrd with the most cogent in terms of policy prevailing.
" Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) provides that the plaintiff in a shareholder's
derivative suit shall aver (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the
time of the wrong or that he got his shares by operation of law and (2)
that the action is not collusive. The complaint must also show a demand
for action upon the directors, and if necessary, the shareholders. If no
demand is shown, reasons must be given for this.
,380 U.S. 460, 466-67 (1965).
"The state rule specifically applied to a worknen's compensation issue.
""The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment
to the Constitution or as given by statute of the United States shall be
preserved to the parties inviolate." Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(a). This rule is not
mentioned in the majority opinion of Byrd.
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As demonstrated by Byrd, if the federal practice has a strong federal
or constitutional basis, it is likely to prevail. 9
In summary, it would seem that Hanna is indicative of the
Court's respect for the federal rules which it promulgated. For
example, in the strict Hanna situation the federal rule prevails, and
in the "outcome-determinative" class of cases there is no disrespect
to the Federal Rules because there is no conflict. The balance test
is also illustrative of the Court's respect for a uniform system of
federal procedure. If the federal practice is not applied in a particular situation, it is only because the practice is not as essential
to the maintenance of uniformity in federal procedure as the state
rule is to the policy of intrastate uniformity in result.
JAMES

L.

NELSON

Federal Jurisdiction-Labor Law-Jurisdiction to Remove Suits to
Enjoin Strikes to Federal Court
In American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Marine Div., Int'l.
Union Operating Eng'rs1 the defendant union had ceased work,
and the plaintiff, there being a no-strike clause in their contract,
sought to enjoin the strike by a suit in the Pennsylvania state court.
The defendant removed to federal court under section 1441 (b) of
the Judicial Code.2 Plaintiff moved to remand under section 1447(c)
of the Judicial Code.- The district court denied the motion, 4 holding
that it had jurisdiction under section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947r and that the case was, therefore, prop" Smith, supra note 16.
'338

F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 985 (1965),

reversing 224 F. Supp. 985 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
S(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties
or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the
citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be
removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and
served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is
brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1958).
"If at any time before final judgement it appears that the case was
removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall
remand the case . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
'224 F. Supp. 985, 989 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States
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erly removable under section 1441(b). The district court then
denied a motion for temporary injunction," relying on section 4 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act 7 and Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson.' The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court,9
ruling that the federal courts had no jurisdiction and that, therefore,
the case should have been remanded to the Pennsylvania court.
The court based its decision on four basic issues of law: (1) whether
the wording of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and Sinclair preclude
federal jurisdiction in this area; (2) whether a decision that the
case is removable would lead to an absurd or unjust conclusion by
removing plaintiff's right to get an injunction; (3) whether there
is "federal question" jurisdiction in the first place; and (4) whether
a state court would have the power to grant an injunction if the case
were to be remanded.
The first point the court made was that section 4 of the NorrisLaGuardia Act ° and the Sinclair decision do not simply reject the
right of the federal courts to give injunctions to stop strikes, but
instead eliminate the entire jurisdiction of federal courts in these
cases." In other words, does the phrase, "no court . . .shall have
jurisdiction to issue ... injunctions,"' 2 take away the entire power
of the court to hear the case, or does it merely remove "equity
jurisdiction"?" The court here said that the statute leaves the
federal courts powerless to take any jurisdiction in these cases.' 4
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
:224 F. Supp. at 989.
747 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
8370 U.S. 195 (1962).
o 338 F.2d 857.
10 No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case
involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person
or persons participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms
are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the
following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any
relation of employment;
47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
11338 F.2d at 840-42.
1247
Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
"The problem of the misuse of the word "jurisdiction" to mean power to
give equitable remedies has been frequently discussed by legal scholars.
See, e.g., CHAFEE, SOME PROBLE S OF EQUITY 296-380 (1950); McCLINTOCK, EQUITY, § 40 (2d ed. 1948).
14 338 F.2d at 840.
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There has been a split of authority on this issue. A majority of
cases' " have agreed with the decision in American Dredging, but
a substantial minority16 and many renowned scholars17 have taken
the opposite view. However, all of these cases on both sides were
either before the Sinclair decision or were decisions of district
courts and, thus, cannot be relied on as authoritative precedent.
The court in American Dredging partly relied on Sinclair. In
Sinclair the issue was whether section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act' s impliedly overruled section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia." The Court, by a five-to-three decision, held that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act was in no way overruled and that the Court
would make no accommodation between the two statutes. The
Court stated, "The District Court was correct in dismissing count
3 of petitioner's complaint for lack of jurisdiction under the NorrisLaGuardia Act."2 The court of appeals relied on this as authority
that the Supreme Court thought that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
totally removed jurisdiction.2 '
It must be pointed out, however, that at no time in Sinclair
nor in any other decision, so far as this writer's research discloses,
has the Court discussed the issue of how "jurisdiction" is used in
section 104. Also, the Court has made statements in other cases
which would seem to indicate that the words mean equity jurisdiction only.22
"Direct Transit Lines, Inc. v. Starr, 219 F.2d 699 (6th Cir. 1955);
Merchants Refrigerator Co. v. Warehouse Union, 213 F. Supp. 177 (N.D.
Cal. 1963); National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Heffernan, 195 F. Supp. 153
(E.D.N.Y. 1961); Swift & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 177 F.
Supp. 511 (D. Colo. 1959); Hat Corp. of America v. United Hatters, 114
F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1953).
" Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Dist. Council No. 11, 229
F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Tri-Boro Bagel Co. v. Bakery Drivers
Union, 228 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. N.Y. 1963); Crestwood Dairy Inc. v.
Kelley, 222 F. Supp. 614 (E.D. N.Y. 1963); H. A. Lott, Inc. v. Hoisting
& Portable Eng'rs Union, 222 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Tex. 1963); Pocohontas
Terminal Corp. v. Portland Bldg. & Constr. Trade Council 93 F. Supp.
217 (D. Maine 1950).
, See, e.g., Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements-Some
Unanswered Questions, 63 COLUm. L. Rnv. 1027 (1965); CHAFEE, SOME
PROBLEMIS OF EQUITY 367-74 (1950). See also Comment, Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts to Enjoin Labor Disputes, 32 TENN. L. REV. 284 (1965).
18 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
10 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).

10 370 U.S. at 215.

21338 F.2d at 840.
"E.g., "The Norris-LaGuardia Act-considered as a whole and in its
various parts-was intended drastically to curtail the equity jurisdiction of
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In addition to the above, the Third Circuit relied on the use of
the word "jurisdiction" in section 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Actf
and upon the fact that the Supreme Court had defined jurisdiction
just six years before the passage of the act as: "power to entertain
the suit, consider the merits and render a binding decision thereon. ...

)24

The court then assumed that Congress knew of this

definition when it passed the act, and the court relied on section 2
to show it did use it in this manner." This assumption by the court
seems falacious, for in section 7 of the act2" the term "jurisdiction"'
is again used. It seems clear from a careful reading of section 7
that Congress only intended the term to mean equity jurisdiction.
Moreover, the use of the word in section 7 shows that the act only
intended to limit the power of the courts to grant the equitable
remedy of injunction because in section 7 Congress is clearly not
trying to define the jurisdiction of the court, but only supplying
the conditions under which the equitable remedy of injunction may
be given.
The second holding of the court of appeals is based upon the
principle that courts should not interpret statutes to lead to absurd
or unjust conclusions. The court concluded that an absurd and
unjust conclusion is reached by a decision that the court had removal jurisdiction because the court would then be depriving the
plaintiff of injunctive relief available in the state courts. Such a
conclusion would leave the federal court with a case under confederal courts in the field of labor disputes." Milk Drivers' Union v. Lake
Valley Farm Prods., Inc., 311 U.S. 91, 101 (1940). "[I]ts [the NorrisLaGuardia Act's] prime purpose was to restrict the federal equity power."
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R.R., 321 U.S. 50, 58
(1944).
"'In the interpretation of this chapter and in determining the jurisdiction
and authority of the courts of the United States, as such jurisdiction
and authority are defined and limited in this chapter, the public policy
of the United States is hereby declared as follows:
.. . therefore, the following definitions of and limitations upon the
jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the United States are enacted.

47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1958).
2'

General Inv. Co. v. New York Cent R.R., 271 U.S. 228, 230 (1926).

338 F.2d at 840-41.
2 No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue a tempo-

rary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a

labor dispute, as defined in this chapter, except after hearing the testimony of the witnesses in open court (with opportunity for cross-examination) in support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath,
and testimony in opposition thereto if offered, and except after findings
of fact by the court to the effect . . .

47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1958).
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sideration for which it could not give a remedy. The court pointed
out that to have jurisdiction is to have not only the ability to hear
the case but also to provide a remedy for it."
The question whether a state is precluded by Norris-LaGuardia
from issuing an injunction has never been decided by the Supreme
Court.2" If the Third Circuit is correct in saying that the state
court does have this right, is it unjust to conclude that the federal
courts nevertheless have jurisdiction? When a case is removed
from a state court to a federal court certain rights are invariably
lost."0 Yet the jurisdiction of the federal courts is not dissolved
because of this loss of right. Why should this be a determinative
issue in the present case alone?
There is no doubt that the court was correct in stating that it
would be an absurd conclusion to say that federal courts had jurisdiction in this case but had no remedy available which could be
granted. But certainly there are adequate remedies other than injunction against the strike which the federal courts could grant.
The district court held that it could not grant an injunction but
could give money damages, for the complaint had asked for any
other appropriate relief.3 0 The district court also noted that even
if the complaint did not make this request, the court could still grant
other appropriate relief under rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 1 The Third Circuit held this rule inapplicable
since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not to be used to
expand jurisdiction.32 The court of appeals also asserted that the
only way money damages would be useful to gain jurisdiction in
this case is by use of section 1441 (c) of the Judicial Code,'3 if
damages were a separate controversy within the meaning of the act.
'The court held that this would not be a separate controversy and
F.2d at 843.
" This writer's research discloses no Supreme Court case dealing with
this issue.
" E.g., if plaintiff filed a bill in equity in North Carolina, and defendant
then removed the case to federal court, plaintiff's right to a jury trial in
North Carolina would be lost in federal court. N.C. CoNsT. art. 4, § 1;
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-172 (1943); Worthy v. Shields 90 N.C. 192 (1884);
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-Op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958).
" 224 F. Supp. at 988.
-2 338

"1 FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
2 "These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction
of the United States district courts or the venue of actions therein." FED.
R. Civ.
82. § 1441(c) (1958).
"28 P.
U.S.C.
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thus section 1441 (c) could not be used in this case." Both of these
assertions of the Third Circuit are correct, except that the court
misconstrued what the district court held. The district court did not
hold that other relief could be given in this case so that it could
gain jurisdiction under section 1441(c), nor did it use rule 54(c)
to expand jurisdiction. What the district court actually held was
that it could give money damages with or without the use of the
procedural rule 54(c) and, therefore, the "absurd conclusion" of
having jurisdiction without a remedy does not exist. In fact the
district court had another and perhaps more effective remedy which
it could use. The contract between plaintiff and defendant in this
case provided for compulsory arbitration of grievances."
The
court could, therefore, grant an injunction forcing arbitration.36
The third basis for the court's holding was that, assuming that
Norris-LaGuardia only restricts the power to issue an injunction
and not the jurisdiction of the court, the federal courts still do not
have jurisdiction over the case because there was no diversity of
parties and no federal question and therefore the case did not come
within the constitutional bounds of federal jurisdiction 7
The question of what is a federal question has plagued the
federal judiciary from shortly after the framing of the Constitution
until the present day. s There is no rule or definition which adequately covers this question. Nevertheless, some guidelines have
been established.3 9 The Third Circuit determined in American
"338 F.2d at 849. Although it is not entirely clear, distinct causes of
action apparently are required for there to be separate controversies. American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn 341 U.S. 6 (1951).
3 See Brief for Appellant p. 2, Brief for Appellee p. 7.
It was conclusively decided in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448 (1957), that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act meant that federal courts could give specific performance to arbitration
agreements: "It expresses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce
these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that
industrial peace can be best obtained in that way." Id., at 455. If arbitration were enforced, could the strike be stayed pending the arbitration?
This question is unanswered by the Court as far as this writer's research
can determine.
"U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2.
"8E.g., Gully v. First Nat'l Bank 299 U.S. 109 (1936); Shulthis v.
McDougal 225 U.S. 561 (1912); Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes 96
U.S. 199 (1878); Osborn v. Bank of United States 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738,
824 0(1824).
" E.g., the federal question must be on the face of the complaint; the
ultimate substantive issue must be of federal law; and the right created by
federal law must be a substantive element of the case. Gully v. First Nat'l
Bank 299 U.S. 109, 112-13 (1936). See for good discussions of federal
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Dredging that the plaintiff may, in drawing his complaint, base it
on the law he wishes.40 If he casts it in such a way that the decision
must be based on a construction of the Constitution, a federal statute,
or a treaty, or in some other way based on federal law, then and
only then has a federal question been raised. The Third Circuit
concluded that the plaintiff in this case based his complaint solely on
state law and in no way did the plaintiff base his case on section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act or on any other federal law.
This conclusion seems highly dubious, for in no way does it take
into account the decisions subsequent to the passage of section 301
which have vastly affected the whole field of suits arising out of
labor contracts. The cases, Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills,4 Charles Dowd Box Co., Inc. v. Courtney,' and Local 174,
Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co.,43 basically have decided

the questions of which forum labor contract cases may be tried in and
what law is to be applied.
From these cases it is clearly shown that the court was amiss
in concluding that the suit on the issue of breach of a labor contract's no-strike provision is not a question of federal law, no
matter how the complaint in the case was framed. For these three
cases show that labor contract cases, which are clearly the cases
covered by section 301(a), are to be determined by federal law
alone. Even though they may be tried in a state court, they still
must be tried on federal law. To carry this one step further, since
question jurisdiction, 1

BARRON

&

HOLTZoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-

§ 25 (Wright ed. 1960); 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § .60 (2d
ed. 1964).
40 338 F.2d at 846, citing Gully v. First Nat'l Bank 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
This case said:
41353 U.S. 448 (1957).
CEDURE

The question then is, what is the substantive law to be applied in

suits under § 301 (a)? We conclude that the substantive law to apply
in suits under § 301 (a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion
from the policy of our national labor laws. ... Any state law applied,
however, will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent

source of private rights.
Id. at 456-57.

1 368 U.S. 502 (1962). Here it was decided that § 301 (a) did not
give federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction, but jurisdiction is instead
concurrent with the state courts.
"-369 U.S. 95 (1962). In this, the last decision of what is commonly
called the trilogy, the Court held that "incompatible doctrines of local law
must give way to principles of federal labor law. . . . The dimensions of
§ 301 require the conclusion that substantive principles of federal labor law
must be paramount in the area covered by the statute," and "we cannot
but conclude that in enacting § 301 Congress intended doctrines of federal
labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules." Id. at 102-05.
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all labor contract cases must be tried on a federal standard, there
is necessarily always a federal question and, therefore, always
federal jurisdiction.
The last of the contentions of the court is in actuality an attempt to rebut the dissenting opinion. Judge Hastie in his dissent4 4
contended that the state courts have no power to enjoin strikes,
and therefore, plaintiff was not unjustly deprived of his right to
an injunction as the majority contended. Judge Hastie reached
this conclusion by reasoning that the Sinclair decision brought
prohibition of injunctions in section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia into
the federal common law called for by the Lincoln Mills decision.
The majority opinion unfortunately never discusses the question
of whether this prohibition has become part of the federal common
labor law. Instead it goes to great lengths to show that the NorrisLaGuardia Act was not originally intended to affect state proceedings. This is probably true, but in no way answers Judge Hastie's
contention.
In the final analysis only the Supreme Court will be able to say
whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act will be extended to the states
by way of Lincoln Mills.4" The Court may limit itself purely to a
construction of the statute." On the other hand, the balancing of
public policies may force the Court to make the prohibition part
of the federal common labor law as Judge Hastie contended. If
the Court decides to extend this anti-injunction by dictating which
remedies state courts may give, it will cause much friction between
our federal and state court systems. But, if the Court allows the
state courts to enjoin strikes, this will cause a preference for the
state forum to such an extent that it is very doubtful that the federal
court will be used at all for these cases. Thus the decision of American Dredging, the lack of removal jurisdiction and that states' re"338 F.2d at 857-58.
'Although

the Supreme Court has never discussed the question of

whether state courts may enjoin strikes, state courts generally have said

that they could grant the injunctions. E.g., McCarroll v. Los Angeles
County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958); and other cases collected at 32 A.L.R.2d
822 (1953). Legal scholars have generally opposed this view. E.g., Aaron,
Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements-Some Unanswered Questions,
63 CoLum. L. REv. 1027, 1029-40. (1965).
" If the question is limited to statutory construction, the Supreme Court
will probably construe the words "court of the United States" as limiting
only federal courts. See, e.g., Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis,
241 U.S. 211 (1916); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
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tention of the power to enjoin strikes, circumvented the policy expressed by Congress in section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.
The problems discussed in this case are fundamental to the
litigation of labor disputes in the courts. It would appear to this
writer that if and when the Supreme Court or Congress answers
these questions, the answers should reach the conclusions opposite
those of the court of appeals. This must be done if for no other
reason than a consistent public policy.
The Supreme Court in Lincoln Mills47 and Lucas Flour8 decided that labor contract suits are to be decided by federal common
law. Yet if suits on breach of no-strike provisions are not allowed
in federal courts, the irony is created of state courts creating federal common labor law in this area. This, of course, would put the
tremendous, time-consuming responsibility of review of this statecreated federal common law squarely on the shoulders of the Supreme Court.
The perplexing problems discussed in American Dredging can
be solved finally only by a Supreme Court decision unless, of course,
Congress legislates an answer. Since even a temporary injunction
is likely to break a strike before any appeal can be processed through
the courts, it seems unlikely that the question presented by a state
injunction of a strike will ever reach the Court before becoming
moot. Moreover, the question of whether the federal courts have
removal jurisdiction over such a case can obviously be reached
by the Court only through the federal system. Consequently, it is
difficult to imagine why the Supreme Court, faced with both of
these questions in this case, did not grant certiorari. It is clear that
the answers are paramount in litigation of breaches of no-strike
clauses in labor contracts. Therefore, they demand the attention
of the Court in the immediate future.
DENNIS JAY WINNER

"353 U.S. 448 (1957).
"369 U.S. 95 (1962).
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Limitation of Actions-Claims Between Spouses
In an action by a wife against her husband to establish a resulting or constructive trust in land or, in the alternative, to recover
money advanced to the husband for improvements in consideration
of his oral promise to convey to her a one-half interest in land held
in the husband's name, it was held that the wife's evidence was insufficient to establish either a resulting or a constructive trust and
that her alternative action based on implied contract was barred
by the statute of limitations.' The court concluded that notwithstanding the continuance of the marital relationship the statute of
limitations had commenced running at the time of the husband's
repudiation of his agreement to convey.
The controversy whether statutes of limitations should be applied, during coverture, to claims between spouses appears to have
arisen primarily from the common-law fictional unity of the spouses
with the consequent disability of the wife to sue her husband and
the policy of the law to encourage domestic peace and tranquility.2
The emergence of so-called "married women's" acts relieving
married women of many of the common-law disabilities gave rise
to the question whether these statutes, by eliminating the wife's
inability to sue, had repealed by implication the married-women's
'Fulp v. Fulp, .264 N.C. 20, 140 S.E.2d 708 (1965). The statute provides a three-year limitation period for actions "upon a contract, obligation or
liability arising out of a contract, express or implied.. .

."

N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 1-52(1) (1953). The application of the statute of limitations to contracts
implied in law seems both historically and statutorily sound. At commonlaw, contracts implied in law were cognizable at law by writ of assumpsit.
CoiNnr, CONTRACTS § 19 (1963). Furthermore, in all cases in which equity

and law might have concurrent jurisdiction, the courts of equity were bound
by the limitations statutes and did not act merely in analogy to it. Falls v.
Torrance, 11 N.C. 412 (1826); KELLY, CODE LIMITATIONS OF AcTIONS §
47 (1903); 1 MCINTOSH, N.C. PRACTCE & PROCEDURE § 273 (2d ed. 1956).

By statute, "The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity
and the forms of such actions and suits are abolished, and there is but
one form of action for the enforcement or protection of private rights and
the redress of private wrongs, which is denominated a civil action." N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-9 (1953). Under this statute, the statute of limitations
would, apply to both legal and equitable claims. 1 MCINTOSH, supra at § 273.
2 See, e.g., Barnett v. Harshbarger, 105 Ind. 410, 5 N.E. 718 (1886) ; In
the Matter of Estate of Crawford, 155 Kan. 388, 125 P.2d 354 (1942);
Morris v. Pennsgrove Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 115 N.J. Eq. 219, 170 At.
16 (Ch. 1934); Alpaugh v. Wilson, 52 N.J. Eq. 424, 28 Atl. 722 (Ch.
1894); Stockwell v. Stockwell's Estate, 92 Vt. 489, 105 Atl. 30 (1918);
Second Nat'l Bank v. Merrill & Houston Iron-works, 81 Wis. 151, 50
N.W. 505 (1891). See generally Annot., 121 A.L.R. 1382 (1939).
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exemption from the limitations statutes.3 Conflicting decisions were
4
reached with no discernible majority rule.
Subsequently, many state legislatures expressly eliminated coverture from the list of statutory disabilities under limitations statutes;
but, even absent this saving clause, the weight of authority held that
claims between spouses were exempt from the statute during continuance of the marital relation. 5 The basic reasoning applied by
these courts seems to have been that even though the spouses are
permitted to bring actions against each other during coverture,
public policy demands the exemption of such claims from the compulsive force exerted by statutes of limitations.6 Thus, the limitation
period will begin running only upon termination of the marriage
through death or divorce.' However, when the limitation period
'Originally statutes of limitations were viewed with disfavor and judicial exceptions were implied at every opportunity. See Richards v. Maryland Ins. Co., 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 84 (1814). In later years, however,
statutes of limitations were considered as applicable to all causes of action
not specially excepted by the legislature. See M'Iver v. Ragan, 15 U.S.
(2 Wheat.) 25 (1817).
'See Smith's Ex'r v. Johns, 154 Ky. 274, 157 S.W. 21 (1913) (no
repeal by implication); Brown v. Cousens, 51 Me. 301 (1864) (repeal by
implication); Lindell Real-Estate Co. v. Lindell, 142 Mo. 61, 43 S.W. 368
(1897) (no repeal by implication); Wiesner v. Zaun, 39 Wis. 188 (1875)
(no repeal by implication).
'E.g., Hamby v. Brooks, 86 Ark. 448, 111 S.W. 277 (1908); Mergenthaler v. Mergenthaler, 69 Cal. App. 2d 525, 160 P.2d 121 (Dist. Ct. App.
1945); Fourthman v. Fourthman, 15 Ind. App. 199, 43 N.E. 965 (1896);
Barnett v. Harshbarger, 105 Ind. 410, 5 N.E. 718 (1886); Yeomans v.
Petty, 40 N.J. Eq. 495, 4 Atl. 631 (Ch. 1885); Cary v. Cary, 159 Ore.
578, 80 P.2d 886 (1938); Morrish v. Morrish, 262 Pa. 192, 105 At. 83
(1918) (dictum); Stockwell v. Stockwell's Estate, 92 Vt. 489, 105 Atl. 30
(1918); Brader v. Brader, 110 Wis. 423, 85 N.W. 681 (1901) (affirmed
rule without giving assent thereto in order to protect those who had relied
upon it); Second Nat'l Bank v. Merrill & Houston Iron-works, 81 Wis.
151, 50 N.W. 505 (1891) (dictum).
'The best-considered decisions upon the subject in hand, even since the
Married Women's Property Acts, are to the effect, that owing to the
social importance of maintaining the family relation, in suits between
wives and their husbands for the protection of the former's property,
statutes of limitation, as also presumptions or estoppels by lapse of time,
ordinarily, do not affect the rights of the wife, since she cannot be expected
to treat her husband as a stranger. As certain courts have well said,
any other policy would be apt to beget disagreements and contentions
in the family fatal to domestic peace....
Morrish v. Morrish, 262 Pa. 192 at 201, 105 At. 83 at 86 (dictum). See
1 Wis. L. REv. 378 (1922).
' As to mere separations, a distinction seems to have been drawn by
some courts between amicable separations with a possibility of reconciliation
and separations which lack this element. In jurisdictions in which the
public policy argument prevails, this distinction would seem to be necessary
in view of the fact that, since the limitation is tolled during cohabitation
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has begun running on a claim before coverture, the general rule is
that the subsequent marriage of the parties does not toll the statute."
This result, when applied in majority-rule jurisdictions, would
appear to come into direct conflict with the public policy foundation
of the initial exemption, i.e. the policy of strengthening the family
relation by refusing to compel spouses to sue during coverture or
suffer their claim to become barred by lapse of time would seem to
be as applicable to claims arising prior to as well as subsequent to
the marriage of the parties. In both cases, the threat of forcing
litigation between spouses during marriage would appear to be the
target to which the policy argument is directed.
There would appear also to be some question as to the validity
of the basic premise upon which the policy argument is founded.
The compulsory effect of the running of limitations may indeed
result in claims between -spouses and thus afford evidence of a
corruption of the domestic peace and tranquility; but, the true
threat to the maintenance of the family relation would seem to be
the underlying wrong done, not the formal action based thereon. 9
Consequently, it might be argued that suit by the wife merely
places a preoccurring breach of the marital relationship upon the
public stage-it is the result, not the cause, of the family discord.,'
On the other hand, there is the possibility that a reconciliation
will more likely occur where the injustices of the home have not
been placed before the public. However, it would seem that mere
exemption of the claim from the running of the limitation period
in the interest of family peace, the reason for the rule actually gains force

where separation with a tenuous possibility of reconciliation has intervened.
See Hampton v. Hampton Holding Co., 17 N.J. 431, 439, 111 A.2d 761,

765 (1955) (dictum); Lineweaver's Estate, 284 Pa. 384, 390, 131 Adt.
378, 380 (1925) (dictum).

. People Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Renz, 203 Ky. 566, 262 S.W. 951

(1924); Graves v. Howard, 159 N.C. 594, 75 S.E. 998 (1912); Charmley

v. Charmley, 125 Wis. 297, 103 N.W. 1106 (1905).

Contra, Fourthman v.

Fourthman, 15 Ind. App. 199, 43 N.E. 965 (1896); Morris v. Pennsgrove

Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 715 N.J. Eq. 219, 170 Adt. 16 (Ch. 1934).
"A litigation of the kind between husband and wife may be unseemly

and abhorrent to our ideas of propriety, but a litigation in one form can be
no more so than in another, and no more so than the necessity itself which
gives rise to the litigation. . .

."

Wilson v. Wilson, 36 Cal. 447, 454 (1868).

"0In Fulp, a separation had resulted from the domestic discord prior to
the bringing of the wife's action. 264 N.C. at 22, 140 S.E.2d at 711. It

would seem arguable that where a cause of action is evidence itself of a
prior deterioration and collapse of the family relation there remains in fact
no family relation to protect.
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would have little effect upon the occurrence of a reconciliation,
unless such reconciliation is based upon the wife's forgiving today
on the hope of suing tomorrow. It appears doubtful that any such
reconciliation would in fact lead to a strengthening of the family
relation.
In judging the persuasiveness of the public policy argument, it
should also be noted that the limitations statutes themselves are
founded upon the broader policy that it is best to suppress fraudulent
and stale claims from springing up after great lapses of time and
surprising the parties when the evidence may be lost, the facts
obscure, and the witnesses absent.11 It would seem, therefore, that
the policy of maintaining family peace must be considered in conjunction with the policy of protecting other interested parties from
stale claims."2
In jurisdictions applying the statute of limitations to claims
between husband and wife during marriage, the reasoning of the
courts has been that since the limitations statute contains no express
exemption in favor of such causes of action, the courts cannot
engraft such an exemption into the statute.'3 Such a theory would
appear to be applicable in North Carolina. Not only is coverture no
longer a bar to a wife's maintaining an action against her husband,' 4
but it has also been expressly stricken from the disability exemptions to the North Carolina statute of limitations.' 5 This deletion
was made notwithstanding a statutory command that "civil actions
can only be commenced within the periods prescribed . . . except

where in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by statute.""
The command of the statute would seem to evidence an explicit
1 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S.
342 (1944); Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E.2d 508 (1957).
' See In the Matter of Estate of Crawford, 155 Kan. 388, 125 P.2d
354 (1942). The "dead man's statute," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-51 (1953),
offers some protection, but its effect is no greater a safeguard in the
husband-wife claim situation than in other situations subject to the running
of limitations. Since the husband presumptively holds his wife's property
in trust for her, it appears that § 8-51 may actually be less effective in the
family claim cases.
"it re Estate of Deaner, 126 Iowa 701, 102 N.W. 825 (1905); Wyatt
v. Wyatt, 81 Miss. 219, 32 So. 317 (1902) ; It re Lange's Estate, 91 N.E.2d
546 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949).
"Graves v. Howard, 159 N.C. 594, 75 S.E. 998 (1912) (containing
dictum to the effect that the statute of limitations should run on the wife's
claim).
Laws 1899, ch. 78.
"'N.C.
"N.C. Sess.
GEN. STAT. § 1-15 (1953). (Emphasis added.)
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legislative intent that married women be removed from any and all
disability exemptions. Upon this ground alone the North Carolina
17
result would appear to be correct.
Furthermore, it would seem that the result reached in Fulp
could be justified on the ground that exemption of claims between
spouses from the running of limitations does not in fact strengthen
the family relation. This position, noted previously, might be
maintained on the additional ground that even when a complete
reconciliation is accomplished, there is no longer a wrong for which
a remedy is required.
However, it could be maintained that a distinction should be
made between situations in which the husband has wronged his wife
or her property by an overt act and those situations in which the
delict has been his failure to act."8 Though, in reality, it may be
that the wife should not be expected to bring an action to compel
her husband to repay a loan, perform his promise or otherwise fulfill
a legal obligation to her, such a distinction as stated above seems
unnecessary. Since the husband is presumed to hold in trust any
property given him by his wife,'" it appears that it will generally
take an overt act by the husband to start the running of the statute
against his wife's claim. In such a situation the only burden on the
wife would seem to be the burden of determining whether her
See cases cited note 13 supra.
No such distinction has been made in the cases. Compare Morrish v.
Morrish, 262 Pa. 192, 105 Atl. 83 (1918) (limitations did not run against
wife on claim for cancellation of deed on grounds of fraud), with Stockwell
v. Stockwell's Estate, 92 Vt. 489, 105 Atl. 30 (1918) (Wife's claim for
money loaned husband is not barred by limitations). Compare In re Lange's
Estate, 91 N.E.2d 546 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949) (Wife's claim for money loaned
is barred by limitations), with Rosenberger v. Mallerson, 92 Mo. App. 27
(1901) (Wife's action for conversion is barred by limitations). See also
Posnick v. Posnick, 160-A.2d 804 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1960), in which
it was held that where the wife had been involved in constant litigation with
her husband for six years and had merely failed to join the claim in question with her earlier actions, the statute of limitations barred her claim.
17
18

1"

Where a wife voluntarily delivers her money to her husband the law

will presume, in the absence of direct evidence that it was intended as a
gift, that he takes it as trustee for her. Etheredge v. Cochran, 196 N.C. 681,
682, 146 S.E. 711, 712 (1929). Claims by the cestui que trust for breach of

the trust are not subject to the running of limitations until knowledge of
the trustee's repudiation of the trust has reached the claimant. Solon Lodge

v. Ionic Lodge, 247 N.C. 310, 101 S.E.2d 8 (1957). Neither do limitations
run against a cestui que trust in possession. Bowen v. Darden, 241 N.C.

11, 17, 84 S.E.2d 289, 294 (1954).
For discussion of the running of limitations in the constructive trust
situation see 44 N.C.L. REv. 202 (1965).

202
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Such a

burden would not seem to create a threat to the maintenance of the
family relation. However, where the wife's claim is to be subject
to the running of limitations, perhaps it would better serve the
policy of striving for domestic peace to require a clear showing of
repudiation by the husband.2 1
The protection of the family relation is a worthy policy; but,
when used in support of judicial determinations, it would seem to
stand as a statement of a conclusion only, leaving vacant the area
of discussion in which should fall the reasons why and the manner
by which the decision has in fact supported the stated policy. The
danger appears when "the protection of the family relation" becomes a mere shibboleth of the courts to be utilized perfunctorily in
engrafting judicial exemptions into the statute of limitations.
RoBERT

0. KLEPFER, JR.

Limitation of Actions-Equitable Remedies-Repudiation
In consideration of her husband's oral promise to convey to her
a one-half interest in land held in the husband's name, the wife
advanced him money for improvements.' Upon completion of the
improvements and in answer to his wife's request to put her name
on the deed, the husband replied: "'You don't think I am a damn
'0Further protection is afforded by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(9) (1953),
which provides that for relief based upon fraud or mistake the cause of
action is not deemed to have accrued until the aggrieved party has or should
have discovered such fraud or mistake. In addition, "... equity will deny
the right to assert that defense [running of limitations] when delay has
been induced by acts, representations, or conduct, the repudiation of which
would amount to a breach of good faith. ..." Nowell v. Great At. & Pac.
Tea Co., 250 N.C. 575, 579, 108 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1959) (defendant's promises to correct defects estopped him to plead limitations).
" In the rare case in which the husband has a claim based upon his
wife's failure to act, exemption of his claim from the running of limitations
would appear of little consequence, since whatever he gives his wife is
presumptively a gift. Bowling v. Bowling, 252 N.C. 527, 114 S.E.2d 228
(1960); Shoe v. Hood, 251 N.C. 719, 725, 112 S.E.2d 543, 548 (1960). It
appears, therefore, that since lapse of time would decrease the possibilities
of overcoming the presumption, it is doubtful that the exemption would be
utilized.
'Fulp v. Fulp, 264 N.C. 20, 140 S.E.2d 708 (1965). It should be noted
that in North Carolina full performance by one of the parties to a contract
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds does not take the contract out
of the statute. Carter v. Carter, 182 N.C. 186, 108 S.E. 765 (1921).
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fool, do you?' "2 In a subsequent action by the wife to establish a
resulting or constructive trust, or in the alternative to recover her
money, this statement was held to constitute a repudiation of the
husband's agreement sufficient to start limitations running against
the wife. The North Carolina Supreme Court also held that the
wife's evidence was insufficient to establish either a resulting or a
constructive trust,3 and that her claim based upon contract implied
in law4 was barred by the three-year limitation statute.3 However,
the court conceded that "were plaintiff the cestui que trust of a
)30
resulting or constructive trust, the ten-year statute would apply ....
Both the logic of this distinction between quasi-contracts and
constructive trusts and the effectiveness of the husband's statement
as a repudiation would seem open to inquiry.
The broad concession by the court that the ten-year limitation
period applies in all constructive trust situations seems doubtful.
Of the three cases cited as support for the concession, one involved
a resulting trust ;7 one concerned an evidentiary problem and the
statute of limitations was not in issue;' and the third, in holding a
claim for breach of an express trust barred by limitations, stated
in dictum that the ten-year period is applicable to constructive
trusts.9
However, in an earlier case involving an action to set aside a
deed for fraud and undue influence and to impress a trust on the
property, it was stated that the ten-year statute did not apply because, "the alleged right to impress a trust upon the property is
dependent upon the validity or invalidity of the deed ...and if the
2264 N.C. at 22, 140 S.E.2d at 711.
'It would seem that the use of the wife's money in making improvements
on the land should not entitle her to hold her husband as constructive
trustee of the property since the money was not used in acquiring the
property. See generally 4 Scorr, TRusTs § 512 (2d ed. 1956).
'The court noted that, because of the confidential relationship, the wife
could have acquired an equitable lien on the property if her action had not

been barred. 264 N.C. at 25, 140 S.E.2d at 713.
The statute provides a three-year limitation period for actions "upon

a contract, obligation or liability arising out of a contract, express or im-

plied. . . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(1) (1953).
0264 N.C. at 26, 140 S.E.2d at 714. This statute is a catchall provision

providing that, "an action for relief not otherwise limited by this subchapter
may not be commenced more than ten years after the cause of action has
accrued." N.C. Gmq. STAT. § 1-56 (1953).
Bowen v. Darden, 241 N.C. 11, 84 S.E.2d 289 (1954).
8
Rochlin v. P.S. West Constr. Co., 234 N.C. 443, 67 S.E.2d 464 (1951).
' Teachey v. Gurley, 214 N.C. 288, 199 S.E. 83 (1938).
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right to assail this deed is barred by the statute, any and all claim
to the proceeds in the possession and control of defendants is also
barred."'"
More recently, a federal court, in applying North Carolina law,
came to the following conclusion:
A constructive trust is merely a procedural device by which a
court of equity may rectify certain wrongs. It is suggestive of
a power which a court of equity may exercise in an appropriate
case but it is not a designation of the cause of action which justifies an exercise of the power. .

. We find nothing in any

North Carolina decision suggesting that the courts of that state,
for purposes of limitations, classify a cause of action by reference
to the court's remedial power to grant redress. ....For purposes of limitations . .. the North Carolina court has looked
to the nature of the right of the litigant which calls for judicial
aid, not to the nature of the remedy to rectify the wrong.'1
These views, though in apparent conflict with the broad statement
in Fudp, would seem to reach the better result. As defined by
Professor Scott, "a constructive trust arises where a person who
holds title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to
another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he
were permitted to retain it. .. . The constructive trust is apparently established for the purpose of preventing unjust enrichment
without regard to the intention of the parties; whereas the express resulting trust is established when circumstances raise an inference that
the settlor did not intend the person taking title to have the beneficial interest.3 The constructive trust should also be distinguished
from the equitable lien. The equitable lien entitles a defrauded party
to a charge on the property to the extent of funds traced there; the
constructive trust entitles him to the property itself.' 4
"0Little v. Bank of Wadesboro, 187 N.C. 1, 6, 121 S.E. 185, 188 (1924)
(dictum).
"iNew Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Waller, 301 F.2d 839, 842 (4th Cir. 1962).

" 4 Scorr, TRUSTS § 462 at 3103 (2d ed. 1956).
" See Avery v. Stewart, 136 N.C. 426, 434-35, 48 S.E. 775, 778 (1904).
1123 MINN. L. REv. 706 (1939). It was stated in Fulp that
the very essence of every real trust, express, resulting, or constructive,
is the existence of two estates in the same thing,-a legal estate vested
in the trustee, and an equitable estate held by the beneficiary. In an
equitable lien there is a legal estate with possession in one person, and
a special right over the thing held by another.
264 N.C. at 24, 140 S.E.2d at 712. Such a distinction appears doubtful.
Even though the beneficiary of a constructive trust has "some kind of an
equitable interest," his interest would appear not to be in all respects similar
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It would seem that the constructive trust is established on the
same general principles of unjust enrichment 5 that lie at the foundation of quasi-contract obligations and equitable liens, i.e., it
appears to be merely one of several remedial devices available for
relief in situations calling for restitution. 6 Whereas an action by the
beneficiary of an express trust is generally brought for the determination of interests, the cestui que trust of a constructive trust
is seeking a reconveyance founded, apparently, upon an implied-inlaw promise to reconvey. Consequently, since in all cases where a
party seeks restitution, whether by quasi-contract or by constructive
trust, the wronged party is generally required to assert some specific
ground, such as fraud or mistake, in order to recover,'17 it would
seem that this right asserted, not the remedy available, should be
determinative of the applicable limitation period. The same reasoning
would seem equally applicable to actions based upon contracts implied
in law."8 Such an emphasis upon substance rather than form would
seem to serve better the purposes of the statute of limitations as well
as avoid the anomaly of applying differing periods of limitation to
19
the same substantive wrong.
Cases may arise in which no underlying wrong is discernible.20
to the estate held by the beneficiary of an express trust. RESTATEMENT,
RESTITUTION § 160 (1937). See SCOTT, TRUSTS § 462.5 (2d ed. 1956).
"See Speight v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 209 N.C. 563, 183 S.E.
734 (1936).
" See Atkinson v. Atldnson, 225 N.C. 120, 33 S.E.2d 666 (1945). 4
SCOTT, TRUSTS § 461 (1956). See 12 N.C.L. REv. 400, 401 (1934). "He
is not compelled to convey the property because he is a constructive trustee;
it is because he can be compelled to convey it that he is a constructive
trustee."
4 ScoTT, op. cit. supra § 462, at 3103.
1
DAWSo N, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 117 (1951).
18 Such a rule is applied in Kansas. Orozem v. McNeill, 103 Kan. 429,
175 Pac. 633 (1918). Student Symposium on Statutes of Limitation in
Kansas, 9 KAN. L. REV. 179, 183 (1960). Contra, McFarlan v. Stillwater
County, 109 Mont. 544, 98 P.2d 321 (1940) (holding mistake of law to be
mere incident to action on implied contract). In North Carolina the same
limitation period would generally apply; but, for relief based upon fraud
or mistake the cause of action is not deemed to have accrued until the
aggrieved party has or should have discovered such fraud or mistake.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(9) (1953).
19 "If restrictions are to be imposed on the remedy they should rest on
the grounds for awarding relief, not on the form the gains assume." DAWSON,
op. cit. supra note 17, at 23. It would seem arguable that where limitations
have run on the underlying wrong that the wrongdoer could not be said
to hold unjustly.
2 There remains an intractible group that cannot be classified in these
terms [of some specific wrong]. Among the quasi-contract cases there
are numerous decisions that rest on no more than the receipt of some
asset (usually money) that should have gone to the plaintiff. In some
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In such a situation, it would seem that either the three-year or the
ten-year statute might be applied. In either case, it would appear
to be the better rule to apply the same period to all actions founded
upon the same substantive grounds.
Another limitation problem is raised by the court's statement
that when a husband acquires possession of the separate property
of his wife, he is deemed to hold it in trust for her benefit.2" Since
no underlying wrong may be discernible in such a situation," it
becomes necessary to determine when the statute of limitations will
begin running against the wife on her action to enforce the trust.
In nontrust situations, where the claim is grounded not in fraud
or mistake, but in an unenforceable promise, the three-year statute
has been used.2"
The majority rule in regard to both resulting and express trusts
seems to be that limitations will run against the cestui que trust
only when the trustee has repudiated the trust to the knowledge of
the beneficiary.2 4 However, since the constructive trust is normally
founded upon an adverse holding from the beginning, it has been
of the constructive trust cases the equitable 'wrong' is so attenuated that
one can find only the conscience of equity at work, retrieving the gain.
DAWSON, op. cit. supra note 17, at 118.

21264 N.C. 20, 23, 140 S.E.2d 708, 711-12 (1965). By process of elimination, any such trust would appear to be a constructive trust since there
would appear to be a refutation of the mutual assent necessary for an
express trust. Neither would such a situation appear always to fall within
any of the resulting trust situations, i.e., failure of an express trust, full
performance of an express trust without exhausting the trust estate and
purchase of property by one person with conveyance to another at his
direction. See 4 SCOTT, TRUSTs § 404.1 (Zd ed. 1956).
" It would seem that, in lieu of proof of actual fraud, the wife might
make an argument for constructive fraud. Constructive fraud "rests upon
presumption arising from breach of fiduciary obligation rather than deception intentionally practiced." Miller v. First Nat'l Bank, 234 N.C. 309, 316,
67 S.E.2d 362, 367 (1951). However, the imposition of this doctrine seems
to have been limited to cases involving attorney and client, trustee and
beneficiary, mortgagor and mortgagee, guardian and ward, and principal

and agent. See McNeill v. McNeill, 223 N.C. 178, 25 S.E.2d 615 (1943).

"E.g., Dunn v. Brewer, 228 N.C. 43, 44 S.E.2d 353 (1947).
4Solon Lodge v. Ionic Lodge, 247 N.C. 310, 101 S.E.2d 8 (1957). 4
ScOTT, TRUSTS § 481.1 (1956). In Teachey v. Gurley 214 N.C. 288, 199 S.E.

83 (1938), it was held that where an express trust was based upon contract,

the three-year limitation period applicable to contract actions governed the
action to establish the trust, not the ten-year statute. The propriety of

extending this rule to all express trust situations seems questionable. Consideration is not required for the establishment of the trust and the trustee
by accepting the trust does not make a contract to perform the trust enforceable in an action at law. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TRUSTS § 197 (1959).
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suggested that limitations should run immediately with no requirement of repudiation.25 Nevertheless, where the wife is beneficiary
of a constructive trust and has no reason to believe the trusteehusband is holding adversely to her, it would seem that limitations
would not run until repudiation.2"
Statements concerning the requisites for a finding of repudiation
have generally appeared in cases involving alleged anticipatory
breaches." In such situations, the established guidelines appear to
be that the repudiation need not be written; but it must be unequivocal, positive, distinct, absolute, inconsistent with the existence
of the contract, and accepted by the adverse party as a repudiation.2
Applying such a standard to the husband's statement-"You don't
think I am a damn fool, do you?"-it would seem doubtful that
there had in fact been a repudiation.
In Fulp the parties were not dealing at arm's length. Although
the husband's failure to convey after full payment and demand had
been made by the wife might be considered an avoidance of the
express oral contract,2 9 the controlling question would still appear
to be whether the husband had so repudiated his agreement that the
wife was chargeable with knowledge of his adverse holding of
her money. The husband's subsequent statements of intention to
convey at a future time would therefore seem relevant not only
on the question of estoppel, 30 but also on the question of repudiation.
Consideration of the relationship of the parties would seem to
" 18 U. CiNc. L. Rv.230, 231 (1949).
2 See Mclnnes v. Mclnnes, 163 Md. 303, 163 At. 85 (1932) (applying
doctrine of laches); Opp. v. Boggs, 121 Mont. 131, 193 P.2d 379 (1948).
"Thus where A conveys land to B who orally agrees to reconvey it to A,
and B is in a confidential relation to A, B holds the property upon a constructive trust for A. In such a case A is not guilty of laches in failing
to sue as long as B has not repudiated his promise." 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS §
481.1 at 3152 (2d ed. "1956).
"'
See Edwards v. Proctor, 173 N.C. 41, 91 S.E. 584 (1917).
8

Ibid. The requirement that the repudiation must be accepted as such
by the injured party seems proper since there is the possibility of retraction
so long as no substantial change of position has intervened. See 4 CoanIN,
CONTRAcTS § 981 (1951).
"In North Carolina oral contracts for the conveyance of land are
not void, but voidable merely at the instance of the party to be charged.
Durham Consol. Land & Improvement Co. v. Guthrie, 116 N.C. 381, 384,
21 S.E. 952, 953 (1895). 30 N.C.L. REv. 292 (1952).
30 See Nowell v. The Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 250 N.C. 575, 108
S.E.2d 889 (1959). The husband had replied to repeated requests to convey,
"'Oh, we'll do that later.., we will, but let's go ahead with it."' 264 N.C.
20, 22, 140 S.E.2d 708, 711.
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require that on the equitable claim for money had and received
limitations should not commence running until the husband clearly
and unequivocally repudiates his agreement.
ROBERT O. KLEPFER, JR.

Patents-Section 103 Obviousness as a Time-bar Under
Section 102(b)
The Congress shall have Power ....
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries ....1
This is the constitutional basis of the United States patent system.
In 1790 the first patent act was enacted by Congress,2 to be followed
by others, each growing in complexity. For a patent to issue, it was
necessary that an "invention" be useful, new or novel, and an
invention. Typical of these acts was the act of 1870 which provided
that "any person who has invented or discovered any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof. .

. ."'

was entitled to a patent.

A great body of decisional law was developed as the courts attempted to define "invention," but as was pointed out by the Supreme
Court,4 "invention" cannot be defined. In recognition of the indefinableness of invention, affirmative rules were developed to aid
the courts in determining the presence of invention as were negative
rules to indicate the lack thereof.' But these rules did not definitively establish either the presence or lack of invention in fact. In
'U.S.
2

CONsT.

art. I, § 8.

Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109.
Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 24, 16 Stat. 201, reenacted, REv.

(1875).

STAT.

§ 4886

'McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891).
' Examples of the affirmative rules are the long-felt want for the invention; successful efforts on the part of the inventor over unsuccessful
efforts by those skilled in the art; commercial success of the invention;
imitation by others; new or unexpected results; turning a halt in the art
into progress; and solutions to an outstanding unsolved problem. Some
examples of the negative rules are the mere exercise of skill expected of a
person having ordinary skill in the art; substitution of materials or elements; reversal of parts; and change in size, shape or form. 2 DELLmR,
DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 106 at 75 (2d ed. 1964) [hereinafter
cited as DELLER].
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1952 Congress enacted the present patent act in which sections 101,"
102,' and 103' set forth a statutory standard of patentability without
requiring "invention." Briefly stated, an "invention" to be patentable must be useful, novel, and unobvious to one of ordinary skill
in the art to which the "invention" is addressed. Of these sections,
sections 101 and 102 find their counterparts in the prior acts, but
section 103 is new and there is no corresponding provision in any
of the previous acts. However, it has been stated that section 103
was merely a codification of prior decisional law.9 Furthermore,
635 U.S.C. § 101 (1958).
§ 101. Inventions patentable.
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.
'35 U.S.C. § 102 (1958).
§ 102. Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to patent.
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country,
before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in
this or a foreign country, more than one year prior to the date of the
application for patent in the United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented by the
applicant or his legal representative or assigns in a foreign country
prior to the date of the application for patent in this country on an
application filed more than twelve months before the filing of the application in the United States, or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application
for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention
thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to patented, or
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made
in this country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or
concealed it ....

835 U.S.C. § 103 (1958).

§ 103. Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter.
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall
not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
'See Stanley Works v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 203 F.2d 846 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 818 (1953); General Motors Corp. v. Estate Stove
Co., 203 F.2d 912 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 822 (1953). It appears,
however, that the statements made in both cases, to the effect that 103 is a
codification, are dicta. But see Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224
F.2d 530 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 911 (1955) (which is said to
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it was said 10 this about section 103 and the Patent Act of 1952:
With respect to what used to be called the requirement of
"invention"-and the use of the past tense in referring to it
cannot be too strongly urged-the 1952 act did three things:
1. It put the requirement into the statutes for the first time,
in section 103.... Though one may call section 103 "codification"
it took a case law doctrine, expressed in hundreds of different
ways, and put it into statutory language in a single form approved by Congress. In such form it became law superior to that
which may be derived from any prior court opinion.
2. The Patent Act of 1952 expresses this prerequisite to
patentability without any reference to "invention" as a legal
requirement. Nowhere in the entire act is there any reference
to a requirment [sic] of "invention" and the drafters did this
deliberately in an effort to free the law and lawyers from bondage
to that old and meaningless term....

3. The act sets as the standard of patentability the unobviousness of the invention, at the time it was made, to a person having
ordinary skill in the art. Therefore, what we have today, and
have had since January 1, 1953, is a requirement of unobviousness, rather than a requirement of "invention.""
Therefore, for a patent to issue, an invention must meet the requirements of both sections 102 and 103.Y This, of course, means
that every application presented to the Patent Office for the issuance
of a patent must be examined for compliance with these two sections.
A rejection of an application in the Patent Office, or an invalidation by the courts in an infringement action, based on section 102,
and 102(b) in particular, is generally said to be an anticipatory
rejection, since a "prior art"" reference 14 anticipates the applicant's
have been the first judicial recognition of the restoration of the classical
test found in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850)).
See 55 MICH. L. REv. 985, 993 (1957). See generally Federico, Commentary
on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1, 14-24 (1954).
10 Giles S. Rich, Associate Judge, United States Court of Customs and
Patent
Appeals.
t
Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 393, 405
(1960).
" These are not the only requirements the application must meet for a
patent to issue. An application may be rejected, for example, on the grounds
that its claims are broader than the disclosures, that the invention is inoperative, that the invention is not disclosed, that the specifications are not full,
clear, or concise, for double patenting, or because the applicant was not
the first inventor-that is, he could not establish priority in an interference
proceeding.
" See Woodcock, What is Prior Art., 3 VILL. L. REV. 255 (1958)
[hereinafter
cited as Woodcock].
"4What is a "reference"? It is nothing more than a patent or publica-
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invention. More recently, however, a 102(b) rejection is said to
be a statutory "time-bar" rejection, where the applicant loses his
right to a patent even though the invention is patentable. A rejection based on section 103 is generally stated in terms of the invention's being obvious in view of the "prior art" or "unpatentable
over"'15 a particular reference. As can readily be seen, both sections

rely on prior art, but from the statutory language it is not apparent
whether the same prior art used for a section 102(b) rejection may
be used for a rejection under 103.10 It is apparent, though, that
there are time differences from which the prior art may be applicable
or available. For example, section 102(b) provides
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in
this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent .... 17

tion cited to show that all or part of the invention for which a patent
is sought was in the prior art, either more than a year before the filing
date to which the applicant is entitled, in which case it is a "statutory
bar" and cannot be sworn back of, or before the applicant's date of
invention. When a reference is not a statutory bar, Rule 131 provides a
procedure by which the applicant is permitted to show, if he can, that his
date of invention was earlier than the date of the reference.
In re Stemple, 241 F.2d 755, 760, 113 U.S.P.Q. 77,-(C.C.P.A. 1957). As
for what constitutes a printed publication, see Cottier v. Stimson, 20 Fed.
906 (D. Ore. 1884):
But something besides printing is required. The statute goes upon
the theory that the work has been made accessible to the public, and is
no longer patentable by any one. Publication means put into general
circulation or on sale, where the work is accessible to the public.
Id. at 910.
" An "unpatentable over" rejection is generally thought to be a § 103
rejection; however, as will be seen later, such an assumption in certain
instances is erroneous. See In re Hughes, 345 F.2d 184, 145 U.S.P.Q. 467
(C.C.P.A. 1965):
That language ["unpatentable over"] usually is taken to denote a section 103 rejection. See In re Rice and Wilson, 52 CCPA 998, 341 F.2d
309, 144 USPQ 476; In re Foster, 52 CCPA-, 343 F.2d 980, 145 USPQ
166; In re Dwyer et al., 50 CCPA 1230, 317 F.2d 203, 137 USPQ 904.
Id. at 188 n.2, 145 U.S.P.Q. at 471 n.2 (concurring in part, dissenting in
part); In re Beach & DiRubbio, 245 F.2d 209, 213, 145 U.S.P.Q. 484, 487
(C.C.P.A. 1965) ("This type of rejection continues to cause confusion but
to the extent it indicates a statutory ground of rejection, it is a rejection for
obviousness .

. . .")

(dissenting opinion).

" Section 102 provides that invention must be "described" in the prior
art reference and section 103 provides that the prior art need not "identically"
disclose or describe the invention.
Emphasis added.
In the determination of novelty, the statute makes time of the essence.
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This means that a reference A if printed or patented less than one
year before the applicant's filing date will not bar the issuance of a
patent. But, if the reference B was published or patented more
than one year prior to the filing date, it is a statutory bar to the
issuance of the patent. Section 103, on the other hand, provides
A patent may not be obtained ...

if the differences between

the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious
at the time the invention was made .... 18
Therefore, reference A in the prior example could be used to establish obviousness of the invention if the applicant could not swear
back of the reference under rule 13119 to show a date of invention
It is here that dates become critical in establishing (1) the date of in-

vention, (2) the date of application, (3) the date of the prior knowledge
or use in the United States, (4) the date of public use and sale in this
country, (5) the date of patent or publication describing the invention in
this or a foreign country. From these dates it can be determined whether
or not the time factor has worked a forfeiture of the right to a patent.
The so-called "one-year rule" refers strictly to the date of application
for patent in this country. No length of time is specified for the factors
which affect loss of the right to patent if they occur prior to the date
of invention by applicant. One day is sufficient. The establishment in
this and prior statutes of rigid rules which are so inflexible as to the
time factor, have caused the loss of the right to patent many otherwise
patentable inventions.

1

SMITH, PATENT LAW

285 (1954).

Emphasis added.
10 C.F.R. § 1.131 (1960) provides:
Affidavit of prior invention to overcome cited patent or publication.
(a) When any claim of an application is rejected on reference to a
domestic patent which substantially shows or describes but does not
claim the rejected invention, or on reference to a foreign patent or to a
printed publication, and the applicant shall make oath to facts showing
a completion of the invention in this country before the filing date of the
application on which the domestic patent issued, or before the date of
the foreign patent, or before the date of the printed publication, then
the patent or publication cited shall not bar the grant of a patent to the
applicant, unless the date of such patent or printed publication be more
than one year prior to the date on which the application was filed in this
country.
The U.S. PATENT OFFIcE, DEPT. OF COmmERcE, MANUAL OF PATENT Ex18

AMINING PROCEDURE

§ 715 (3d ed. 1961) provides:

Any printed publication dated prior to an applicant's effective filing
date, or any patent of prior filing date, which is in its disclosure pertinent
to the claimed invention, is available for use by the examiner as a
reference, either basic or auxiliary, in the rejection of the claims of the
application.
Such a rejection may be overcome, in certain instances . . . by applicant's filing of an affidavit . . . known as "swearing back" of the
reference.
Affidavits under Rule 131 may be used:
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213

prior to both the date of filing and the date of the reference. But
what about reference B?-could it be used as a reference under
section 103, and, if it could, would the applicant be entitled to the
benefit of rule 131 ? If B did not fully describe and disclose the
invention sought to be patented, it does not "anticipate" the invention under 102(b).2O In this situation-that is, where B does
not anticipate-will B provide any statutory ground for rejection?
This question was first definitively answered in the case of In re
Palmquist 1 decided in 1963 by the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (hereinafter the C.C.P.A.). In that case the applicant's
claims for a protective-reflective film and adhesive were rejected by
the examiner as being "unpatentable over" a combination of various

references. The court with Judge Smith writing construed the rejection as being a rejection for obviousness-section 103. During
the prosecution of the application through the Patent Office, the
examiner removed a rejection based on another patent in view of
(1) Where the date of the foreign patent or that of the publication is
less than one year prior to the applicant's effective filing date.
(2) Where the reference, a U.S. Patent, with a patent date less than
one year prior to applicant's effective filing date, shows but does not
claim the invention.
Affidavit ...

is not appropriate...

(1) Where reference publication date is more than one year back of
applicant's effective filing date. Such a reference is a "statutory bar."...
It should be kept in mind that it is the rejection that is withdrawn and not
the reference.
See generally THOMAS & AUSLANDER, CHEMICAL INVENTIONS & CHEMICAL
PATENTS § 515 (1964); AMDUR, PATENT OFFICE RULES AND PRAICE §§
131-.12 (1959).
20 No doctrine of the patent law is better established than that a prior
patent or other publication to be an anticipation must bear within its
four corners adequate directions for the practice of the patent invalidated.
Dewey & Almy Chem. Co. v. Mimex Co., 124 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir. 1942).
See also Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Heckethorne Mfg. & Sup. Co., 332
F.2d 406, 414 (6th Cir. 1964); Firestone v. Aluminum Co. of America,
285 F.2d 928, 930 (6th Cir. 1960) ; Southern Phosphate Corp. v. Phosphate
Recovery Corp., 102 F.2d 801 (3d Cir. 1939); Baldwin-Southwark Corp.
v. Tinius Olsen T. Mach. Co., 88 F.2d 910, 914 (3d Cir. 1937); Skelly Oil
Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 31 F.2d 427, 431 (3d Cir. 1929); Straussler
v. United States, 339 F.2d 670, 143 U.S.P.Q. 443 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
21319 F.2d 547, 138 U.S.P.Q. 234 (C.C.P.A. 1963). This is apparently
the first case to decide the issue here presented; however, prior to the 1952
act the C.C.P.A. decided In re Wenzel, 88 F.2d 501, 503, 33 U.S.P.Q. 30,
32 (C.C.P.A. 1937). The court in Wenzel reached a result contrary to that
in Palmquist on a factual situation which was very similar, but the court
cited no authority for its decision. In support of the conclusion reached in
Wenzel, see the MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 715 quoted
note 19 supra, which has remained unchanged from its first edition in 1949.
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the applicant's rule 131 affidavit showing completion of invention
prior to 1952, his application having been filed on June 3, 1954.
However, the examiner would not permit the applicant to swear
back of a printed publication, Van Boskirk's article, because of section 102(b) .22 The rejection was affirmed by the Patent Office
Board of Appeals, but was reversed by the C.C.P.A. The court held:
Van Boskirk, however, was published more than one year
prior to appellants' filing date but since it does not "describe"
the claimed invention, it is not a statutory bar under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b).
The position of the examiner ... is, in effect, that the claims
are properly rejected under . . . § 103 if the claimed invention

was obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the
application was filed.23
In the present case we do not have the question of a statutory
time bar which arises under... § 102(b) by reason of the failure
of an applicant to file his application within one year of the date
of the anticipatory publication. The question here is whether
what is obvious to one of ordinary skill in an art is to be determined as of "the time when the invention was made," as specified in ... § 103, or whether it is to be determined as of some
later date when the application is filed.2 4
The court found that the proper time reference was at the time
the invention was made, and that in the absence of any rules to establish the time of invention, the rule 131 affidavit was sufficient. The
court, therefore, answered the question in the negative; that is, B
provided no statutory ground for rejection of the patent. Palmquist
permitted the applicant to swear back of the nonanticipating reference and thereby remove the rejection predicated upon it, even
though the reference was more than one year prior to the date of
application.
However, two years later the Palmquist court had a change of
heart and overruled its decision in it re Foster.;5 Thus, the answer
" The Patent Office was arguing that § 102(b) presented a statutory
time bar situation, but the court did not fully appreciate the examiner's
reliance thereon as the basis of his rejection. This lack of appreciation is
what caused the court to reconsider in In re Foster, 343 F.2d 980, 145
U.S.P.Q. 166 (C.C.P.A. 1965). AmERIcAx PATENT L. A. BULL. 303 (June,
1965). See text accompanying note 25 infra.
23319 F.2d at 550, 138 U.S.P.Q. at 137.
-1Id. at 551, 138 U.S.P.Q. at 138.
" 343 F.2d 980, 145 U.S.P.Q. 166 (C.C.P.A. 1965), petition for cert.
filed, 34 U.S.L. WEEx 3048 (U.S. July 20, 1965) (No. 347).
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to whether B provides any statutory grounds for rejection must
be in the affirmative.
In In re Foster the applicant's patent application, Serial No.
605,440, was filed August 21, 1956, for claims addressed to Butadiene Polymers and Copolymers Thereof.20 The claims were, for
the sake of convenience, categorically of three types.17 Type I was
characterized by polymers of butadiene-1,3 and copolymers of
butadiene-1,3 and styrene in specific percentages of cis 1,4 structure
and 1,2 structure. Type II was characterized by the same polymers
and copolymers of butadiene-1,3, but in an 85 per cent butadiene
monomer joined in a head-to-tail relationship. And Type III was
represented by claim 28.2s The examiner and the Board of Appeals
rejected all of the claims basing their rejection upon an article2 9
written by Binder in August, 1954, two years before the applicant
26

trans- Polybutadiene elastomer
Principle component:

CH2 C = CCH~

Butadiene Rubber BR
cis- Polybutadien elastomer

Principle component:
CCH1
(CH
IH2C = H

Butadiene Rubber BR
Butadiene-Styrene Rubber
SBR, GRS
SOCMA HANDBOOK V at 60

Ore arrangement:
-CH 2 CH = CHCH 2 CH 2 C1

1

cc

(1965).

27

-

Claim 12 is an example of Type I:

A synthetic polymer selected from the group consisting of rubbery
homopolymers of butadiene-1,3 and rubbery copolymers of butadiene-1,3
and styrene; said synthetic polymer being characterized by a cis 1,4structure of at least 23% and a 1,2-structure not in excess of 15% of
the polymeric butadiene present in the polymer.
Claim 25 is representative of Type II:
A synthetic polymer selected from the group consisting of rubbery
homopolymers of butadiene-1,3 and rubbery copolymers of butadien-1,3
and styrene; said synthetic polymer being characterized in that at least
85 per cent of the butadiene monomer units thereof are joined in a headto-tail relationship.
Claim 28 is representative of Type III:
Products comprising conjugated polyolefin hydrocarbon polymers and
copolymers in which the conjugated polyolefin monomer units are
present in 1,4 addition polymer structure.
343 F.2d at 983, 145 U.S.P.Q. at 169.
8
Ibid.
29 Binder, Microstructures of Polybutadienes and Butadiene-Styrene Co-

polymers, 46

INDUSTRIAL

AND

[hereinafter cited as Binder].

ENGINEERING

CHEMISTRY

1727

(1954)
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filed his application. The rejection of Type II claims was predicated
upon the conclusion of the Binder article,"0 and applicant's 1,4
structures were found to be "unpatentable over" Binder (the only
reference in issue) without indicating whether or not Binder was
anticipatory.3 The applicant argued on appeal that "unpatentable
over" indicated a rejection based on 103, while a rejection based
on anticipation indicated reliance on section 102(b). The court,
however, rejected this contention, while admitting that the language
used in the rejection was confusing and unclear, stating:
The words "unpatentable over" do not necessarily mean reliance
on section 103 alone. The statements of the rejection are sufficient for us to consider the rejections on both sections 102(b)
and 103.32

The majority then found that Binder did not describe or disclose
the applicant's invention (Type II), at least in the section of the
article relied upon by the examiner, and, hence, did not anticipate

Foster.m
o The results of the analyses reported here show that while the amount
of cis-l,4 addition increases with increasing temperature of polymerization, a polybutadiene containing 100% cis-1,4, or trans-1,4 addition
cannot be made at any practical temperature. At least up to 100 ° C. the
amount of trans-l,4 addition in the butadiene part of a butadiene-styrene
copolymer is always greater than in the corresponding polybutadiene,
while the amounts of cis-1,4 and 1,2 additions are less.
Binder 1730.
"l See notes 15 & 20 supra.
32 343 F.2d at 984, 145 U.S.P.Q. at 170.
23 Id. at 984-85, 145 U.S.P.Q. at 170-71. The court found the reasoning
of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Ladd, 219 F. Supp. 366 (D. D.C. 1963), persuasive. In that case the claims were addressed to a 100% cis-1,4-polybutadiene, the Patent Office argued there, as it did in this case, that the claims
were anticipated by the conclusion, supra note 30, in the same Binder article.
Claims 17 and 19 of the Smith & Zelinski application, S.N. 578,166, were
addressed to polymers of 1,3 butadiene characterized by at least 85% cis-1,4
addition; this is the same percentage as found in Foster's Type II claims.
In rejecting the Patent Office's argument that the conclusion of Binder
anticipated Smith et al., the court stated:
The Court finds that new and unexpected properties of a truly unique
nature resulted from the presence of at least 85% of the cis 1,4 configuration, and the Court, as well as the Board of Appeals considers the percentage to be critical. There can be no doubt as to the nature of that
difference, for prior to Smith et al. no one had described a polybutadiene
having more than 50% of the cis 1,4 configuration. Where criticality is
present, there must be a difference in kind, and the Court finds that
such a distinction exists here.
Id. at 369. It is interesting to note that had the Patent Office not relied
only upon Binder's conclusion, Binder at 1728, Table V, Polymer Nos. 39-1
and 39-3, discloses polymers of 1,4 configuration of 82%. Also, polymers
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As in Palmquist, the applicant in Foster had been permitted to
swear back of a patent used by the examiner as a reference and in
so doing had established December 26, 1952, as the date of invention
which antedated the Binder article by nearly two years. The applicant then argued that since his invention date antedated the Binder
article, the reference should be removed on the ground of the holding in Palmquist. The court rejected the applicant's contention and
thus overruled Palmquist. The court held:
It would seem that the practical operation of the prior law
was that references having effective dates more than a year before applicant's filing date were always considered to be effective
as references, regardless of the applicant's date of invention, and
that rejections were then predicated thereon for "lack of invention" without making the distinction which we now seem to see
as implicit in sections 102 and 103, "anticipation" or no novelty
situations under 102 and "obviousness" situations under 103.
But on further reflection, we now feel bound to point out that of
equal importance is the question of loss of right predicated on a
one-year time-bar which, it seems clear to us, has never been
limited to "anticipation" situations, involving only a single reference, but has included as well "no invention" (now "obviousness") situations. It follows that where the time-bar is involved,
the actual date of invention becomes irrelevantand that it is not
in accordance with either the letter or the principle of the law,
or its past interpretation over a very long period, to permit an
applicant to dispose of a reference having a date more than one
year prior to his filing date by proving his actual date of invention.s 4
Now, according to Foster, whatever right to a patent an applicant
may have had at the time of his invention, it is lost within the
meaning of section 102 (b) if the invention became obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art through a publication reference more than
one year before the applicant's filing date. The reference is available
even though it was subsequent to the time when the invention was
containing ca. 85% are found in Tables I and II, page 1727, polymer Nos.

995, 1975, & 1060. Therefore, these claims were, in fact, anticipated, but as

Chief judge Worley pointed out in his concurring opinion, new grounds of
rejection could not be entered into on appeal. 343 F.2d at 992 n.3, 145
U.S.P.Q. at 177 n.3. Thus, in fact, the Binder article anticipated all but
three claims: two claims of Type I were found not to have been anticipated
by the court, as was Type III.
311343 F.2d at 989, 145 U.S.P.Q. at 174.
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made, but more than one year before the applicant's filing date.8"
This means that reference B in the previous example is now a
statutory "time-bar." Although B does not anticipate the applicant's invention, it became obvious more than one year before
applicant filed his application.
Judge Smith, who wrote for the court in Palmquist, pointed out
in his dissent that he was unable to find a single case where there had
been a loss of right to a patent, except where the invention was
"described" in a prior patent or printed publication 8 5-- an anticipatory rejection. Judge Smith then found:
Most disturbing of all ...

the fact that from this day forward

obviousness under section 103 will be tested, not as of the time
the invention was made, but as of one year prior to the filing
date of the application.

Prior to the enactment of section 103, the determination of
"invention" and the evaluation of the prior art relevant thereto
always was made as of the time the invention was made. To now
change the meaning of section 103 so that obviousness is tested
as of one year prior to the filing date of the application, as it
seems to me is required by the rationale of the majority, I think
we should have some definite indication that such a change was7
within the contemplation of Congress in enacting Section 103.

An analysis of the rationale of the majority holding will show
a lack of cogent logic which does not render justice, and arguably
denies due process. As pointed out by the majority, references
having effective dates more than a year before the filing date have
been considered to be effective as references regardless of the date
of invention, but these references have been anticipatory."8 For
rejections predicated on prior art before the date of invention as
"lacking invention," it is to be remembered that section 103 not
only provides a substitute requirement-obviousness rather than
invention-but expressly provides that obviousness is to be determined at the time the invention was made. Moreover, section
103 "became law superior to that which may be derived from prior
court opinion. ' 9 Nonetheless, the majority relies upon the "prior
o' See In re Folkers, 344 F.2d 967, 145 U.S.P.Q. 426 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
This case was decided one month after Foster, Smith again dissenting and

cautioning against the denial of procedural due process.
11 343 F.2d at 994 n.3, 145 U.S.P.Q. at 178 n.3.
Id. at 999, 145 U.S.P.Q. at 182.
18

See note 36 supra.

"Rich, supra note 11.
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law" to support its conclusion that an invention which became
obvious more than one year prior to the applicant's filing date is
barred by section 102(b). It is virtually impossible to ascertain
what "prior law" the majority had in mind, since the bold propositions are without authority. Neither did the majority distinguish
the general application of the prior law, which provided that in
order to preclude patentability the description must antedate the
invention or discovery,4° from the "law" which the majority alluded
to as holding otherwise. Furthermore, the "prior law" did not
"speak" in terms of a statutory time-bar; the time provision specified
in section 488641 was a reference from which to determine the
availability of the prior art as an anticipation-that is, lack of
novelty. For the reference to be anticipatory, the elements of the
invention or their equivalents had to be found in a single description
or disclosure.4 2 If the court was unable to find that the references
were anticipatory, it did not disregard them but considered them
relevant to the question of invention.43 In other words, the courts
have considered lack of novelty and lack of invention as independent
grounds for rejection or invalidation, and this has been true even
after the enactment of the 1952 act.44
The majority also found that the decision in Palmquist was
erroneous in that it periitted the applicant to sleep on his rights more
than a year after the invention became "obvious to the public,
whereby the public has potential possession of it .

.

. .

The

rationale in this latter respect, predicated on "public policy," is
both overbearing and factitious. It assumes in the first instance
that the public has a "vested right" in the applicant's invention.
At most the public has a possibility of possession; it does not have
the invention. If the applicant had filed within one year of the
reference, he then could have excluded the public for seventeen
years from making, using or selling the invention.4" If, on the
other hand, the public had had possession of the invention, then
the applicant would have been barred-because it was anticipated40 See Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5, 11 (1939).
,1§ 4886, as amended, ch, 39, § 1, 29 Stat. 692 (1897).
42 1 DE.LER § 72 at 334 & n.1.
See also note 20 supra.
"See Himmel v. Serrick, 122 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1941).
*' See, e.g., Helene Curtis Indus. v. Sales Affiliates, 233 F.2d 148 (2d
Cir. 1956).
" 343 F.2d at 990, 145 U.S.P.Q. at 175.
"035 U.S.C. § 154 (1958).
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but only if he had not filed within one year after the anticipatory
reference. Thus, extrapolating the majority's rationale, the congressional fiat of a one-year time limit for anticipatory references
was injurious to the public, since an applicant who falls within the
one-year limit is able to "oust" possession of the invention from
the public and keep it to himself exclusively for seventeen years.
What the majority is concerned with is the situation where the
applicant "sleeps" on his right more than a year and "ousts" a possibility of possession from the public.
The history of the patent acts shows that Congress was concerned with public possession of an invention.17 For one-hundred
and seven years the various patent acts provided that if the invention
was in the public use or on sale before the time of the applicant's filing, he was not entitled to a patent. 4' However, if the invention was
described in any printed publication, that publication must have antedated the applicant's date of invention in order to preclude him
from a patent. Sixty-seven years ago Congress inserted a time
limitation from which a determination of novelty could be madeoriginally two years before the date of application, then one year.
Congress in 1952 specifically provided in section 102 an enumeration
of situations in which an applicant would lose his right to a patent,
4' The Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117, provided:
or that it had been patented or described in any printed publication in
this or a foreign country, or had been in public use or on sale with the
applicant's consent ...

prior to the application ....

The Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 24, 16 Stat. 198, provided:
not known or used by others in this country, and not patented, or
described in any printed publication in this or any foreign country,
before his invention or discovery thereof, and not in public use or on
sale for more than two years prior to his application ....
Section 24 became section 4886 when reenacted, Rav. STAT. (1875). Section
4886 was amended by the Act of 1897, ch. 391, 29 Stat. 692, to provide:
Any . . . improvements thereof, not known or used by others in this

country, before his invention or discovery thereof, and not patented or
described in any printed publication ...before his invention or discovery
thereof, or more than two years prior to his application, and not in
public use ....
"See Bartholomew v. Sawyer, 2 Fed. Cas. 960 (No. 1070) (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1859), which construed § 7, Act of 1836:
The terms, in this section, "prior to the application" for patent, refer
only to the "public use or sale" (of the invention) "with applicant's
consent or allowance." They do not refer to anything else. And the
terms, "prior to the alleged invention or discovery thereof by the
applicant," refer to . . .a patent or description in some printed publication ....

Id. at 962.
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and only in those situations. Moreover, the interpretations of the
patent statutes prior to '1952 expressly held that the courts could
not diminish or deny an applicant any of his statutory rights, 49 and
this was especially true with regard to the various time limitations.
Thus it would appear that the majority has misconstrued the
"prior law" and denied the applicant his statutory rights. It would
also seem that the majority has denied the applicant due process,
since the rejection "unpatentable over" (in its new context of
either a 102(b) or 103 rejection) is vague and does not meet the
notice requirement of section 132. 50
Does the decision in Foster mean that the Patent Office can
combine references which do not anticipate and which are more
than one year prior to the filing date, determine that the applicant's
invention is obvious, and then reject the claims on the ground that
the applicant is barred by section 102(b)? The answer seems to
be a very definitive yes. In the past a rejection on a combination of
Chapman v. Wintroath, 252 U.S. 126 (1920).
There is no suggestion in the record that the original application ...
was not prosecuted strictly as required by the statutes ...

and therefore,

it is settled, their rights may not be denied or diminished on the ground
that such delay may have been prejudicial to either public or private
interests.
"A party seeking a right under the patent statutes may avail himself
of all their provisions, and the courts may not deny him the benefit of
a single one. These are questions not of natural but of purely statutory
right. .

.

. No court can disregard any statutory provisions in respect

to these matters on the ground that in its judgment they are unwise or
prejudicial to the interests of the public." United States v. American
Bell Telephone Co., 167 U.S. 224, 227 ....

(Emphasis added.)
Id.
. "at35136-37.
U.S.C. § 132 (1958).
§ 132. Notice of rejection; reexamination.
Whenever, on examination, any claim for a patent is rejected, or any
objection or requirement made, the Commissioner shall notify the applicant thereof, stating the reasons for such rejection, or objection or
requirement, together wuith such information and references as may be
useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of his
application . . . if . . . the applicant persists

. . .

the application shall

be reexamined .
(Emphasis added.) In this connection, see Rule 132, 37 C.F.R. § 1.132
(1960) (affidavits traversing grounds of rejection).
An applicant whose claims have been twice rejected may appeal the
examiner's decision to the Board of Appeals. 35 U.S.C.-§ 134 (1958). If
the applicant is dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of Appeals, he
may appeal to the C.C.P.A. (thereby waiving a right to a civil action to obtain a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 145 (1958)) within twenty days after he
has filed his notice of appeal as provided in 35 U.S.C. § 142 (1958). 35
U.S.C. § 141 (1958). Unless the applicant has taken a § 141 appeal, he may
appeal the decision of the Board of Appeals in the District Court for the
District of Columbia under § 145.
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and the suggestion

that the references could be combined must have been found within
the references themselves, rather than from the disclosures of the
application.62 If the applicant could show that the "suggesting"
reference had a date later than his date of invention, he could
swear back of it, thereby having the reference removed from consideration and thus causing the remaining combination to fall for
the lack of a "suggestion for the combination" within the remaining
references themselves."3 However, if the suggesting reference is
more than one year prior to the applicant's filing date, it is a statutory
bar. Thus a section 102(b) rejection can be predicated upon a
combination of references regardless of the applicant's date of invention, even though the rejection is only predicated on obviousness.
Judge Smith, on the other hand, tended to exaggerate the majority's holding, since the court still recognizes the differences inherent in sections 102(b) and 103. The court recognizes the inherent differences only when the statutory time-bar situation is
not present: that is, where the reference which is not anticipatory
is not more than one year prior to the filing date.5" Of course this
" See It re Andr6, 341 F.2d 304, 144 U.S.P.Q. 497 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
See generally Woodcock 295.
" In re Hortman, 264 F.2d 911, 121 U.S.P.Q. 218 (C.C.P.A. 1959):
In re Shaffer, 229 F.2d 476, 108 U.S.P.Q. 326 (C.C.P.A. 1956); accord,
It re Pavlecka, 318 F.2d 339, 138 U.S.P.Q. 152 (C.C.P.A. 1963); It re
Rothermel & Waddell, 276 F.2d 393, 125 U.S.P.Q. 328 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
" This exact situation is one which very seldom arises and is used here
more or less for illustration.
"Ii re Hughes, 345 F.2d 184, 145 U.S.P.Q. 467 (C.C.P.A. 1965);
In re Yale, Lowinski, & Berstein, 146 U.S.P.Q. 400 (C.C.P.A. 1965); In re
Tanczyn, 146 U.S.P.Q. 298 (C.C.P.A. 1965). All of these cases were decided subsequent to Foster. In It re Hughes supra, Judge Smith, writing
for the court, stated:
We cannot agree with the solicitor that there is no material difference
between sections 102 and 103 with respect to the applicant's right to a
day in court. A rejection under section 102 involves a comparison between
the subject matter disclosed by the reference and the claimed invention,
in order to determine whether the claimed invention is "described" in
the reference....

Section 103, on the other hand, requires consideration

of the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art, for the
purpose of determining whether the claimed subject matter as a whole
would have been "obvious" to one of ordinary skill in the art. Thus, the
issues arising under the two sections may be vastly different, and may
call for the production and introduction of quite different types of evidence.
Id. at 185-86, 145 U.S.P.Q. at 469. The language of Judge Smith is quite
broad and would seem to imply that the court had gone back to its holding
in Palnquist; however, such is not the case as is seen by In re Hassler,

19651

NOTES AND COMMENTS

distinction is of no consequence to the applicant, since, even if the
reference were anticipatory, it would not be applicable against him
because the mandate of 102(b) provides that it must be more than
one year prior to the filing date. Thus only if the applicant's date
of invention is within the one-year period may he escape the rejection predicated on obviousness. It would seem, however, that the
language of section 103 leaves no doubt that the time of the reference is to be the invention date rather than the filing date, regardless
of whether or not there is a statutory time-bar present. 55
In conclusion it is suggested that section 102(b) has been rewritten by the Foster decision and now provides:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication . . . or became obvious . . . more than one year before

the date of the application...
as has section 103, which now provides:
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made; Provided, however, that the time
the invention was -mde shall not be more than one year before
the filing date ....

The language of both sections is clearly not as stated above, and
clearly it should not be, but Foster has so construed the sections to
provide what has been suggested. The decision in It re Palmquist
seems inherently correct, giving vitality to all of the statutory
146 U.S.P.Q. 167 (C.C.P.A. 1965). The issue here was what was disclosed and whether that disclosure, taken with the prior art, renders the
claimed invention obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. It was held:
We agree with the board's holding that The News and Observer
article is a valid reference under 35 U.S.C. 102(b) for what is disclosed therein, since it is available to the public for more than a year
prior to applicant's filing date. In re Ruscetta ....

255 F.2d 687, 118

USPQ 101; In re Foster supra. The publication is not removed as a
reference merely because it discloses appellant's own invention, or in
early stages of that invention, and the publication, having been available
to the public more than one year, may not be overcome by a showing of
invention prior to the publication date.
Id. at 168-69. judge Smith concurred finding that the article was an
"enabling" disclosure under Cohen v. United States Corset Co., 93 U.S.
366, 377 (1876). But "to the extent that the resolution of the issue here
requires a determination of patentability under section 103, as the majority
seems to indicate," he would have reversed. 146 U.S.P.Q. at 175.
" See Woodcock 299.
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language."0 Foster, on the other hand, has rendered section 103 a
mere redundancy.
THOMAS C. WETTACH

Taxation-Gross Estate-Accident Insurance as Life Insurance
For federal estate tax purposes, a decedent's gross estate includes
the proceeds of insurance on the decedent's life, regardless of the
identity of the beneficiary, if the decedent at his death possessed
any of the incidents of ownership in the policy.' In Commissioner
v. Estate of Noel,2 decedent, just prior to a fatal plane crash, acquired two flight insurance policies which were paid for by his wife.
The terms of the policies provided that the beneficiary could be
changed and the policies assigned by written endorsement -of -the
insured. However, having designated his wife as beneficiary, decedent merely handed her the policies. His executor subsequently
excluded the flight insurance proceeds from the gross estate. The
Commissioner determined a deficiency under section 2042(2) and
was sustained in this by the Tax Court.' The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit reversed,4 distinguishing flight insurance as accident insurance against a risk rather than insurance against an inevitable event which is within the purview of this section. 5 Rejecting the appellate court's rationale, the Supreme Court held that
0 See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528 (1955). In a proceeding
on petition for naturalization, the court said:
The Government's contention that § 405 (a) does not apply to any
phase in the processing of naturalization petitions would defeat and

destroy the plain meaning of that section. "The cardinal principle of

statutory construction is to save and not to destroy!'. . . It is our duty
"to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute," Montclair Tp. v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152, rather than to emasculate an
entire section ....
Id. at 538-39. (Emphasis added.)
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042 provides in part:
§ 2042. PRocEEDs OF LIFE INSURANcE. The value of the gross estate
shall include the value of all property(2) RECEIVABLE BY OTHER B3ENEFICIARIES. To the extent of the amount
receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the
life of the decedent with respect to which the decedent possessed at
death any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in
with any other person....
conjunction
2380 U.S. 678 (1965).
' Estate of Marshall L. Noel, 39 T.C. 466 (1962).
'it re Noel's Estate, 332 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1964).
'Id. at 952.
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section 2042(2) applies to any type of accidental death insurance
on the life of the decedente and includes such proceeds if the decedent at his death possessed any of the incidents of ownership in
the policy notwithstanding the factual impossibility of his exercising
these rights. 7 Thus, the Noel case represents an encompassing application of section 2042(2) to all types of insurance policies on the
decedent's life even though such proceeds might be included under
some other section of the Code.8
Entitled "Life Insurance," section 2042(2) applies to "policies
on the life of the decedent" 9 which "are designed to shift to a
group of individuals the risk of premature death."'" The distinction
between death proceeds from life insurance and accident insurance
has been purely academic for estate tax purposes" since a 1929
Board of Tax Appeals interpretation:
It is well recognized that there is a distinction between life insurance and accident insurance, the former insuring . . . against

death in any event and the latter against death under certain
contingencies, but we fail to see why one is not taken out upon
the life of the policy holder as much as the other. In each case
the risk assumed by the insurer is the loss of the insured's life,
and the payment of the insurance money is contingent upon the
loss of life ....

The provisions of Section [2042(2)] are broad

enough to include both classes of insurance ....

12

Thus, relying on congressional, administrative, and judicial acquiescence in this general construction,'" the Court applied section
2042(2). They intimated that the type of insurance policy is immaterial so long as it is "on the life of the decedent."' 4 But, should
not the type of policy make a difference?
8 380 U.S. at 682.
7

8

Id. at 684.

See LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXES 286-87
(2d ed. 1962); 2 MER~a"rs, LAW o FFEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXATION
42-55 (1959).
oSee note 1 supra.
1 Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 540 (1941).
11
The technical distinction is that under an accident insurance policy
the insured contingency is an accident resulting in death to the insured,
whereas under a life insurance policy it is death by whatever cause. For
discussion of the inadequacy of this distinction under the estate tax, see

Johnston, Flight Insurance and Federal Taxation: A Critical Examination
of The Noel Case, 1965 DUKE L.J. 32.
" Leopold Ackerman, 15 B.T.A. 635, 637-38 (1929).
U.S. at 681-82. See Johnston, supra note 11.
" The Treasury Regulations provide that "the term 'insurance' refers
to life insurance of every description, including death benefits paid by fra13380
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Enacted to prevent estate tax avoidance in transmitting property
at death,' 5 section 2042(2) should apply to those types of insurance
policies which would be purchased for that purpose, namely, the
carefully selected life insurance policies and accident insurance
policies with death benefits which protect the insured and his family
during most of his life. However, trip-by-trip insurance policies
with death benefits, hastily purchased from any seller, do not accomplish this long-range scheme of protection."0 Rather they appear to be a one-shot gamble. But this type of policy does supplement the over-all plan of insurance protection to pass on at death
a wealth to a recipient of the insured's selection and thereby falls
squarely within the ambit of section 2042(2) if the decedent insured possessed at death any of the incidents of ownership in the
policy.
Where he possesses at death the right (1) to change the beneficiary, 17 (2) to assign the policy, or to revoke an assignment,' 8
(3) to surrender the policy and receive the cash value, 9 (4) to
borrow on the policy,20 (5) to cancel the policy,2 ' or (6) to receive
distribution in case of disability, 2 or where the decedent possesses at
death (7) a possibility of reverter in the policy exceeding five
per cent in value, 3 or (8) other economic benefits in the polternal beneficial societies operating under the lodge system." Treas. Reg. §
20.2042-1(a) (1) (1958). For examples of "life insurance," see generally
LOwNDEs & KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 8, at 288-91; 2 MERTENS, op. cit.
supra note 8, at 334-40.
" See H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1918); S. REP. No.
617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 42 (1918).
1" However, those who travel extensively often purchase travel insurance
to cover a specified period.
1,
Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929).
1 Caldwell v. Jordan, 119 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ala. 1953).
10 Liebmann v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945).

20 Ibid.

11 Estate of Myron Selznick, 15 T.C. 716 (1950), aff'd sub no., Selz735(1939).
(9th Cir. 1952).
F.2d343
Commissioner,
v. Nat'l
Estate
nick's
B.T.A.
Bank, 39 195
Point
" Old
Cir. 1945). The INT. REv.
(8th
574
152
F.2d
" Hock v. Commissioner,
CODE or 1954, § 2042(2) provides:
[T]he term "incident of ownership" includes a reversionary interest
_(whether arising by the express terms of the policy or other instrument
or by operation of law) only if the value of such reversionary interest
exceeded 5 percent of the value of the policy immediately before the
death of the decedent. As used in this paragraph, the term "reversionary
interest" includes a possibility that the policy, or the proceeds of the
policy, may return to the decedent or his estate, or may be subject to
a power of disposition by him. The value of a reversionary interest at
any time shall be determined (without regard to the fact of the decedent's
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icy,24 the decedent insured has sufficient incidents of ownership in the
policy to include the proceeds under section 2042 (2).25 The Court
interpreted the Code as not imposing a dual requirement of possession plus exercisability" and held that the decedent had met this
requirement, even though as a practical matter he could not have
changed the beneficiary or assigned the policy en route. If the view
were taken that inability to exercise these rights negates possession
of an incident of ownership, very few insurance proceeds would be
included in a decedent's gross estate, since this situation almost
always prevails moments before death.
Thus, mere legal possession at death of any of these incidents of ownership is enough for
inclusion under the insurance section. Moreover, such possession
by a decedent could warrant including the proceeds or some part
thereof under some other section or sections of the Code, notwithstanding the application of section 2042(2).
The value of the incident of ownership possessed at death by
the decedent insured could be included under section 2033.2" While
death) by usual methods of valuation, including the use of tables of
mortality and actuarial principles ....
The Treasury Regulations state that "the term 'incidents of ownership' is not limited in its meaning to ownership of the policy in the technical
legal sense. Generally speaking, the term has reference to the right of the
insured ... to the economic benefits of the policy." Treas. Reg. § 20.20421(c) (2) (1958).
For illustrations of nonincidents of ownership, see generally 2 MERTENS,
2"

2"

op. cit. supra note 8, at 368-70.

" Even though the Code refers to incidents of ownership possessed by
the decedent, "exercisable either alone or in conjunction with another
person," the courts have held this clause not to require more than legal
exercisability. See Estate of John J. Round, 40 T.C. 970 (1963).
27 Most insurance policies require an endorsement of the policy to exercise
the incidents of ownership. Unless the decedent insured carried the policy
in his pocket, he could not exercise his rights at death regardless of his
whereabouts. But, could it be argued that this factual question is one which
should be submitted to a jury? Cf. Empire Trust Co. v. United States, 226
F. Supp. 623 (1963) (whether a woman is capable of having children is now
a question for the jury). If such were allowed, the federal district courts
would be swamped with cases involving this one question since the Tax
Court does not have a jury. Moreover, the jury might be prejudiced against
the government when, e.g., a little old lady was too feeble to understand
that complicated insurance policy. Thus, the key to inclusion is possession
alone.
8 INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 2033 provides that "the value of the gross
estate shall include the value of all property ... to the extent of the interest
therein of the decedent at the time of his death." Only the value of the
decedent's interest is included. Thus, where the only incident of ownership
possessed by the decedent was a reversionary interest exceeding five per
cent in value of the policy, the amount included in his gross estate is the
value of such reversionary interest and not the entire proceeds.
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the Treasury Regulations and the legislative history of section
2033 express such a possibility," the courts have refused to apply
this generic section to insurance on the life of the decedent by reasoning that the more specific provision, section 2042(2), preempts inclusion under section 2033.30 However, they have freely utilized
other specific sections to include such proceeds. 31
Applying to inter vivos transfers where a grantor retains the
power to affect beneficial interests, sections 2036(a)(2)32 and
203833 would include the proceeds where a decedent transferred an
insurance policy but retained and possessed at death such rights as
the power to change the beneficiary, the power to assign the policy,
or other incidents of ownership. 34 Furthermore, section 2037"5
applies to insurance proceeds where there was an inter vivos transfer
by a decedent insured if beneficial enjoyment of the policy were
solely dependent upon surviving the decedent who possessed at
death a reversionary interest exceeding five per cent in value of the
"O
Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (a) (2) (1958); S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. 236 (1942).
"See Singer v. Shaughnessy, 198 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1952); Proutt's

Estate v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 591 (6th Cir. 1942).
" See, e.g., Estate of Ruth Brainard Cutler, 13 T.C. 138 (1949) (transfer taking effect at death).

" (a) GENERAL RULE.-The value of the gross estate shall include the
value of all property . . . to the extent of any interest therein of which
the decedent has at any time made a transfer ... by trust or otherwise,
under which he has retained for life or for any period not ascertainable
without reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact
end before his death-

"(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income
therefrom.
INT. Rzv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036(a).
" INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 2038 provides in part:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property
to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer . . . by trust or otherwise, where the enjoyment
thereof was subject at the date of his death to any change through the
exercise of a power . . . by the decedent alone or by the decedent in
conjunction with any other person . . . to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate, or where any such power is relinquished in contemplation of
decedent's death....
" Estate of Mabel E. Morton, 12 T.C. 380 (1949). However, once the
court has found § 2042 applicable, they deem it unnecessary to consider §§
2036 (a) (2) and 2038. See Estate of Myron Selznick, 15 T.C. 716 (1950),
aff'd sub nom., Selznick's Estate v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 735 (9th Cir.
'5INT. REV. CODE oF

1954, § 2037.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

1965]
6

policy.
Usage of these inter vivos transfer sections would be
decisive for the government if the application of section 2042(2)
were dubious.3 7 However, the Noel case enlarges the scope of this
section to include the insurance proceeds of any type of policy "on
the life of the decedent" if he possesses at death incidents of ownership. Thus, the possession at death of these incidents of ownership
is required for inclusion under both the insurance section and the
inter vivos transfer sections.
To avoid the inclusion of proceeds from insurance on his life,
an insured must irrevocably designate a beneficiary other than his
estate and completely divest himself of all other incidents of ownership in the policy. Moreover, unless actuated by "living motives,""8
this divestiture must occur more than three years before the decedent's death to escape inclusion under section 203539 as a transfer
in contemplation of death.' With this three-year limitation, however, a decedent insured can still avoid the inclusion of trip insurance
proceeds by having the transferee pay the premiums on the policy."
Thus, the key to exclusion is prudent planning.
COMANN P. CRAVER, JR.
oEstate of Ruth Brainard Cutler, 13 T.C. 138 (1949). For evaluation
of the reversionary interest, see Treas. Reg. 20.2037-1(c) (3) (1958).
"' See, e.g., Goldstone v. United States, 325 U.S. 687 (1945); Commissioner v. Clise, 122 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1941).
88 See, e.g., Des Portes v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 598 (E.D.S.C.
1959) (transfer to his wife to make her more financially independent);
Estate of Verne C. Hunt, 14 T.C. 1182 (1950) (transfer to wife to avoid
judgment creditors).
" INT. Rnv. ColE oF 1954, § 2035 states that "if the decedent within a
period of 3 years ending with his death . . . transferred an interest in
property . . . such transfer . . . unless shown to the contrary," shall be

included in the decedent's gross estate.
"0Garrett's Estate v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1950). Even
after complete divestiture, where a decedent insured continued to pay the
premiums on the policy, that part of the insurance proceeds proportionate to
the premiums paid within this three-year period will be included in his
gross estate. See Liebmann v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945).
However, this situation can be avoided by creating a funded insurance trust
more than 3 years before his death. See LowNDEs & KRAMER, op. cit.
supra note 8, at 147-48.
,' See Liebmann v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945), where the
court held that the proportionate part of the insurance policy purchased by
the transferee should be excluded from the decedent's gross estate.
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Taxation-Gross Estate-Inter Vivos Transfers-Retention of
Possession or Enjoyment
The federal estate tax taxes a transfer of property made by a
decedent during his life if the decedent "retained for his life . . .
or for any period which does not in fact end before his death .. .
the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the
property . . . ."I Several recent cases raise the question what is
meant by a retention of possession or enjoyment of the transferred
property for a period which does not in fact end before the transferor's death. Is it enough that the decedent actually remained in
possession of the property until his death, or must his possession or
enjoyment have been accompanied by an agreement with the transferee allowing him to do so? As far as the naked language of the
statute is concerned, it would seem that section 2036 would be satisfied by the continued possession or enjoyment of the decedent,
regardless of whether this was pursuant to an agreement with the
transferee. Two recent decisions hold, however, that there must
be an agreement. 2
In Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States,' the decedent
in 1958 had conveyed by a recorded warranty deed his undivided
interest in the family home to his wife. He continued to live in the
home until his accidental death in 1959. The Commissioner made
a deficiency assessment, taxing the transfer of the home under section
2036 as a transfer with the retention of a life interest. The plaintiff
as executor of the decedent's estate paid the assessment and sued
for a refund. The government moved for a summary judgment
either on grounds that the facts showed there was an implied agreement that the decedent might continue to live in the home, or on
grounds that his continued possession or enjoyment of the residence
until his death satisfied the statutory requirements for a tax under
section 2036. The taxpayer also moved for a summary judgment,
contending that the facts showed the absence of an express or implied agreement between the decedent and his wife and that continued
factual possession and enjoyment, not based on an agreement, was
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036.
Stephenson v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. Va. 1965);
Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 883 (W.D. Tenn.
1964).
'238 F. Supp. 883 (W.D. Tenn. 1964).
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not sufficient to include the value of the residence in the decedent's
gross estate. In overruling both motions for summary judgment,
the court held that the decedent's continued residence in the home
was neither sufficient to show the existence of an agreement nor to
meet the statutory requirement of retention of possession or enjoyment. The court further held that the transfer could not be
taxed under section 2036 unless the jury determined from the facts
that there was an agreement, even an unenforceable one, giving the
decedent the right to continue living in the home. The jury found
that there was no such agreement.4 In a later case, Stephenson v.
United States,' in which the husband purchased a family home in
his wife's name and lived in the house with her until his death, the
government again moved for summary judgment because of the
decedent's factual possession or enjoyment of the home. In overruling the motion, the court held that to incur tax liability under
section 2036, lifetime possession in fact must result from an agreement with the transferee.
It is difficult to see any justification for interpreting section
2036 as requiring an agreement in addition to actual possession or
enjoyment of the transferred property until the transferor's death.
When the statute speaks of the decedent's retaining possession or
enjoyment "for his life" and "for any period which does not in
fact end before his death," it would appear to be contrasting retention of an interest in the property under an agreement for a life
estate with retention in fact of possession or enjoyment of the
property.0 It is, moreover, quite apparent from the Union Planters
Nat'l Bank and the Stephenson cases that actual proof of the existence or absence of an agreement for retention of possession by the
decedent of the transferred property places the government at a
severe disadvantage. This proof must be sought after the death
"Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States, FED. EsT. & GIFT TAx

REP.

(65-1 U.S. Tax Cas.) 12,298 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 28, 1964).
'238 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. Va. 1965). Cf. Peck v. United States, FED.
12,333 (M.D. Ga. May 5,
EsT. & GIFT TAx REP. (65-2 U.S. Tax Cas.)
1965).

6 Congress apparently used the language, "for any period which does not
in fact end before his death," to cover a transfer similar to one which went
untaxed in Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927). Mrs. Coolidge had
deeded her two residences to her children on the understanding that she
would continue to live in the residences until her death, which she did. The
Court held this was not a transfer intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at her death because she had not reserved a legal interest in
the residences at the time of the transfer.
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of the transferor from interested witnesses who normally stand
in such an intimate family relationship to the decedent that their
dealings with the decedent would have been confidential.7 How
can it be determined, for example, what understanding actually
existed between the decedent and his wife about the decedent's continued occupancy of the family residence? Obviously, section 2036
was worded in broad and inclusive terms in order to prevent tax
avoidance. It would seem to encourage tax avoidance if the courts
ignore the language of section 2036 and read into the statute a
requirement of an agreement with the transferee in addition to
possession or enjoyment in fact until his death.
The only basis in the statutory language for requiring an agreement that the transferor be allowed to continue in possession of the
transferred property during his life, in addition to possession in
fact of the property until his death, is the word "retained." The
statute says that the decedent must have "retained" possession or
enjoyment of the transferred property for a period not in fact ending before his death. Does this necessarily imply the existence of
some agreement for the continued possession of the transferred
property, or can the requirement of retention be satisfied by possession in fact? The dictionary definition of "retain" is "to hold or
continue to hold in possession or use." 8 Certainly one could keep
possession of property without any agreement for continued possession. A wrongdoer who seized property against the true owner's
will might "retain" possession of the property, even though this
retention was quite independent of any agreement with the true
owner and was in fact in complete defiance of the true owner's
wishes. It is certainly a strained interpretation of section 2036 to
say that the statute's use of the word "retained" implies a requirement of an agreement for continued possession. Moreover, there
seems to be little justification for straining if this defeats the policy
of the statute, as it appears to do. Presumably, Congress provided
that there should be a tax where a person transfers property and
retains possession or enjoyment of the transferred property for a
' In both cases the evidence establishing that there was not an express
or implied agreement concerned private conversations between the decedent and his wife at the time of the transfer. In Stephenson, Mrs. Stephenson quoted her husband as saying at the time he gave her the home, "It's
yours to do with as you choose, you can even put me out if you wish."
238 F. Supp. at 662, n.2.
'WEBSTER, THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1965).
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period not in fact ending before his death in order to prevent tax
avoidance by means of apparent outright transfers coupled with
secret agreements for retention of possession. The test which the
statute appears to lay down for a tax is the objective fact of continued possession for the actual duration of the transferor's life,
rather than his subjective state of mind or some unknown agreement with a transferee."
It is difficult in these cases to discern the relevance of an unenforceable agreement. An enforceable agreement that the transferor shall have possession of the transferred property until his
death would be tantamount to a reservation of a life estate. Itis
also difficult to see how an unenforceable agreement adds anything
to retention in fact, since it has no legal status. An unenforceable
agreement might indicate an intention to retain possession of the
transferred property during the transferor's life, but, if the critical
characteristic of a taxable transfer under section 2036 is the objective operation of the transfer,"0 the subjective state of mind of
the transferor would seem to have no significance.
Prior to the Union PlantersNat'l Bank case there were decisions
hinting that some sort of agreement for continued possession or
enjoyment was necessary for a tax under section 2036,11 but there
does not seem to have been any case which squarely held that the
agreement was a sine qua non of the tax where the decedent's
possession and enjoyment had continued from the time of the transfer until his death.
There have been decisions in which an agreement has been used
as a makeweight along with continued possession or enjoyment to
impose a tax liability. This was the case in Estate of McNichol v.
Commissioner'" where the decedent transferred by warranty deed all
of his income-producing property to his children and continued to
See note 10 infra.
"oSections 2036 to 2038 which tax incomplete inter vivos transfers grew
out of and amplify the wording of section 202(B) of the Revenue Act of
1916 that taxed transfers "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment

at or after . . ." the death of the transferor. Mr. Justice Holmes in Shukert
v. Allen, 273 U.S. 545 (1927), established an objective test for transfers

taking effect at death. In Estate of Speigel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701

(1949) rehearing denied 336 U.S. 915 (1949), the subjective intent of a
transferor was held immaterial in determining whether a transfer took
effect at death. See LOwNDEs & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXES

§§ 6.1-6.3 (2d ed. 1962).

See cases cited notes 12-19 infra.

12265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959), affirming 29 T.C. 1179 (1958).
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receive all of the rents from the property under an oral agreement
with his children until his death. The taxpayers argued that the
transfer was not taxable because the oral agreement was unenforceable under the Pennsylvania Statute of Frauds and, therefore, did not give the decedent a "right to the income." The Tax
Court 3 rejected this argument and held that the receipt of the income
was a retention of possession and enjoyment, declaring that the
statute posed alternative tests for inclusion-either the right to
income or the factual retention of possession and enjoyment, regardless of the decedent's retention of any right to the property.
In affirming the Tax Court's decision, the Third Circuit' 4 placed
more reliance on the presence of the agreement, holding that retaining even an unenforceable right to the income is taxable as retention
of possession and enjoyment. The court limited its decision to the
facts of the case and declined to say whether it would have upheld
the tax if there had been no evidence of an agreement. In Harter
v. United States", the decedent in 1935 had conveyed income-producing property to his wife by a warranty deed that was not recorded until 1950 when he was in his final illness. Up until the
time of his death he had received all of the rents from the property,
and from 1941 to 1947 he had reported the rents as income and had
taken deductions for depreciation of improvements to the property
on his separate income tax returns. The court held the transfer
to be taxable, basing its decision on the factual retention of a life
interest and an inferred agreement between the decedent and his
wife that he would control the property. Neither of these decisions
decided directly that an agreement is indispensable for a tax under
section 2036.
In other cases, agreements have been the deciding factor in determining whether the decedent was the settlor of a trust under
which he had a life interest. This was one of the issues in State
St. Trust Co. v. United States" where the decedent had originally
created a trust for his children, reserving the power to terminate
it. He terminated the trust in favor of the children upon their
agreement to use the funds to establish a second trust, the one in
issue in the case. The court found the decedent to be the settlor
"29 T.C. 1179 (1958).
'265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1959).
55-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 55,397 (N.D. Okla. 1954).
10263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959).
1
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of the second trust on the theory that he was the substantial creator
of the trust. The question of who is the settlor of a trust also
comes up in cases involving cross or reciprocal trusts in which
agreements have been relevant in determining whether one trust
was created as consideration for the other trust.17 Agreements were
significant in these cases in determining whether the decedent was
the transferor, not in establishing whether he had retained a taxable
life interest in the transferred property.
In cases where the decedent overtly transfers possession and
enjoyment which he later receives back from the transferee, agreements have been necessary to prove that the decedent never completely divested himself of the transferred property. In Estate of
Skinner v. United States"8 the decedent created an irrevocable
trust that gave the trustees a discretionary power to pay the income
to the decedent or to others. Tax liability was imposed after it was
established that the decedent had received all of the income of the
trust during her life as a result of a prearrangement with the trustees.
9 the court refused to uphold a tax when
In Burrill v. Shaughnessy"
the government failed to sustain its allegation that the decedentsettlor had been appointed a contingent life estate in a trust as a result
of a prearrangement with the donee of the power. This, however,
was not a case of continued possession or enjoyment. The decedent
had created an irrevocable trust giving his wife the income for her
life and a limited power to appoint to him by will, which she exercised several months after he had transferred the property into
the trust.
None of the previous cases hold that an agreement for retention
of possession or enjoyment is a prerequisite for a tax under section
2036 when the decedent retained possession or enjoyment of property
he transferred during his life for a period not in fact ending with
his death. They were either cases where agreements were necessary
to determine whether the decedent was in fact the transferor of the
property, as in the State St. Trust Co. case, or cases where, in
instances of interrupted possession or enjoyment, agreements were
'" Estate of Guenzel v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 248
(8th Cir. 1958);
McLain v. Jarecki, 232 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1956); Newberry's Estate v.
Commissioner, 201 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1953).
" 316 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1963). Cf. Estate of T. M. Flynn, 13 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 1380 (1944); Estate of J. H. Scheide, 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
1087 (1947).

" 71 F. Supp. 99 (N.D.N.Y. 1947).
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invoked to determine whether the decedent had completely divested
himself of the property at the time of the transfer, as in the Skinner
case. There were also cases in which agreements were used as a
makeweight in finding a tax liability, as in McNichol, but no cases
squarely holding that no tax would be imposed on continued possession or enjoyment in the absence of an agreement.
The Treasury contends that if the decedent transferred his home
to his wife or to his children, the full value of the home should be
included in his gross estate in any of the three following situations:
(1) if by state law he had a legally enforceable right to live in the
home as long as it belonged to his wife, or (2) if he was discharging
a legal obligation to support his wife or children, or (3) if he continued to reside in the residence until his death."
In light of the literal wording of section 2036 and the apparent
policy behind the statute to prevent tax avoidance, it is submitted
that the Treasury's position is sound and should be followed.
WILLIAm S. LOWNDES
Torts-Implied Warranty in Real Estate-Privity Requirement

The principle of caveat emptor' in real property sales is beginning to show cracks in what previously was its impregnable structure.
In 1936 Professor Williston said, "There are no implied warranties
in sales of real estate."2 Although this is still the rule in a vast
majority of the jurisdictions in the United States,3 the reasoning
behind it seems to be weakening.
The first inroad into the principle involved houses to be con"0Speech by Chief Counsel Sept. 19, 1964, as reported in 4 REsEARcH
INSTITUTE TAX COORDxNATOR 47008C (1965).
'The North Carolina view is that caveat emptor will be followed in
the sale of real property provided no fraud is involved. Smathers v. Gilmer,
126 N.C. 757, 759, 36 S.E. 153, 154 (1900). For a further discussion of the
North Carolina view see 42 N.C.L. Rav. 946, 951 (1964). See generally
Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty, 14 VAND. L. Rxv. 541 (1961);
Dunham, Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness of Land for a ParticularPurpose,
37 MINN. L. REv. 108 (1953); Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat
Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931); Comment, 5 DE PAuL L. REv. 263
(1956); Note, 4 W. REs. L. REv. 357 (1953).
4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 926, at 2602 (rev. ed. 1936).
'E.g., Narup v. Higgins, 51 Ill. App. 2d 102, 200 N.E.2d 922 (1964);
Coutrakon v. Adams, 39 Ill. App. 2d 290, 188 N.E.2d 780 (1963); Shapiro
v. Kornicks, 103 Ohio App. 49, 124 N.E.2d 175 (1955); Steiber v. Palumbo,
219 Ore. 479, 347 P.2d 978 (1959). See 55 Am. Jum. Vendor and Purchaser
§ 368 (1946); Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 446 (1961).
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structed or in the process of construction.4 In these instances some
courts have permitted the immediate vendee to recover for defects
in the house on an implied warranty.' This rule is receiving increasing support but is not yet unanimous. 6
A very small minority of United States jurisdictions that have
considered the problem have gone so far as to allow an implied
warranty to survive the completion of the house.' In Carpenter v.
Donohoe8 the plaintiffs purchased a house built by the defendant.
Four months later the walls began to crack. The suit was based on
fraud and breach of implied warranties. The Supreme Court of
Colorado held that the implied warranty doctrine would be extended
"to include agreements between builder-vendors and purchasers for
the sale of newly constructed buildings, completed at the time of
contracting."9 The court continued, "Where . . . a home is the

subject of sale, there are implied warranties that the home was built
in workmanlike manner and is suitable for habitation."'" In the
Donohoe case, there was privity of contract between the parties.
This would seem essential where the plaintiff is suing on a contractual theory." But where personal injury is involved, privity would
2
not be essential, since the suit would be in tort and not contract.'
This exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor in the sales of real
property seems to have originated in England. Miller v. Cannon Hill

Estates, Ltd., [1931] 2 K.B. 113. In that case the vendee contracted with

the builder-vendor of a housing development to buy a house then being
constructed. Structural defects appeared in the house and the vendee sued.
The court held the vendor liable for breach of an express warranty and for
breach of an implied warranty of fitness for habitation.
'E.g., Weck v. A :M Sunrise Constr. Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d
728 (1962); Gilbert Constr. Co. v. Gross, 212 Md. 402, 129 A.2d 518
(1957); Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819
(1957); Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474
(1958).
6 See cases cited note 3 supra.
Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. -, 388 P.2d 399 (1964) ; Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). Louisiana has
adopted the doctrine of redhibition which has established an implied warranty
in sales of real estate as well as chattels. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 2520-48
(1952).
'154 Colo-, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
Id. at -,

10Ibid.

1

388 P.2d at 402.

It is a basic rule of contracts that an essential element of a cause of
action on a contract, or based on a contractual theory, is privity of contract.
E.g., Fowler v. Athens City Waterworks Co., 83 Ga. 219, 9 S.E. 673 (1889);
Sterback v. Robinson, 148 Md. 24, 128 Atl. 894 (1925). See 2 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 347, at 794 (3d ed. 1959).
See PRossna, TORTS § 97, at 681 (3d ed. 1963).
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In this situation, sales of real property should be on the same footing
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in
as sales of chattels.'
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.14 recognized this difference. In
that case the defendant corporation was a mass builder-vendor of
houses. Its vendee lived in one of the houses for two years and
then leased the house to one of the plaintiffs. When the house was
built, the defendant equipped it with a hot water system that was
directly connected with the heating system of the house. Since the
water that came from the hot water tap was almost boiling, one
first had to turn on the cold water to reduce the temperature. The
infant plaintiff was severely burned when he turned on the hot
water without first turning on the cold water. The Supreme Court
of New Jersey held the defendant liable on the theories of negligence 5 and breach of implied warranty of habitability.' 6 In abrogating the privity requirement, the court drew an analogy to sales
of chattels, saying that there is no meaningful distinction between
a mass producer of automobiles and a mass builder of homes."'
Various reasons have been advanced for not requiring privity
where a person injured by a chattel sues the manufacturer:
(1) Since only the manufacturer can comprehend the intricacies
of his product, he should be responsible for the defects which cause
injuries to those who could foreseeably be expected to use the
product.'
(2) The consumer has no control over the precautions the manufacturer takes in making the product. Thus, the manufacturer
should have the responsibility of making the product reasonably
safe.' 0
" See generally PRossER, To RTS § 97 (3d ed. 1963); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J.
1099 (1960); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J.
1 (1965).
44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
207 A.2d at 328. Although this was the first time the
1 Id. at -,

Supreme Court of New Jersey had held a building contractor liable for

negligence without requiring privity, other jurisdictions in the United States
had done so before. Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736
(1958); Colbert v. Holland Furnace Co., 333 Ill. 78, 164 N.E. 162 (1928);
Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 191 (1950).
" 44 N.J. at -, 207 A.2d at 328.
17 Id. at -,
207 A.2d at 325.
"' Comment, 16 BAYLOR L. REV. 263, 266 (1964).
19 Gladiola Biscuit Co. v. Southern Ice Co., 267 F.2d 138 (5th Cir.
1959). See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability
to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
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(3) Placing liability on the manufacturer would best insure the

20
life and health of the consumer.

(4) The manufacturer is better able to distribute the risk of
loss to the general public through insurance and slightly increased
prices.2These policy reasons would seem to apply equally well to the
situation presented in the Schipper case where defendant is a mass
builder of houses.
In time it is likely that more courts in the United States will
follow the New Jersey decision. The process of change will be slow,
however, for precedent must be overcome. The basic obstacle facing
the courts is the rule of law that all the provisions of the antecedent
contract in the sale of real estate are merged in the deed, which
becomes prima facie the total obligation of the parties. 2 2 Once the
court has permitted an implied warranty to survive acceptance of
the deed, another problem arises. Warranty is associated with
contract, and if there is no privity between the plaintiff and defendant, there can be no warranty, and, hence, no breach of warranty. 23
Originally breach of warranty sounded in tort since it was an
action on the case. Thus there was no privity requirement.2 4 When
the method of declaring on a warranty became indebitatus assumpsit, the tort elements were lost,2" breach of warranty became a part
of contract law, and privity was required. 2 But in a personal injury
case, the plaintiff is not suing on the contract. According to the
Restatement of Torts, "The liability stated is one of tort, and does
not require any contractual relation, or privity of contract, between
the plaintiff and the defendant .... It is strict liability .... The basis

"Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d
828 (1942).
"PROSSER, TORTS § 84 (2d ed. 1955).

" E.g., Ridley v. Moyer, 230 Ala. 517, 161 So. 526 (1935); Duncan
v. McAdams, 222 Ark. 143, 257 S.W.2d 568 (1953); Percifield v. Rosa, 122
Colo. 167, 220 P.2d 546 (1950).
" E.g., Welshausen v. Charles Parker Co., 83 Conn. 231, 76 At. 271
(1910); Flaccomio v. Eysink, 129 Md. 367, 100 Atl. 510 (1916); Wood v.
Advance Rumely Thresher Co., 60 N.D. 384, 234 N.W. 517 (1931).
24 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 195 (3d ed. 1948); Ames, History of Assumpsit,
2 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1888).
"Jeanblanc, Manufacturer's Liability to Persons Other Than Their
Immediate
Vendees, 24 VA. L. Rav. 134, 149 (1937).
26 See cases cited note 23 supra.
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Damages are measured in tort. 8
of liability is purely one of
The warranty is one imposed by law and does not derive from the
mutual consent of the parties. 29 The liability being one of tort,80
the merger theory and the privity theory have no relevance in the
sales of real property where personal injury is involved.
Of course, there must be limitations to the extent of this strict
liability., It should not be feared that strict tort liability would
be unlimited once the privity requirement is abrogated, for the
rules governing the sales of chattels seem to provide logical limits.
In the chattels field "no one has yet recovered for personal injuries, on the basis of strict liability without privity, who could not
fairly be called a consumer of the product, or at least a user." 2 Thus,
in the sales of chattels, where there is personal injury involved, the
courts hold the manufacturer strictly liable only to foreseeable plaintiffs.8" This would also seem to be the logical limit in the sales of
real property. Surely public policy demands that the builder be held
strictly liable to those who he could reasonably foresee would be
injured by a defect in the house.
There is another problem which must be considered: for what
period of time will this strict liability apply to the builder? It
would seem that there are two logical solutions. In the Schipper
case the court said that three years was a reasonable time under
the circumstances.3 4 What is a reasonable time must be determined
on the facts of each case. The statute of limitations might provide
another solution to the problem. The North Carolina statute of
limitations provides a three-year limitation on an action for injury
2
(SECOND), TORTS § 402A, comments, 1, m (1965).
"RESTATEMENT
'" Comment, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 418, 424 (1959).
tort."2

2'Ibid.
'o Dean Prosser, speaking about chattels, aptly expresses the idea when
he says, "If there is to be strict liability in tort, let there be strict liability
in tort, declared outright, without an illusory contract mask." Prosser, The
Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J.

1099, 1134 (1960).

"1The Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized that there must be

certain limitations to this strict liability when they said, "Issues of notice,

time limitation and measure of proof, which have not really been discussed
in the briefs, would seem to be indistinguishable from those which have
been arising in the products liability field .... ." 44 N. J. at -, 207 A.2d at
328.
82 PROSSER, TORTS § 97, at 682 (3d ed. 1963).
82 Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (Super. Ct. 1963).
For a case which holds that the plaintiff was not an intended user see
Kuschy v. Norris, 25 Conn. Supp. 383, 206 A.2d 275 (Super. Ct. 1964).
8,44 N.J. at --,207 A.2d at 328.
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to the person. It is further provided that the statute begins to
run when the cause of action accrues3 6 and, as interpreted by the
North Carolina Supreme Court, this is when the defendant committed the tort and not when the plaintiff first acquired knowledge
of the tort." In the cases in which the North Carolina Supreme
Court has interpreted the statute, a nominal injury had to occur to
begin the running of the statute.3 8 Perhaps, the courts could apply
this rule as a limit in the case of a builder and have the statute
begin to run at the time the house was sold although the plaintiff
39
had not yet suffered any personal injury.
It is important to note that the doctrine of strict liability would
not relieve the plaintiff of sustaining his burden of proof. 40 As in

sales of chattels, the plaintiff would still have to prove that his injury
was caused by a defect in the house4 1 and that the defect existed
when the house left the hands of the defendant.4 The time for
which the builder's liability would exist would be limited further
by the burden of proof since, as time passed, it would be more
difficult to prove that the defect existed when the house left the
hands of the builder.
The question may arise whether strict liability would apply to
the builder of a single house. In this situation, the court has two
basic policies to consider. First, the builder of one house could not
distribute the risk of loss to the general public any better than could
the injured plaintiff. On the other hand, since the injured plaintiff
had no real opportunity to inspect the house, the builder should
have the responsibility of making the house reasonably safe for
all foreseeable users. The outcome of the case may depend upon
which policy the court considers more significant.
In the not-too-distant future, it is likely that the strict liability
principles applied in Schipper will be extended to other fields. Dean
GEN. STAT. § 1-52(5) (1953).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15 (1953).
"E.g., Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E.2d 508 (1957); Lewis
v. Shaver, 236 N.C. 510, 73 S.E.2d 320 (1952).
"sIbid.
"In Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 258 N.C.
323, 128 S.E.2d 413 (1962) the court said that it would not decide whether
"N.C.

the statute would begin to run if there had been no injury at all. Id. at 326,

128 S.E.2d at 416. If the court would not do so, the legislature could enact
a statutory exception to the rule.
40 PRoSsER, TORTs § 97, at 683 (3d ed. 1963).
41 Ibid.

"Ibid.
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Prosser states, "As to defendants other than sellers, who supply
chattels under contract, there has as yet been no suggestion of any
strict liability to third persons."4 But considering that the law
has expanded from liability for negligence where there is no privity" to strict liability in real estate4 ' notwithstanding the doctrine
of caveat emptor, the day may come when strict liability without
privity will be applied to defendants other than sellers. 6
THOMAS SIDNEY SMITH

Torts-Nondelegable Duty-Direct and Vicarious Liability
for Negligence
The plaintiff in a recent North Carolina case1 recovered from
the general concessionaire2 of a county fair for injuries received
when she was thrown from a carnival ride owned and operated by
an independent contractor. The retaining bar of the ride was found
to be difficult to close, and the independent contractor, not a defendant in the suit, was found to be negligent in failing to ascertain
whether the retaining bar securing the plaintiff was closed and
properly latched. The ride was determined to be "inherently dangerous,"'3 i.e., that it was such a ride as was likely to cause injury
to passengers unless due care was exercised in its maintenance and
operation. The jury also found the defendant concessionaire negligent in failing to inspect the ride and its operation to see that it
was maintained and operated with due care.
It is the general rule that an employer is not ordinarily liable
for the negligent acts of his independent contractor; however this
rule has numerous exceptions.' They are so numerous, in fact, that
" Id. § 98, at 685.
" MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
" 44 N.J. at -, 207 A.2d at 328.
" It must be noted that the Supreme Court of New Jersey held the defendant liable on the alternate grounds of negligence and implied warranty
of habitability. The alternate holding of negligence may tend to minimize
the import of the court's decision on implied warranty. Whether the court

will follow this case as a precedent, where no negligence is alleged, remains to be seen.
'Dockery v. World of Mirth Shows, Inc., 264 N.C. 406, 142 S.E.2d
29 (1965).
'Hereinafter the terms concessionaire, employer, or owner will be
used to designate the person who contracts with the independent contractor.
'264 N.C. at 414, 142 S.E.2d at 35.
'2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 26.11 (1956); MECHEM, AGENCY §§ 480-

90 (4th ed. 1952);
OND),

PROSSER, TORTS

TORTS §§ 409-29 (1965).

§ 70 (3d ed. 1964);

RESTATEMENT (SEc-
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their very number casts doubt upon the validity of the rule.5 Commentators group the exceptions under three broad categories:"
(1) personal fault of the employer, (2) nondelegable duty of the
employer, and (3) inherently dangerous or dangerous in the absence of special precautions.7
Cases comprising the first category are not genuine exceptions
to the general rule because the employer is liable for his own
failure' to exercise due care, not for the failure of an independent
contractor. Such situations arise where he negligently selects an
incompetent contractor, 9 provides defective equipment,'0 or negligently gives instructions pursuant to the work to be done." A
negligent failure to exercise control retained 12by him over the work
will result in direct liability of the employer.
The second category is comprised of those cases in which statutory duties,' 3 duties created by charter or franchise,14 or common
"A number of factors concur to constitute ....such a powerful argument for the liability of the employer of an independent contractor that it
would seem highly desirable for the courts to adopt the rule of liability and
confine nonliability to a few exceptional cases." HARPER, TORTS § 292, at
646 (1933). See Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 ILL.
L. REV. 339 (1935). But see Steffen, The Independent Contractor and the
Good Life, 2 U. Ci. L. REV. 501 (1935).
' See authorities cited note 4 supra.
'These terms represent different forms of stating the same general
principle. See Annot., 23 A.L.R. 1016 (1923); Annot., 23 A.L.R. 1084
(1923); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §§ 416, 427 (1965).
' See HARPER, TORTS § 292, at 645 (1933). "In the cases in this category
the employer's liability is clearly not vicarious but based on pure tort
theory.. . ." MECHEm, AGENCY, § 482, at 332 (1952).
'See Huntt v. McNamee, 141 Fed. 293 (4th Cir. 1905) (applying North
Carolina law) ; Baker v. Scott County Milling Co., 323 Mo. 1089, 20 S.W.2d
494 (1929); Mullich v. Brocker, 119 Mo. App. 332, 97 S.W. 549 (1905);
Jolly Motor Livery Corp. v. Allenberg, 188 Tenn. 452, 221 S.W.2d 513

(1949);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND),

TORTS §

411 (1965).

"See, e.g., Brady v. Jay, 111 La. 1071, 36 So. 132 (1904); Johnson v.
J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 193 Mo. App. 198, 182 S.W. 1089 (1916).
Compare Mack v. Marshall Field & Co., 218 N.C. 697, 12 S.E.2d 235
(1940); Peters v. Carolina Cotton & Woolen Mills, Inc., 199 N.C. 753,
155 S.E. 867 (1930); Paderick v. Goldsboro Lumber Co., 190 N.C. 308,
130 S.E. 29 (1925); Royal v. Dodd, 177 N.C. 206, 98 S.E. 599 (1919);
Midgette v. Branning Mfg. Co., 150 N.C. 333, 64 S.E. 5 (1909).
App. 754 (1913);
"- See Starr v. Standard-Tilton Milling Co., 183 Ill.
Board of County Comm'rs v. Vickers, 62 Kan. 25, 61 Pac. 391 (1900);
State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n v. Diamond Transp. Corp., 226
N.C. 371, 38 S.E.2d 214 (1946); Embler v. Gloucester Lumber Co., 167
N.C. 457, 83 S.E. 740 (1914) (dictum); Persons v. Raven, 187 Ore. 1,

207 P.2d 1051 (1949).

"2Bissel v. Ford, 176 Mich. 64, 141 N.W. 860 (1913); Allen v. Texas

866 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
Elec." E.g.,
Serv. Snyder
Co., 350v.S.W.2d
Southern Cal. Edison Co., 44 Cal. 2d 793, 285 P.2d
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duties, 15

i.e., duties that exist because of some special relationlaw
ship between the employer and the plaintiff and those that exist
because of the inherently dangerous character of the work, place the
employer under a nondelegable duty. As in the first category,
the employer may be liable for his own fault in these situations.
Where it is reasonably foreseeable that harmful consequences will
arise unless special precautions are taken, the employer may be
subject to liability for his failure to inspect the work after it is
finished1 to see that it is in reasonably safe condition, or, on occasion,
to see that proper precautions are taken on work in progress.' 7
Where activities being carried on by an independent contractor on
the employer's premises create unreasonable risks of bodily harm
to those outside the premises, the employer may subject himself
to liability for failure to exercise reasonable care to protect them.' s
Owners and occupiers of land who hire independent contractors to
do work on their premises owe business invitees the common law
duty of keeping their premises reasonably safe for the purposes of
the visit."
912 (1955); Weber v. Buffalo Ry., 20 App. Div. 292, 47 N.Y. Supp. 7
(1897); Blount v. Tow Fong, 48 R.I. 453, 138 Atl. 52 (1927).
"E.g., Dixie Stage Lines v. Anderson, 222 Ala. 673, 134 So. 23 (1931);
Eli v. Murphy, 39 Cal. 2d 598, 248 P.2d 756 (1952); Brown v. L.H.
Bottoms Truck Lines, Inc., 227 N.C. 299, 42 S.E.2d 71 (1947); Newsome
v. Suratt, 237 N.C. 297, 74 S.E.2d 732 (1953), noted in Agency, 1953 Survey
of N.C.
Law, 32 N.C.L. Rav. 379, 385 (1954).
"0E.g., Ferguson v. Ashkenazy, 307 Mass. 197, 29 N.E.2d 829 (1940)
(landlord-tenant relationship and inherently dangerous activity); Corrigan
v. Elsinger, 81 Minn. 42, 83 N.W. 492 (1900) (business invitee); Davis v.
Summerfield, 133 N.C. 325, 45 S.E. 654 (1903) (adjacent property owners
and inherently dangerous activity).
"0McGuire v. Hartford Buick Co., 131 Conn. 417, 40 A.2d 269 (1944)
(seller of used automobile failed to inspect tires negligently repaired by
contractor); Rumetsch v. John Wanamaker, New York, Inc., 216 N.Y.
379, 110 N.E. 760 (1915) (corporate owner of department store failed to
have elevator properly inspected). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), ToRTs § 412

(1965).

7 fSheridan v. Rosenthal, 206 App. Div. 279, 201 N.Y. Supp. 168 (1923)
(supervision of construction required). See Person v. Cauldwell-Wingate
Co., 176 F.2d 237, 240 (2d Cir. 1949), "In such [inherently dangerous]
cases the law imposes the duty of inspection upon the owner or contractor
in invitum, and forbids him to delegate it.. .. "
" E.g., Brown v. Gustafson, 264 Minn. 126, 117 N.W.2d 763 (1962);
Lamb v. South Unit Jehovah's Witnesses, 232 Minn. 259, 45 N.W.2d
403 (1950); Hunter v. Southern Ry., 152 N.C. 682, 68 S.E. 237 (1910);
Schwarts v. Merola Bros. Constr. Corp., 290 N.Y. 145, 48 N.E.2d 299
(1943), affirming 263 App. Div. 631, 34 N.Y.S.2d 220, motion denied,
289 0N.Y. 756, 46 N.E.2d 357.
" E.g., Turgeon v. Connecticut Co., 84 Conn. 538, 80 AtI. 714 (1911),
It was the duty of the defendent to use reasonable care to keep every
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The first genuine exceptions to the general rule of employer
nonliability fall within this category of nondelegable duty.2'0 These
cases proceed on the theory that the employer is vicariously liable2
for the independent contractor's acts of negligence that are not so
remote from the contemplated risks as to be collateral.' Thus
there is a nondelegable common-law duty to afford one's neighbor
lateral support, for landlords to maintain common approaches in
reasonably safe condition,' for adjacent owners to refrain from
obstructing the public way,25 and to maintain one's premises in a
reasonably safe condition for business invitees.2 8 In effect, the negpart of the grounds to which it had invited the plaintiff in a reasonably
safe condition, and to accomplish this end it was its duty to use reasonable care to see that the railway was so built, maintained, and operated
as not to risk doing injury to any of its patrons while in the park.
Id. at 542, 80 Atl. at 715; Stickel v. Riverview Sharpshooters' Park Co.,
250 Ill. 452, 95 N.E. 445 (1911); Thornton v. Main State Agricultural
Soc'y, 97 Me. 108, 53 Atl. 979 (1902) ; Williams v. Charles Stores, Co., 209
N.C. 591, 184 S.E. 496 (1936); Smith v. Cumberland County Agricultural
Soc'y, 163 N.C. 346, 79 S.E. 632 (1913) (dictum); E.S. Billington Lumber
Co. v. Newport, 180 Okla. 407 (1937); Engstrom v. Huntley, 345 Pa..10,
26 A.2d 461 (1942); Lineaweaver v. John Wanamaker of Philadelphia, 299
Pa. 2045,
149 Atl. 91 (1930).
HAPmR, TORTS § 292, at 647 (1933).

See Brown, Liability for the Torts of Independent Contractors in
West Virginia,55 W. VA. L. REv. 216 (1953); Comment, 44 CALIF. L. Rnv.
762 (1956); Comment, 39 YALE L.J. 861 (1930). See also Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L.J. 584, 720 (1929);
Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor,29 ILl. L. Rnv. 339 (193).
"See 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 26.11, at 1410 (1956); PROSSER,
TORTS

§ 70, at 487 (3d ed. 1964);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND),

TORTS

§ 426

(1965); Smith, Collateral Negligence, 25 MINN. L. REv. 399 (1941).
"E.g., Law v. Phillips, 136 W.Va. 761, 68 S.E.2d 452 (1952), 133
A.L.R.2d 95. In Davis v. Summerfield, 133 N.C. 325, 45 S.E. 654 (1903),
the defendant-employer did the actual excavation that damaged plaintiff's
building, but for the purpose of deciding whether an employer would be
liable for the negligence of his independent contractor, the court assumed
that the contractor performed the work. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TORTS § 422A (1965).
"Brown v. George Pepperdine Foundation, 23 Cal. 2d 256, 143 P.2d
929 (1943) (negligence of contractor imputed to the landlord); Russo v.
Watson, 249 App. Div. 782, 292 N.Y. Supp. 249 (1936). See Annot., 162
A.L.R. 1111 (1946); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 421 (1965).
" E.g., Goodwin v. Mason & Seabury, 173 Iowa 546, 155 N.W. 966
(1916); Cole v. City of Durham, 176 N.C. 289, 97 S.E. 33 (1918);
Dunlap v. Raleigh, C. & S. R.R., 167 N.C. 669, 83 S.E. 703 (1914) ; McClure
v. Neuman, 17 Ohio Op. 2d 483, 178 N.E.2d 621 (1961). See Carrick v.
Southern Power Co., 157 N.C. 378, 72 S.E. 1065 (1911); Baily v. City of
Winston, 157 N.C. 252, 72 S.E. 966 (1911).
"Daly v. Bergstedt, 267 Minn. 244, 126 N.W.2d 242 (1964) ; Corrigan
v. Elsinger, 81 Minn. 42, 83 N.W. 492 (1900); Mayer v. Fairlawn Jewish
Center, 38 N.J. 549, 186 A.2d 274 (1962) (concurrent negligence of the
employer and the independent contractor),
Under the circumstances of this case [invitee], Center [the employer]
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ligence of the independent contractor provides the plaintiff with a

theory of recovery additional to or alternative with that of the
personal fault of the employer.
Cases where the activity is inherently dangerous comprise the
third category.2" To bring a case within this category, it is sufficient if there is an appreciable and foreseeable danger in relation
to the particular circumstances.29 Cases in which the employer
would be absolutely liable, without fault, are included within this
s
category. o

Since courts often state the personal fault and the inherently
dangerous cases in terms of nondelegable duty,"' the question arises
whether the grouping into categories is not more verbal than real.
The term "nondelegable duty" essentially expresses the underlying
concept of all the so-called exceptions to the general rule of em2
ployer immunity for the negligence of his independent contractor.
had a non-delegable duty for the safety of persons using the premises
at its invitation. If while repairs or structural alterations were going on,
a dangerous condition was created which resulted in injury to an invitee,
liability for damages would exist. And with respect to that liability
it would be immaterial whether the construction work was being performed by Center's own employees or by an independent contractor.
Id. at 555, 186 A.2d at 277; Eide v. Skerbeck, 242 Wis. 474, 8 N.W.2d 282
(1943) (tent peg too far out in midway of fair),
Wherever an owner or operator of a place of amusement leaves to an
independent contractor the performance of a duty which under the law
he is obligated to perform himself, he is liable for the negligent-act of a
servant of the independent contractor to the same extent as if the negligent act had been done by a servant directly in his employ.
Id. at 481-82, 8 N.W.2d at 285. Justice Ruffin in a dissent to the early
case of Wiswall v. Brinson, 32 N.C. 554, 564-79 (1849), stated the rules
with respect to the liability of an owner or occupier of land for dangerous
conditions on their premises, whether the work was done by a servant,
himself, or an independent contractor.
27 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS, Introductory note, § 409 (1965).
28 See 2 HARPER
& JAMES, TORTS § 26.11, at 1408 (1956); MECHEM,
AGENCY, §§ 487-90 (4th ed. 1952); PROSSER, TORTS § 70, at 484 (3d ed.
1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §§ 416, 427 (1965).
s' Evans v. Elliott, 220 N.C. 253, 17 S.E.2d 125 (1941).
"The case of Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), the building
stone for absolute liability for abnormally dangerous instrumentalities and
activities, was itself a case involving an independent contractor. See Allied
Hotels, Ltd. v. Barden, 389 P.2d 968 (Okla. 1964) (diversion of surface
water); Guilford Realty & Insurance Co. v. Blythe Bros. Co., 260 N.C. 69,
131 S.E.2d 900 (1963) (blasting). See generally PROSSER, TORTS §§ 74-79
(3d ed. 1964).
"See Annot., 23 A.L.R. 1084 (1923); Annot., 23 A.L.R. 1016 (1923);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TORTS §§ 416, 427 (1965); 2 HARPER & JAMES,
TORTS § 26.11, at 1408 (1956).
'Apparently, this is the rationalization used by the North Carolina
court. See Evans v. Elliott, 220 N.C. 253, 17 S.E.2d 125 (1941); Thomas
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Included within this term would be all the categories enumerated
above, including those previously termed inherently dangerous and
personal fault. The essential idea is that these are situations in
3
which an employer may not contract away his liability."
4 would support both direct and vicarious
The facts in Dockery"
liability. The employer breached his nondelegable duty to inspect
and supervise operation of the ride. Negligence of the independent
contractor in operating the inherently dangerous ride could have
been imputed to the defendant. Nevertheless, the court chose to
express the employer's liability in terms of a breach of his own
duty.
A question is thus raised whether the court recognizes the independent contractor's negligence as a basis of employer liability in
addition to that predicated on the personal fault of the employer.
In addition to Dockery, another important North Carolina case
deals with this question.3 5
In Evans v. Elliott,3 6 the court stated that the employer's liability

was direct, original, and independent, not derivative.3 It further
stated that "the contractor may, of course, be liable for the same
want of due care in not taking the necessary precautions, for the
omission of which the employer becomes liable."' In Dockery, 0
the court stated that the
liability of such owner or general concessionaire is based either
upon his nondelegable duty to maintain a reasonably safe place
for the patrons, in accord with which he must answer for the
negligence of the sub-concessionaire... in rendering the premises
and devices unsafe, or merely upon the general ground that
such owner or general concessionaire is responsible for his
breach of duty to keep the premises, including the devices,
to any separate act or omisreasonably safe, without reference
sion of the sub-concessionaire.4 0
v. Hammer Lumber Co., 153 N.C. 351, 69 S.E. 275 (1910); Davis v.
Summerfield, 133 N.C. 325, 45 S.E. 654 (1903).
" Prosser states that, "these exceptions making the employer liable
overlap and shade into one another; and cases are comparatively rare in
which at least two of them do not appear." PROSSER, TORTS § 70, at 481
(1965).
8'264 N.C. 406, 142 S.E.2d 29 (1965).
" Evans v. Elliott, 220 N.C. 253, 17 S.E.2d 125 (1941).

3"Ibid.

'Id. at 259, 261, 17 S.E.2d at 129, 130.
"'ld. at 259, 17 S.E.2d at 129. (Emphasis added.)
8264 N.C. 406, 142 S.E.2d 29 (1965).
added.)

,oId. at 411, 142 S.E.2d at 33. (Emphasis
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It is therefore clear that an employer in North Carolina may be
vicariously liable for the negligence of his independent contractor.
As a practical matter, this means that the plaintiff in an action
against the employer has at least two, possibly three, theories of
recovery. He may formulate the issue with respect to the personal
fault of the employer and have the jury instructed accordingly. 4
In addition, the plaintiff may plead, offer proof, and have the jury
instructed on the negligence of the independent contractor that may
be imputed to the employer.4 When the activity contracted for is
"In Dockery, the following portion of the judge's instructions with
respect to the negligence of the defendant certainly opens to question whether
the jury was actually instructed on his personal fault: "[A]nd such failure
by... [the independent contractor] would be attributed as a matter of law
to ... the defendant, and that such failure of World of Mirth to inspect and
supervise was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries .... " Id. at 411, 142
S.E.2d at 33. The first portion of the instruction, beginning with the word
"and" and ending at the word "defendant," has no antecedent in the instr'iction. For further comment on this part of the instruction see note 42
infra. The latter portion of the instruction fails to submit the personal
negligence of the defendant to the jury, but is tantamount to a directive by
the judge to find the defendant liable. It is submitted that it was not the
intention of the court to impose absolute liability on the operators of
amusement rides.
An interesting point is raised in RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TORTS § 416,
Illustration 3f (1965). Essentially the rule is that when the work is dangerous in the absence of special precautions (or inherently dangerous) and
the independent contractor exercises reasonable care but the harm happens
anyway, that the employer will not be liable merely because the precautions
taken by the contractor proved to be ineffectual. "In order that the employer
be subject to liability, it is necessary that the contractor fail to exercise
reasonable care to take adequate precautions."
It is submitted that, logically, this rule should apply to all cases where
the employer is under a nondelegable duty and the independent contractor
exercises reasonable care with harm resulting, this being true whether or
not the employer actually supervised or inspected the operations of the
independent contractor. However, the employer may be subject to liability
within those exceptions set out in notes 14, 15, 16, and 17 supra, dealing
with personal fault of the employer.
" In Dockery, the independent contractor's negligence was the first
issue submitted to the jury. Logically, this is the missing antecedent referred to in note 41 supra. If this is a correct interpretation, then it is reasonable to say that the employer was held liable for the negligence of his independent contractor, not his own personal fault. Admittedly the same
result is reached, but this illustrates the problems that exist in formulating the
proper issues and having the jury instructed accordingly.
This problem is further pointed out in Evans. It was ruled that the relationship of employer-independent contractor existed as a matter of law;
however the issue of the independent contractor's negligence was not submitted to the jury. After holding that it was error to instruct that the
employer had the burden to show that the work did not fall into the exceptions where the employer would not be liable, the court stated,
[W]e think it was error to instruct the jury on the relation of master
and servant, and the negligence which might be imputed to the de-
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so dangerous in relation to the particular circumstances as to be
ultrahazardous in nature, the plaintiff may also seek to hold the
defendant-employer absolutely liable regardless of fault.3
It can be safely concluded that in North Carolina a plaintiff will
recover from the employer of an independent contractor who is
under any of the nondelegable duties enumerated in the preceding
discussion. However, the determination of this question does not
necessarily determine .the issue of who-the employer or the independent contractor-will ultimately bear the financial burden of
the plaintiff's judgment.
C. RALPH KINSEY, JR.
Torts-Successive Automobile Collisions-Joint and
Several Liability
That joint tort-feasors are jointly and severally liable for the
injuries caused by their negligence and can be joined in the same
action by the injured party is a basic principle of law accepted by
most jurisdictions.2 Generally, joint tort-feasors are persons who
fendant on that theory, and upon the principle of agency or respondeat
superior, a relation which as the evidence now stands did not exist.
Id. at 261, 17 S.E.2d at 130. The writer is not certain of the ramifications of
this language and recognizes that any attempted explanation is conjectural.
However, one possible explanation may be that the plaintiff failed to formulate the issue with respect to the negligence of the independent contractor.
This is based on the following language used by the court: "The contractor
may, of course, be liable for the same want of due care in not taking the
necessary precautions, for the omission of which the employer becomes
liable...." Id. at 259, 17 S.E.2d at 129.

"'There should be no problem. in joining this cause of action with that
for negligence under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-123 (1953). The plaintiff may
be presented with the problem of election of remedies. However, these alternative theories do not appear to be inconsistent, and it is submitted that
the plaintiff should be allowed to have them submitted to the jury as alternative, provided, of course, the evidence in the case warrants it. See
Brandis, Civil Procedure (Pleadings and Parties), 43 N.C.L. REv. 871, 877
(1965); Brandis, Recent Developments in the Field of Permissive Joinder
of Parties and Causes in North Carolina, 34 N.C.L. REv. 405 (1956);
Brandis, Permissive Joinder of Parties and Causes in North Carolina, 25
N.C.L. REv. 1 (1946); Civil Procedure, Eleventh Annual Survey of N.C.
Case Law, 42 N.C.L. REv. 600, 612 (1964); Civil Procedure,Ninth,Annual
Survey of N.C. Case Law, 40 N.C.L. REV. 482, 491 (1962); Note, 13 N.C.L.
Ray. 226 (1935). In federal practice the plaintiff would be able to join
both claims for relief and would not be put to an election of remedies.
FED. R. Cxv. P. 8(e) (2).
'See, e.g., Harward v. General Motors Corp., 89 F.Supp. 170 (E.D.N.C.
1950); White v. Carolina Realty Co., 182 N.C. 536, 109 S.E. 564 (1921).
'See,

e.g., Phoenix Ins. Co. v. The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302 (1876); Van
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act either intentionally, or negligently, in concert in committing a
wrong which results in injury to person or damage to property.3
Under this rule, when concert of action or purpose exists, 4 or the
breach of a common duty occurs,5 each tort-feasor is liable for all
injuries caused, on the theory that the act of one is the act of each.6
Neither the fact that the negligence of one may contribute more or
less to the injury than that of others, 7 nor the fact that one may be
8
more culpably negligent than the others makes any difference.
Furthermore, it does not matter whether there is one single injury
to the plaintiff," or whether each wrongdoer's action results in
separate injuries."0 A majority of courts have held that tort-feasors
who commit separate and independent acts of negligence with no
concert of action or purpose are not jointly and severally liable,'
but that each is liable only for the injuries proximately caused by
Troop v. Dew, 150 Ark. 560, 234 S.W. 992 (1921); Drake v. Keeling, 230
Iowa 1038, 299 N.W. 919 (1941); Tricoli v. Centalanza, 100 N.J.L. 231,
126 At. 214 (1924); Bell v. Lacey, 248 N.C. 703, 104 S.E.2d 833 (1958).
It should be pointed out that there is a great difference between the joinder
which holds the defendants to joint and several liability and that which is
merely procedural, allowing two separate causes of action to be tried at
the same time, for convenience. In this note, except where otherwise indictated, "joinder" will mean joint and several liability. See generally
PROSSR, ToRTs § 44 (3d ed. 1964).

Bost v. Metcalfe, 219 N.C. 607, 14 S.E.2d 648 (1941). See 1 HARPER &
TORTS § 10.1, at 692 (1956).
' Concert of action and concert of purpose usually arise in conjunction
with each other. E.g., Brown v. Thayer, 212 Mass. 392, 99 N.E. 237 (1912)
(defendants engaged in racing their automobiles passed one on each side
of a wagon); Boykin v. Bennett, 253 N.C. 725, 118 S.E.2d 12 (1961),
holding that in an automobile race, all participating parties may be held
liable even though the accident happened when the driver lost control
without coming in contact with any other vehicle.
E.g., Leishman v. Brady, 39 Del. (9 Harr.) 559, 3 A.2d 118 (1938);
Johnson v. Chapman, 34 W. Va. 639, 28 S.E. 744 (1897) (defendants who
had a duty to maintain a party wall held liable when it collapsed, destroying
plaintiff's warehouse).
'Sir
Case, 11 Co. Rep.
77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (1613).
,E.g., John
Hall Heydon's
v. Carroll, 253 N.C. 220, 1165, S.E.2d
459 (1960); Hale v.
City of Knoxville, 189 Tenn. 491, 226 S.W.2d 265 (1949).
E.g., Bechtler v. Bracken, 218 N.C. 515, 11 S.E.2d 721 (1940); West
v. Collins Baking Co., 208 N.C. 526, 181 S.E. 551 (1935); Myers v.
Southern Pub. Utils. Co., 208 N.C. 293, 180 S.E. 694 (1935).
'E.g., Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948); Brown v.
Thayer, 212 Mass. 392, 99 N.E. 237 (1912); Boykin v. Bennett, 253 N.C.
725, 118 S.E.2d 12 (1961).
10 See, e.g., Miller v. Singer, 131 Colo. 112, 279 P.2d 846 (1955) ; Rouse
v. Jones, 254 N.C. 575, 119 S.E.2d 628 (1961); Charnock v. Taylor, 223
N.C. 360, 26 S.E.2d 911 (1943).
" See, e.g., Stephens v. Schadler, 182 Ky. 833, 207 S.W. 704 (1919);
Bost v. Metcalf, 219 N.C. 607, 14 S.E.2d 648 (1941). See PROSSER, TORTS
§ 44 n.47 (3d ed. 1964).
JAMES,
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his negligence."2 Recently, however, the trend has been toward a
general relaxation of the requirement of concert of action or purpose, and many jurisdictions, under certain circumstances, now
impose joint and several liability even though the tort-feasors did
not act in concert.3
The imposition of joint and several liability where separate
and independent acts of negligence cause automobile collisions will
be examined in this note. The most common situation arises where
the separate acts of two wrongdoers concur as to time and place
and unite to set into operation a single force which produces a
single impact, resulting in injury to the plaintiff. For example, the
automobiles of two defendants collide, and the plaintiff, a passenger
in one, is injured ;14 or two vehicles collide, and one goes out of
control, hitting a pedestrian.' Although in each case the collision
and injury resulted from independent acts of negligence, the courts
now hold that joint and several liability may be imposed.", The
negligent acts concurred at the same point in time and space to
produce a single impact and injury to the plaintiff, and each was thus
the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.'7
(1951);
12 See, e.g., Glenn v. Chenowth, 71 Ariz. 271, 226 P.2d 165
Symmes v. Prairie Pebble Phosphate Co., 66 Fla. 27, 63 So. 1 (1913);
Garret v. Garret, 228 N.C. 530, 46 S.E.2d 302 (1948); Rice v. McAdams,
149 N.C. 29, 62 S.E. 774 (1908).
1" See Leasure, Joinder of Joint and Concurrent Tortfeasors, 23 OHIO
ST. L.J. 521 (1962); North Carolina Case Law--Torts, 41 N.C.L. Rv.
401, 514 (1963); 31 N.C.L. REv. 237 (1953); PROSSER, TORTS § 44 (3d ed.
1964).
'E.g., Tart v. Register, 257 N.C. 161, 125 S.E.2d 754 (1962); Rouse
254 N.C. 575, 119 S.E.2d 628 (1961).
v. Jones,
"5 E.g., Myers v. Southern Pub. Utils. Co., 208 N.C. 293, 180 S.E. 694
(1935).
The
18 See, e.g., Chesser v. Williams, 268 Ala. 57, 104 So. 2d 918 (1958).
North Carolina decisions are in accord. Tart v. Register, 257 N.C. 161, 125
S.E.2d 754 (1962); Rouse v. Jones, 254 N.C. 575, 119 S.E.2d 628 (1961).
For other cases, see Annot., 62 A.L.R. 1425 (1929); Annot., 62 A.L.R.
1181 (1929); Annot., 16 A.L.R. 465 (1922).
" This is on the theory that there can be two or more actual and proximate causes of an injury, for absent the, negligence of either party, the
accident would not have happened. See, e.g., Salter v. Lovick, 257 N.C.
619, 127 S.E.2d 273 (1962); Darroch v. Johnson, 250 N.C. 307, 108 S.E.2d
589 (1959); White v. Carolina Realty Co., 182 N.C. 536, 109 S.E. 564
(1921). In Darroch v. Johnson, supra, the court said:
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. These may
originate from separate and distinct sources or agencies operating independently of each other, yet if they join and concur in producing the

result complained of, the author of each cause would be liable for the
damages inflicted, and action may be. brought against any one or all.
Darroch v. Johnson, supra at 313, 108 S.E.2d at 593.
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A more difficult situation is illustrated by successive collisions
where independent negligent acts cause multiple impacts upon
plaintiff, either of which may, or may not, cause injury. Three basic
situations arise in relation to such collisions, two of which do not
present a great problem for the courts.
The first arises where there are successive collisions, and the
plaintiff is injured in the second collision only. An illustration of
this situation is where A negligently hits B, the plaintiff, without
injuring him, and pushes him into the path of C, who negligently
hits and injures B.18 C would obviously be liable for all B's injuries
since his negligence directly caused those injuries. A can also be held
liable for all the injuries if it is found that his negligence was an
actual and proximate cause of the second collision, so that joint and
several liability exists."0
The second situation arises where there are separate collisions,
each of which has produced injuries that are both theoretically and
practically divisible.2 ° Such a case would exist where A runs over
B, the plaintiff, breaking his right arm; and an instant later, C also
runs over B, breaking his left arm.2 Assuming the first defendant's
negligence contributed in no causal way to the second accident, there
is no problem of joint and several liability.22 The plaintiff is able
to show the injury caused by each defendant, and each is liable only
for that caused by his own negligence.2
In the third situation, the main concern of this note, definite
"8See, e.g., Penton v. Fisher, 155 So. 35 (La. App. 1934) ; Batts v.
Faggart, 260 N.C. 641, 133 S.E.2d 504 (1963), where plaintiff's car was
struck from the rear by the vehicle negligently operated by the first defendant, and left standing crossways in the highway, subsequently being hit
by second defendant's car; Derleder v. Piper, 239 Wis. 269, 1 N.W.2d 146
(1941), where defendant's negligently operated car in which plaintiff was
riding collided with the car ahead, leaving defendant's car disabled on the
highway, where it was then struck by a following car. For other cases,
see Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 270 (1958).
1"

See generally, Byrd & Dobbs, Torts, North Carolina Case Law, 43

N.C.L. REv. 906, 926-31 (1965).
"0See, e.g., Smith v. Alabama Water Serv. Co., 225 Ala. 510, 143 So.
893 (1932); Resolute Ins. Co. v. Cunningham, 132 So. 2d 244 (La. App.
1961) (damage done by the first collision could be identified and distinguished, first negligent driver not held liable for damage caused by the
second
collision); Young v. Dille, 127 Wash. 398, 220 Pac. 782 (1923).
21 See cases cited note 20 supra.
'

See note 19 supra.

See Leishman v. Brady, 39 Del. 559, 3 A.2d 118 (1938); Cf., Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 49 F. Supp. 625 (E.D.N.C. 1943); 25
C.J.S. Damages § 25 n.67 (1941).
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problems arise. Here, successive or independent collisions arise
out of separate and independent acts of negligence, each producing
injuries which are theoretically, but not practically, attributable to
the negligent act of each wrongdoer.2" A good illustration of the
problem has arisen in the recent Wisconsin case of Caygill v. Ipsen 5
In August, 1961, the plaintiff, a guest passenger in an automobile,
was injured when the automobile was struck from the rear by a
vehicle driven by defendant Ipsen. In January of the same yearsome five months later-while the plaintiff was operating her own
automobile in a different county of the same state, it was struck
from the rear by a vehicle operated by defendant Thompson.
The plaintiff, in her action for personal injuries, attempted to
join both defendants in one action on the theory that each of the
collisions had caused injury to her cervical spine of such a nature
as to make allocation of the damage done by the negligent act of
each defendant impossible and that they should therefore be held
jointly and severally liable for her total injury. The court rejected
this contention, holding that the two collisions gave rise to separate
causes of action and that joint and several liability could not be
properly imposed. Thus, plaintiff's only remedy was a separate
action against each tort-feasor. Her problem is readily seen: Each
of the separate actions may, in turn, be defeated if she cannot
somehow produce evidence of the injury done by each collision.2
Plaintiff is caught up in a "vicious circle."
Successive collisions presenting this problem arise in a variety of
situations. The first defendant's automobile may strike the plaintiff, knocking him into the path of an oncoming second defendant
who also collides with plaintiff. 7 The first collision may leave
plaintiff stranded in his own lane to be struck by a second defendant's automobile following plaintiff.18 The plaintiff, after the first
collision, may recover control of his car and continue on his way,
2"E.g., Barber v. Wooten, 234 N.C.
107, 66 S.E.2d 690 (1951) ; Neubert
v. Sichel, 333 Pa. 90, 3 A.2d 778 (1939).
2
Wis. -, 135 N.W.2d 284 (1965).
Weisenmiller
v. Nestor, 153 Neb. 153, 43 N.W.2d 568 (1950).
2,See, e.g., Rundle v.
Grubb Motor Lines, Inc., 300 F.2d 333 (4th Cir.
1962); Horvath v. Tontini, 126 Conn. 462, 11 A.2d 846 (1940); Leinbach
v. Pickwick Greyhound Lines, 135 Kan. 40, 10 P.Zd 33 (1932).
" See, e.g., Borst v. Langsdale, 8 Ill. App. 2d 88, 130 N.E.2d 520 (1955);
Barney v. Adcock, 162 Neb. 179, 75 N.W.2d 683 (1956); Copple v. Warner,
260 N.C. 727, 133 S.E.2d 641 (1963); Gatlin v. Parsons, 257 N.C. 469,
126 S.E.2d 51 (1962).
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only to be struck then by the second defendant.- In any case, it
often happens that the plaintiff is unable to allocate the injuries to
the individual acts of negligence. Generally, as in Caygill, courts
have refused to impose joint and several liability.30 Plaintiff may,
however, recover the whole amount of his injuries from the first
defendant. 31 If the requisite causal relationship is not present,
plaintiff is faced with proving the separate injuries inflicted by each,
or being defeated in a suit against either defendant.32 Thus, without the imposition of joint and several liability, plaintiff faces the
real possibility of getting no recovery for his injuries.
Most jurisdictions which refuse to allow the plaintiff to hold
the wrongdoers jointly and severally liable reason that a tort-feasor
should be liable only for that injury actually and proximately
caused by his negligence and that the burden of proving the injury
caused by a defendant's negligence should remain with the plaintiff.3 The difficulty or impossibility of allocating the injuries
makes no difference.3 4 These courts view the situation from the
standpoint of the negligent acts themselves, holding that each col':E.g., Batts v. Faggart, 260 N.C. 641, 133 S.E.2d 504 (1963).
' See, e.g., Leishman v. Brady, 39 Del. 559, 3 A.2d 118 (1938); Close
v. Matson, 102 Ga. App. 663, 117 S.E.2d 251 (1960).
"' See note 19 supra. He may also recover from the second defendant for
any increased injuries done by the second collision. But, again, this requires
him to separate the injuries done by each collision. See generally, Graver v.
Rundle, 255 N.C. 744, 122 S.E.2d 720 (1961); Riddle v. Artis, 243 N.C.
688, 91 S.E.2d 894 (1956); Waller v. Skeleton, 31 Tenn. App. 103, 212
S.W.2d 690 (1948).
Cf., Farley v. Crystal Coal & Coke Co., 85 W. Va. 595, 102 S.E. 265
(1920), holding that if plaintiff cannot separate the damages, he does not
sustain his burden of proof and cannot recover against either tort-feasor.
"' These courts refuse to put upon the negligent party the possible burden
of having to pay more than his share of the injury done. See, e.g., Weisenmiller v. Nestor, 153 Neb. 153, 43 N.W.2d 568 (1950); La Bella v. Brown,
103 N.J.L. 491, 133 Atl. 82 (1926); Young v. Dille, 127 Wash. 398, 220
Pac. 782 (1923). The court in Leishman v. Brady, 39 Del. 559, 3 A.2d
118 (1938) said:
When ... a person seeks to recover from several tortfeasors compensa-

tion for separate injuries, resulting from distinct and disconnected
wrongful acts, some of which are committed by one wrongdoer, and
others by entirely different persons, a single action will not lie against
all of such wrongdoers ....

If the results as well as the acts are separable,

in theory at least, so that it can be said that the act of each would have
resulted in some injury, however difficult it may be as a practical matter
to establish the exact proportions of injury caused thereby, each can be
held liable only for so much of the injury as was caused by his act.
Leishman v. Brady, supra at 566, 3 A.2d at 120-21.
"E.g., Caygill v. Ipsen, - Wis. -, 135 N.W.2d 284 (1965). See also
note 32 supra.
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lision-and the specific injury resulting therefrom-constitutes a
separate cause of action.35 As one court said: "It is the wrongful
act, and not the injury, that creates liability.""0 Many authorities
have criticized this approach37 on the ground that the significant
factor should be the injuries to the innocent party and his plight in
being unable to allocate these injuries. They contend that the
whole injury done is the cause of action.3" As Dean Wigmore has
pointed out, there is a manifest unfairness in:
Putting on the injured party the impossible burden of proving
the specific shares of harm done by each .... Such results are
simply the law's callous dullness to innocent sufferers. One would
think that the obvious meanness of letting wrongdoers go scot
free in such cases would cause the courts to think twice and to
suspect some fallacy in their rule of law. ... The rule should be:
Wherever two or more persons by culpable acts, whether concerted or not, cause a single general harm, not obviously assignable in parts to the respective wrongdoers, the injured party may
recover from each for the whole. In short, wherever there is
any doubt at all as to how much each caused, take the burden of
proof off the innocent sufferer; make any one of them pay him
for the whole, and then let them do their own figuring among
themselves as to what is the share of blame for each.89
As successive collisions have become more common, some jurisdictions-perhaps in response to reasoning such as that of Dean
Wigmore-have allowed independent tort-feasors causing such
collisions to be held jointly and severally liable." In the leading case
of Maddu% v. Donaldson,41 plaintiff's car was struck from the
front by the first defendant and thirty seconds later was struck
from the rear by the second defendant's vehicle. It was impossible
s See note 34 supra.
Caygill v. Ipsen, - Wis. - - 135 N.W.2d 284, 286 (1965).
37
Jackson, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEXAS L. REv. 399
(1939); Wigmore, Joint-Tortfeasors and Severance of Damages, 17 ILL.
L. Rzv. 458 (1923); 27 CoLuM. L. REV. 754 (1927); 19 CALIF. L. REv.
630 (1931); 31 N.C.L. REv. 237 (1953).
,' See authorities cited note 37 supra.
*' Wigmore, Joint-Tortfeasors and Severance of Damnages, 17 ILL. L.
REv. 458, 459 (1923).
"'E.g.,Ruud v. Grimm, 252 Iowa 1266, 110 N.W.2d 321 (1961) ; Maddux
v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d 33 (1961); Barber v. Wooten,
234 N.C. 107, 66 S.E.2d 690 (1951); Hodgin v. North Carolina Pub. Serv.
Corp., 179 N.C. 449, 102 S.E. 748 (1920). See also North Carolina Case
Law-Torts, 41 N.C.L. REv. 401, 514 (1963); 31 N.C.L. REv. 237 (1953).
of cases, see Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 16 (1965).
For a362
collection
Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d 33 (1961).
41
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to allocate plaintiff's injuries to either collision. In overturning
Michigan precedent4 2 and allowing joint and several liability, the
court said:
The challenging situation . . . [is] before us, involving two sub-

stantial impacts with multiple injuries, in respect of which a jury
would be well justified in concluding that the plaintiff's various
injuries may not be identified as to origin. As a matter of fact,
it may be utterly unrealistic to insist that the plaintiff is suffering from merely a series of wounds, separable either legally or
medically. Actually the plaintiff may suffer from a composite
injury, the ingredients of which are impossible to identify in
origin and impracticable to isolate in treatment.43
Continuing, the court questioned the policy of requiring separate
actions in such cases: "Is it better, that a plaintiff, injured through
no fault of his own, take nothing, rather than that a tort-feasor
pay no more than his theoretical share of the damages accruing out
of a confused situation which his wrong has helped to create?""4
By the same reasoning, some courts have imposed joint and several
liability for independent and unrelated torts in other areas. 5
The questions facing the parties involved in such a situation are:
How far do the courts now go in imposing joint and several liability,
and, is there any way to determine this as to future cases? The
Wisconsin court, in Caygill, pointed out that in most situations
where joint and several liability has been allowed, there has been
a substantial relation between the collisions in time and place- that the collisions have occurred in such close proximity as to be
considered "one event or occurrence in the eyes of the lay onlooker.")47 Indeed, the Wisconsin court itself declined to rule out joint
"E.g., Meier v. Holt, 347 Mich. 430, 80 N.W.2d 207 (1960), where the

court held that second tort-feasor who inflicts injuries on plaintiff who has

been previously injured by first tort-feasor, is liable only for the amount
of increased injuries.

"Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 431, 108 N.W.2d 33, 36 (1961)
"Id. at 435, 108 N.W.2d at 38.
"This can be seen in the cases involving pollution, diversion, obstruction,
or flooding of a stream by various independent persons. See McDaniel v.
Cherryvale, 91 Kan. 40, 136 Pac. 899 (1913); Lineberger v. City of Gastonia, 196 N.C. 445, 146 S.E. 79 (1929); Landers v. East Texas Salt Water
Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952). But see, Farley v.
Crystal Coal & Coke Co., 85 W. Va. 595, 102 S.E. 265 (1920); Mitchell
Realty Co. v. City of West Allis, 184 Wis. 352, 199 N.W. 390 (1924).
See also 31 N.C.L. Rnv. 237 (1953).
"Caygill v. Ipsen, - Wis. -, -, 135 N.W.2d 284, 289 (1965).
' Id. at -, 135 N.W.2d at 289.
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and several liability where the collisions occur in close relation as to
time and place,4" but did point out that it has consistently refused
to allow any type of joinder where the torts are completely separate
and unrelated, "though their results do concur to cause an individual injury to the plaintiff. ' 49 It views the Caygill situation, where
there is obviously no time relation between the collisions, as being
composed of separate causes of action.
Many of the courts which impose joint and several liability upon
tort-feasors have specifically stated that they require a close relation in time and space between the collisions.5 Those which have
not so stated have apparently considered the time and place relation
an important factor, for there seems to be no decision imposing
joint and several liability where it could not be said there was a
reasonable time relationship between the accidents."' Thus, the
relation of the collisions in time and place might offer some indication of whether, in a given situation, a court will allow joinder.
The Michigan court, in Maddux, however, seems to have gone
beyond most of the jurisdictions which recognize exceptions to the
old rule of joint and several liability for only joint tort-feasors.
It places its emphasis entirely upon the injury to the plaintiff and
purports to disregard completely the relation of time and place.
"The fact that one wrong takes place a few seconds after the other
is without legal significance. What is significant is that the injury
is indivisible .... The reason for the rule as to joint liability was the
52
indivisibility of the injuries, not the time of the various blows.
It must be remembered, however, that the court in Mladdux was
specifically considering chain-reaction type collisions, in which
the accidents occurred only "a few seconds" 5 3 apart. The language
48

Ibid.

19 Ibid.
80
E.g.,

Ruud v. Grimm, 252 Iowa 1266, 110 N.W.2d 321 (1961).
Ruud v. Grimm, 252 Iowa 1266, 110 N.W.2d 321 (1961) (from
one to three seconds); Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d
33 (1961) (thirty seconds); Barber v. Wooten, 234 N.C. 107, 66 S.E.2d
690 (1951) (simply saying one collision occurred immediately after the
other); Hodgin v. North Carolina Pub. Serv. Corp., 179 N.C. 449, 102
S.E. 748 (1920); Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 16 (1965). Some courts have
denied joint and several liability where the time lapse was appreciable.
Hughes v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 236 F.2d 71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied
352 U.S. 989 (1956) (more than three full minutes between collisions);
Montgomery v. Polk Milk Co., 118 Ind. App. 433, 79 N.E.2d 108 (1948)
(an interval of from five to seven minutes between collisions).
52 Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 434, 108 N.W.2d 33, 38 (1961).
58
Ibid.
51E.g.,

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

258

[Vol.44

here, then, may not be sufficient basis for saying the Michigan
court will disregard the time factor.
In the recent case of Watts v. Smith54 however, the Michigan
court has more directly centered upon the time element and has
raised some doubt whether it will require any time and place relationship between collisions. In this case, plaintiff was riding in
an automobile which was struck from the rear twice in the same
day-once while enroute to work, and again while returning home,
some eight hours later. Plaintiff felt pain in his neck after the first
collision, but remained on the job throughout the day. After the
second collision, he had more pain in his neck and back, yet he went
to work the next day. Two days later, it became evident that he
was substantially injured. The lower court refused joinder, but
the Michigan Supreme Court reversed, allowing plaintiff to bring
action against both defendants in the same suit. The court indicated that this was not joint and several liability, but merely procedural joinder.55 Plaintiff still had two separate causes of action
and would be required to show, in the single trial, the separate
injuries done by each negligent party.58
The court then indicates, however, that it might be inclined
to impose joint and several liability in this situation, if it happened
that plaintiff was unable to give sufficient evidence of the respective
injuries inflicted by each collision: "If deadlock should develop over
apportionment of damages, it would then be incumbent upon the
57
trial court to consider the language of Maddux v. Donaldson."
The language to which the court referred is, "The difficulties and
dangers [of the suit] are to be thrown upon those presumably in
the wrong, rather than upon him who was not in fault."58 Thus,
the Michigan court may be prepared to disregard completely the
time and place relation of the collisions. When there is a substantial
time and place difference between the collisions, as in Watts and
Caygill, the plaintiff will usually have some opportunity to ascertain
the amount of injury done by the first collision before the second
"'375 Mich. 220, 134 N.W.2d 194 (1965).
" Prosser seems to favor the rule against joint and several liability, but
he strongly advocates allowing procedural joinder. Prosser, Joint Torts
and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. Rnv. 413, 435 (1937).
Watts v. Smith, 375 Mich. 220, 134 N.W.2d 194 (1965).
,134 N.W.2d at 196.
'T Watts v. Smith, supra at Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 426, 108 N.W.2d 33, 38 (1961),
quoting Cuddy v. Horn, 46 Mich. 596, 603, 10 N.W. 32, 34 (1891).
80
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occurs. Whereas, when the collisions occur within a short time of
each other, it is reasonable to assume that the injuries will not be
ascertainable until after the second collision. 9 It would seem that
when the plaintiff does have an opportunity to determine the extent
of his injuries from one of the collisions, the courts should require
him to do so and allow only separate actions against the wrongdoers.
If for some reason the plaintiff fails to determine his injuries after
the first collision, the inference of Watts is that the Michigan court
still would impose joint and several liability upon the defendants.
Whether the individual courts specifically concern themselves
with the plight of the plaintiff, the time and place relation of the
collisions, or other criteria, it seems they are in reality making the
same fundamental determination-whether, as a policy matter, they
are going to impose joint and several liability, on the theory that it
would be unfair to make the plaintiff sustain the burden of allocating the injuries in a given case. Bound up in this must necessarily
be the consideration of how far they will go in imposing such
liability, which seems to be largely determined by whether the collisions are sufficiently related in terms of time and place to make the
burden of separation of damages more unfair to the plaintiff than
to the defendants. What that time and place relation must be is
the concern of the individual court, which should apply the above
considerations to the facts of each case separately. 0 Any attempt
at prediction of the outcome of a given situation would be useless,
This is well stated by the concurring opinion of Black, J.:
The time element in these cases is usually crucial to decisions the
trial judge must make when he prepares to instruct the jury. It is so
because, if there is a lapse of appreciable time between the consecutive
blows, that lapse usually provides some proof or inference from proof,
on strength of which the trier or triers of fact may and accordingly
should assess the plaintiff's damages in separate amounts, however
difficult it may be as a practical matter to establish the exact proportion.
On the other hand, if the time element is too short for such proof, or if
other factors combine to eliminate any such proof, the jury should be
instructed that the causally negligent actors are to be held liable as
joint tortfeasors.
Watts v. Smith, supra at -, 134 N.W.2d at 197.
" In Watts v. Smith, 375 Mich. 120, 134 N.W.2d 194 (1965), the
concurring opinion of Black, J., pointed this out:
The received delineative proof in each case will determine best what
rule or rules of law the trier or triers of fact should apply to these
successive impact cases, and . . . the availability of proof (of what was
after the first impact, and ... after the second . . . and so on) will . .
provide .

.

. dependable legal guides.

Watts v. Smith, supra at -,

134 N.W.2d at 197.
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though it does seem safe to predict that the courts will not impose
joint and several liability where there is absolutely no relation between the collisions, as in Caygill and Watts. This, of course, is
with the possible exception of Michigan.
As for the negligent defendant, the recent trend in relaxing the
rules of joint and several liability has put him at a disadvantage. He
is now subjected to the possibility of being required to pay a greater
share of the damages than was actually caused by his own negligence. However, one of the parties must necessarily be at a disadvantage in having the burden of proof, and it seems quite fair to
put this upon the defendant rather than upon the innocent plaintiff.
In mitigation of the harshness of this rule, a few courts that impose
joint and several liability will permit either defendant to produce
evidence to show what degree of the damage was, or was not,
caused by his negligence and will allow any judgment against him
to be reduced accordingly.'
JoHN R.

JOLLY, JR.

o See, e.g., Copley v. Putter, 93 Cal. App. 2d 453, 207 P.2d 876 (D.C.
Cal, 1949). Cf., Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (in
effect shifting the burden of proof to the defendants). North Carolina in
the past has held negligent drivers causing successive collisions jointly and
severally liable without giving them an opportunity to prove that they were
not responsible for all the damage. E.g., Hodgin v. North Carolina Pub. Serv.
Corp., 179 N.C. 449, 102 S.E. 748 (1920). But see, Fox v. Hollar, 257
N.C. 65, 125 S.E.2d 334 (1962), and its treatment in North Carolirna Case
Law-Torts, 41 N.C.L. REv. 401 (1963).

